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ABSTRACT
URBAN TERRORISM: STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING TERRORIST ATTACKS 
AGAINST THE DOMESTIC URBAN ENVIRONMENT
John J. Kiefer 
Old Dominion University, 2001 
Chair: Dr. Wolfgang Pindur
This study identifies strategies to mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks against the 
domestic urban environment. It uses multiple qualitative research methods to identify 
patterns of attack used by terrorists against urban targets in the United States and suggest 
ways for policymakers to mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack through not only physical, 
but also organizational, political, legal, and social strategies. It uses case analysis, literature 
review, and interviews with experts in domestic terrorism preparedness to develop and 
suggest solutions.
Terrorism, as with other criminal acts, can have can best me met by implementing 
strategies to mitigate the impact o f this form of crime. Governments are simultaneously 
confronted with a rapidly growing number o f  potential terrorist targets that must be 
secured, and constrained by democratic principles from utilizing many technological 
devices to secure those targets. Creating an effective security system that protects against 
a wide range o f terrorist attacks while it continues to afford a maximum exercise of 
democratic freedoms and privileges is a formidable task.
Several broad, theory-based categories of defending urban spaces are considered. 
This study builds on past research and extends defensible space theory with careful 
consideration o f the special challenges in dealing with terrorist attacks. The potential for
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terrorist attack is reviewed, and an understanding o f  who the domestic urban terrorists 
are, why they may attack the urban built environment, what might they attack, and what 
can be done about is developed. Recommendations for public policy and future research 
are presented.
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The genesis o f modem terrorism in the United States was the bombing o f New 
York's World Trade Center in 1993. This bombing incident was the largest 
international terrorist attack ever conducted in the continental United States. In 1994, 
the FBI successfully thwarted an attempt by terrorists to detonate a bomb in the 
Lincoln Tunnel. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was one of the largest explosions 
ever investigated by the FBI. That single bombing killed more Americans in the 
United States than any terrorist attack in the modem era (Terrorist Research and 
Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996). It demonstrated, for the first time, the real and 
deadly threat of terrorism to urban America.
BACKGROUND
To date, most o f the American planning effort has been directed at response 
capabilities and security procedures. Very little attention has yet been paid to 
designing projects from the start in a manner that will mitigate the effects o f a 
terrorist attack. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment to the FY97 National Defense 
Authorization Act, in response to concern about domestic terrorism, provided 
authority for the Defense Department to address domestic vulnerabilities (National 
defense panel, 1997). Yet the over $40 million allocated was used, according to H.
The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements o f  the Publication Manual o f  the 
American Psychological Association, 4th edition, Washington, D.C.
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Allen Holmes, assistant secretary o f defense for special operations and low-intensity 
conflict, only for training, access to federal assistance (after an incident, and) 
exercises (National defense panel, 1997).
There has been recent statistical data that suggest that buildings and 
institutions, not people, have been the targets chosen by terrorists. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in an information pamphlet, states that 
terrorists look for visible targets where they can avoid detection before or after an 
attack such as large cities, major international events and high-profile landmarks. 
FEMA goes on to list likely targets for terrorist attacks as buildings, auditoriums, 
sports complexes, tunnels, bridges, transportation facilities, utilities, or other public 
services. Such facilities in urban areas are especially vulnerable.
Yet despite more effective physical security and technological 
countermeasures, it is extremely difficult to harden potential targets in urban areas. 
Even if  the range of weapons is relatively short, it will be a considerable challenge to 
expand an anti-terrorist security zone beyond the immediate periphery o f potential 
urban targets like sports facilities, government buildings, corporate headquarters, or 
power plants. Appropriate defense for urban public facilities requires planning for 
terrorist attack well before development of projects.
According to the FBI, most recent terrorist incidents in the United States have 
involved conventional explosives in the forms of car, pipe, or letter bombs (Terrorist 
Research and Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996). Future threats, however, may employ 
more exotic weapons, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) agents. The 
increasing accessibility o f these weapons of mass destruction has elevated
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
significantly the concern over terrorism. In 1996, Georgia Senator Sam Nunn said that 
the United States had a remarkable lack o f  domestic preparedness to deal with NBC 
terrorist attacks. He went on to say that, "an attack o f  this kind is not a question o f ‘ifi 
b u t ‘when’” (Starr, 1996). Given the tremendous destructive threat in terms o f both 
loss o f life and damage to the built environment, urban planners and policymakers 
must consider the potential for terrorist acts against urban targets, particularly those 
involving Weapons o f Mass Destruction (WMD) — the use of nuclear, biological, or 
chemical agents — as well as conventional munitions (bombs).
THE PROBLEM
Terrorist acts aimed at cities in the United States pose a significant problem. 
According to the final report o f the National Defense Panel, created by Congress in 
1996, the "defense o f the homeland" will become a critical problem as more nations 
hostile to U.S. interests acquire weapons o f mass destruction and the means to deliver 
them (National defense panel, 1997).
Richard Clarke, director of Counter terrorism with the National Security 
Council, agrees. "In the future, enemies are going to attack us. They're going to look 
for our Achilles' heel, and our Achilles' heel is here — here in the homeland," Clarke 
said. He said the World Trade Center bombing by Islamic fundamentalists shows 
foreign terrorists' willingness to attack the United States directly (DiefFenbach, 1999).
Leaders also are worried about the increasing availability o f weapons o f mass 
destruction and the willingness of terrorists to use them. For example, the chemicals 
used to make both the Oklahoma City bomb and the toxic Sarin gas released in Tokyo
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in 1995 were purchased on the open market- Officials also are concerned that nuclear 
technology may fall into the wrong hands.
Besides becoming easier to get, these weapons are lethal. One expert 
described a 1979 incident in which a  fraction o f an ounce o f anthrax was accidentally 
released in the Soviet Union, killing 69 people within a three mile radius. The release 
o f a large amount of anthrax or other biological or chemical weapon in a major 
metropolitan area could result in thousands o f casualties (Dieffenbach, 1999).
The FBI has investigated more than 160 cases involving the use or threatened 
use o f weapons of mass destruction over the past two years. While most are hoaxes, 
they still spread panic. More importantly, only one event would be a catastrophe. In 
its series of reports, "Terrorism in the United States," the FBI says that supporters of 
formalized terrorist groups continue to view the United States as an attractive refuge 
and staging area. In addition, it said that extremists with loose affiliations to terrorist 
organizations continue to view the United States as both a staging area and target. The 
report notes that terrorists studying the attack against the World Trade Center and the 
Oklahoma City bombing "could prompt future terrorists to plan their attacks with 
greater care” (FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1991). The recent 
terrorist bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, 
Tanzania and the resulting U.S. retaliatory strikes against known terrorist strongholds 
in Afghanistan and Sudan have given a renewed sense of urgency to preparing for 
domestic terrorist attacks.
On the other side o f the political spectrum, right wing extremist groups -- 
which generally adhere to an anti-government or racist ideology — continued to gain
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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supporters (Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996). Many o f these 
recruits feel displaced by rapid changes in the U.S. culture and economy, or are 
seeking some form of personal affirmation (DeHennis, 1997). As American society 
continues to change, the potential for hate crimes by extremist right wing groups is an 
increasing concern.
During the 1995 seditious conspiracy trial in New York o f Egyptian Shaykh 
Omar Abdel Rahman and several followers, one Sudanese national testified that 
Sudanese diplomats were aware o f the conspiracy to bomb major landmarks in New 
York City. One Sudanese diplomat allegedly offered to help the conspirators place a 
bomb at the United Nations by providing diplomatic license plates. The U.S. 
Department of State, in coordination with the FBI, declared the diplomat at the 
Sudanese Mission to the United Nations persona non-grata in 1996 (Terrorist 
Research and Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996).
Some supporters in the United States are believed to be conducting criminal 
activity — to include military-style training — in support of terrorist groups' objectives 
(FBI). With the conviction of Shaykh Rahman, the detention o f HAMAS leader Musa 
Abu Marzook, and the American retaliatory strikes against known terrorist 
strongholds in Kenya and Tanzania, it is possible that members o f formal terrorist 
groups will be considering some form of retaliation.
Terrorists in the United States continued a general trend in which fewer 
attacks are occurring in the United States, but individual attacks are becoming more 
deadly (Driscol, 1996). Recipes for large explosives are available for any extremist 
willing to research them. It is likely that the United States will continue to face the
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threat o f "spectacular terrorism" for the foreseeable future (Terrorist Research and 
Analytical Center (U.S.), 1996).
In recent years, numerous foreign and domestic terrorists were either 
apprehended or sentenced to prison. Several known terrorist groups and even some 
pariah nations have publicly threatened to retaliate. Other groups may be considering 
revenge, but have not broadcast their intent.
At first glance, the threat of domestic terrorism and the scope o f potential 
methods and targets may appear overwhelming. Activity by right-wing extremist 
groups has remained difficult to assess because o f the cell-type structure and other 
clandestine tactics many groups have adopted and the fact that most groups operate in 
rural areas. Problems have appeared to increase since the Oklahoma City bombing. 
Klanwatch — a project o f the nonprofit Southern Poverty Law Center that attempts to 
curb Klan and racist violence through litigation, education, and monitoring — reported 
that "[tjhere were 858 groups operating in the United States in 1996, a 6 percent 
increase over the 809 groups noted in 1994 and 1995” (Officials Bolster Action Vs. 
Far Right, 1997). Although others who track extremist activity acknowledge the 
difficulty when determining the level o f threat, a concern for future activity remains. 
The same report, along with numerous others, warns o f  increased violence, including 
the possibility o f biological and chemical attacks (Officials Bolster Action Vs. Far 
Right, 1997). Disagreement exists concerning the level o f threat, but the need to 
prepare and plan for the possibility of an incident occurring in any jurisdiction, 
regardless o f location or size, remains strong.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research questions are:
1. What strategies can be implemented to mitigate the impact o f terrorist 
attacks on the urban built environment -- attacks using either conventional or weapons 
o f  mass destruction?
2. What are the unintended effects o f these strategies?
3. Where are the gaps in existing terrorist/crime mitigation theories — 
especially in light o f emerging threats from “weapons of mass destruction” i.e. 
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
To best answer these questions, four sub-questions will be answered 
("attack” for the purposes o f the research is generally synonymous with "attempted 
attack."):
1. What types o f terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built 
environment have taken place over the previous twenty years?
a. Who were the terrorists?
b. What did the terrorists attack?
c. When did the terrorists attack?
d. Where did the terrorists attack?
e. Why did the terrorists attack?
f. How did the terrorists attack?
2. What are the weaknesses/vulnerabilities in the preparedness for attack 
against the built environment o f American urban areas?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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3. How can the involved agencies play a more effective role in ensuring the 
readiness of the urban built environment for terrorist attack?
THE LIMITATIONS
This study will be limited to terrorist (as defined by the FBI) attacks, both 
actual (attack actually caused damage to property and/or loss o f life) and attempted 
(attack was preempted by law enforcement personnel). Because o f the significant 
differences in politico-legal environments, it will examine only domestic (vice 
international) attacks. The subject o f this study will be narrowed to attacks against 
the urban built environment. By this it is meant capital facilities and land assets 
commonly associated with and supportive o f urban densities (generally over 1,000 
persons per square mile), and, generally including regional or community-based water 
distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, storm drainage, transportation 
(including public transportation), and parks. It will specifically exclude 
people/assassinations, attacks against hardened military targets even if  in an urban 
area (for example, a military base), or city-unique targets such as national 
monuments, embassies, or the White House. Finally, the study will also examine 
those attacks estimated by the FBI to be credible and serious. It will eliminate what 
the FBI or other law enforcement agencies have viewed and classified as frivolous 
threats, and will exclude attacks conducted by perpetrators later found to be mentally 
unbalanced.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH
This dissertation will contribute to practice and theory. Theory related to 
urban development and safety will be explored and extended to incorporate the recent 
phenomenon o f urban terrorism. The case study approach, plus interviews with a 
purposeful sample of subject matter experts, will lead to a  more complete 
understanding o f the causes and consequences o f terrorist acts in the United States. 
Clear, practical relevance beyond the research setting will be evident in that urban 
practice will be improved through refining urban design to prevent or mitigate the 
effects of terrorist attacks. It will give a priori consideration to the effects o f a 
conventional, chemical, biological, or nuclear attack against urban targets.
METHODOLOGY
The dissertation will use multiple qualitative research methods to identify 
patterns o f attack used by terrorists against urban targets in the United States and 
suggest ways for policymakers to design public facilities in urban areas to mitigate the 
effects o f a terrorist attack. The methodology will proceed in six parts as follows:
1) It will begin by creating an inventory o f domestic terrorist attacks 
against the urban built environment over the past twenty years.
2) Through careful analysis o f each o f the domestic terrorist attacks 
against the urban built environment, both successful and unsuccessful, shared patterns 
o f attack will be analyzed and vulnerabilities identified. A  matrix, showing what these 
attacks had in common and what was uncommon with regard to types of built
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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environment, method o f attack, and vulnerability, will be constructed. This will form 
a foundation for further analysis. The matrix is provided as Appendix A.
3) Next, trends will be identified and definitions operationalized. A 
conscious effort will be made to ensure that this study meets the criteria for a quality 
research design. Multiple sources o f evidence will be analyzed using triangulation 
(Yin, 1984) and will provide the basis for the development o f interview questions.
4) A comprehensive literature review will be undertaken to suggest and 
develop ideas for mitigating the effects o f urban terrorism on the built environment 
and to further refine interview questions.
5) Expert testimony will be gathered through interviews with experts in 
terrorism, urban design, and emergency management. An explanatory letter will be 
mailed to the participants to describe the purpose and extent of involvement in the 
interview process, the method o f selection, and secure participant's agreement to 
participate. Follow-up telephone contact will be made. These interviews will aid in 
refining the initial suggestions for reducing the severity of terrorist attack developed 
previously through the inventory o f incidents and literature review, and will assist in 
further qualitative development o f those ideas.
6) Given the ideas developed in the steps outlined above, several 
strategies for mitigating the impact o f terrorist attack on the urban built environment 
will be identified. They will provide the basis for the conclusions and 
recommendations for mitigating the effects o f  terrorism on the urban built 
environment.
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One instrument will be used in this study: an interview format and questions 
guide (Appendix B). The interview format and questions guide will provide the 
structure and framework for conducting the interviews with a purposeful sample of 
experts, selected from the agencies that have major responsibility for domestic 
terrorism incidents. The guide will list the introductory comments by the interviewer, 
a review o f agreement to participate and tape the interview, a list o f  questions (from 
general to specific, with a conclusion back to the broad question), and the debrief 
comments.
The purpose of the interviews is to aid in refining the initial suggestions for 
reducing the severity of terrorist attack developed in the inventory case study analysis 
and literature review. They will assist in further qualitative development o f those 
ideas. One or two broad questions will be asked to prompt the initial response in the 
expert, and several more focused questions will be used if  the interviewee has not 
provided depth in explanation o f  the initial response. The goal will be to elicit specific 
vulnerabilities, causes, and ideas for mitigating terrorist attacks against urban areas.
OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT
Chapter I will describe the research problem by giving a statement of the 
problem, the background and significance o f the problem, state the research 
questions, and provide operational definitions. Chapter II will review the literature 
related to urban design for safety and terrorism. Chapter III will detail the 
methodology for the study, and Chapter IV will present the study results and analysis. 
Chapter V will offer conclusions and recommendations for further research.
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DEFINITIONS
Definitions adopted by researchers are often not uniform, so key and 
controversial terms are defined to establish positions taken in the research.
Conventional weapons — utilize missiles or (non-nuclear) explosions and, as a 
function of their design, inflict physical injury by imparting kinetic energy but not 
foreseeably to a specified part o f the body (Coupland, 1996).
Terrorism - this study will use a current and detailed definition of terrorism 
given by the Federal Bureau o f Investigation. Terrorism is officially defined by the 
Bureau as: “the unlawful use o f force or violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social goals” (FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical 
Center, 1991).
Urban — is defined for purposes of this study as “an inhabited place; a place 
larger than a village or town: a large, prominent or important center of population: a 
relatively permanent and highly organized center having a population with varied 
skills, lacking self-sufficiency in the production o f food, and usually depending on 
manufacture and commerce to satisfy the wants of its inhabitants” (Merriam Webster 
Dictionary).
Weapons o f  Mass Destruction - Weapons that cause indiscriminate, 
widespread destruction. Such weapons include nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons in any form, and associated delivery systems. These three types of weapons 
are also referred to as NBC weapons (United States Air Force Counterproliferation 
Master Plan).
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SCOPE, KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITS OF THE STUDY
The dissertation is limited in scope due to both resources and time constraints. 
It will examine and suggest strategies to mitigate the impact o f urban terrorist attack 
against the urban built environment. The cases used in the inventory o f terrorist 
incidents over the past twenty years will meet the criteria and limitations outlined 
below. Specifically, it will be limited to:
1. Terrorist (as defined by the FBI) attacks, both actual (attack actually 
caused damage to property and/or loss o f life) and attempted (attack was preempted 
by law enforcement personnel);
2. Domestic (vice international) attacks;
3. Attacks against the urban built environment means capital facilities 
and land assets commonly associated with and supportive o f urban densities 
(generally over 1,000 persons per square mile); and, generally including regional or 
community-based water distribution, wastewater collection and treatment, storm 
drainage, transportation (including public transportation), and parks (The New Jersey 
State Planning Commission, 1992). It will exclude such attacks that involve specific 
people/assassinations, attacks against hardened military targets even if in an urban 
area such as a military base, or city-unique targets such as national monuments, 
embassies, or the White House;
4. Attacks estimated by the FBI to be credible and serious (i.e. will 
eliminate frivolous threats) -- but the study will specifically exclude attacks conducted 
by perpetrators later found to be mentally unbalanced.
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A purposeful sample o f experts, selected by the researcher both for their 
expertise and for availability, will be used in the interviews.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has laid the foundations for the report. It has introduced the 
research problem and research questions. Then the research was explained and 
justified, definitions were presented, the methodology was briefly described, the 
report was outlined, and the limitations were given. On these foundations, the report 
can proceed with a detailed description o f  the research.
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INTRODUCTION
This study will suggest strategies to mitigate the impact o f  terrorist attack on 
the urban built environment. In this chapter, several broad, theory-based categories of 
strategies are considered. It builds on past research and extends defensible space 
theory with careful consideration o f the special challenges in dealing with terrorist 
attacks. The potential for terrorist attack is reviewed, and an understanding o f who 
the domestic urban terrorists are, why they may attack the urban built environment, 
what might they attack, and what can be done about it will be developed. These 
questions will be the focus of the research in subsequent chapters.
Several broad theories regarding defending physical territory against criminal 
acts have been developed, and will be described in detail later in this chapter. The 
concept of defensible space originated along with the earliest cities, where there was a 
need to provide physical separation from outside the community to ensure physical 
safety. The has been described in myriad histories, but by none more articulately than 
the noted urban critique Lewis Mumford in his classical work History o f  the City.
During the Second World War, Harold Lasswell linked physical defensibility 
to political and military readiness as a matter of public policy, coining the now 
famous concept of “The Garrison State.” The idea that physical spaces could 
somehow be influenced to enhance safety as a matter of public policy was expanded 
upon by the work of Jane Jacobs in The Death and Life o f  Great American Cities.
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16
Jacobs, writing in the early sixties and in the wake o f large scale urban renewal in 
American cities, argued that a priori design o f urban spaces could be employed to 
enhance the safety o f citizens. Jacobs stressed passive measures that would promote 
common ownership and surveillance o f  urban spaces.
In the early 1970’s, Oscar Newman published his work, Defensible Space. 
Newman built on the earlier ideas o f Jacobs and Lasswell, and argued for designing 
urban spaces to maximize defensibility and safety. In the late 1970’s, the concept of 
defending territory to enhance safety was taken one step further by advocates of 
proactive designs for security. Where Jacobs and Newman had argued for passive 
measures, the newer theorists, generally lead by Jeffery and his concept of CPTED 
(Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design), argued for proactive measures 
that encompassed active surveillance devices, hardened entry points, and adequate 
lighting to deter crime.
As the concept o f CPTED was developed and embraced by its proponents, it 
soon became apparent that the proactive approaches inherent in a CPTED philosophy 
were expensive, especially when compared to the essentially non-existent 
defensibility provided by the passive measures advocated by Jacobs and Newman. In 
order to best utilize limited proactive defensive measures, new theories on where 
crime occurs were developed. The premise was that, if  one could determine the most 
likely targets for criminal acts, one could best employ limited defensive resources at 
those locations. This work was pioneered by the Brantinghams with their theory on 
the Geometry o f Crime and Pattern Theory, and continued with the works of Mawbry 
with his theory on the Diffusion of Benefits, Allatt with Displacement Theory, Felson
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& Cohen with Routine Activity Theory, Sherman and Spelman with Crime-clustering 
Theory, Plaster & Carter with their Theories o f Territorial Reinforcement, Combs & 
Crowe with their theory o f Target Hardening, and LaVigne with Theories on 
Designing-in Crime Prevention.
The work o f  the above theorists in determining which areas were likely targets 
for criminal acts was largely dependent on yet other theorists, particularly Cornish & 
Clark with their Rational Choice Theory that took yet another step by attempting to 
understand how criminals made the decision to attack a target. The evolution and 
shifting major focus o f the major theories regarding defending physical territory 
against crime is shown below in Table 1. Figure 1, following, provides an overview 
of the development o f the major theories related to defending territory against 
criminal acts.
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Table 1. The Evolution and Shifting Major Focus of Major Theories 
Regarding Defending Physical Territory Against Crime_________
Physical Separation from Outside the 
Community
Beginning to 1950s 
Societal Influences: '‘The Huns at the 
Gate”
The Historical City; Lewis Mumford 
and others 
The Garrison State; Harold Lasswell
Passive Social Barriers Within the 
Community
1950s-1970s 
Societal Influences: Civil Rights, Great 
Society
Jane Jacobs
Passive Physical Barriers Within the 
Community
1970s
Societal Influences: Rising Crime Rates
Defensible Space; Oscar Newman 
CPTED; Jeffery 
Routine Activity Theory; Felson & 
Cohen
Targeting Specific Locations Within the 
Community
1970s-1980s 
Societal Influences: Social Stratification, 
Gated Communities
Theories on Geometry of Crime;
Brantinghams 
Theory on Diffusion of Benefits; 
Mawby 
Displacement Theory; Allat 
Situational Crime Prevention Theory; 
Clarke
Pattern Theory; Brantinghams 
Rational Choice Theory; Cornish & 
Clarke
Physical Separation Within the 
Community
1990s
Societal Influences: Continuing Social 
Stratification, Domestic Terrorism
Theories of Territorial 
Reinforcement; Plaster & Carter 
Theories on Designing-in Crime 
Prevention; LaVigne 
Theory of Target Hardening; Combs, 
Crowe
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Figure 1. The Relationship o f Major Theories Regarding Defending 
Physical Territory Against Crime
The Historical City o f  Great Walls. Towers. Gates 
Described by Lewis Mumford and other historians
The Garrison State 
Harold Lasswell. 1941
The Death and Life o f  Great American Cities 
Jane Jacobs, 1961




(Theories on Crime Prevention Through Urban Design) | 
Oscar Newman. 1972. 1980
Theories on the Geometry o f  Crime 
Brantinghams. 1977






Routine Activity Theory 




Rational Choice Theory 
Cornish & Clarke. 1986
/
Crime-clustering Theory 
Sherman. 1989 Theories ofTerritorial Reinforcement Plaster & Carter. 1993Spelman, 1995
Theories on Designing-in Crime Prevention
Theory o f  Target Hardening 
Combs. 1997
LaVigne, 1997 Crowe. 1991
This chart is adapted from a  chart provided a t the College of Architecture and Urban Studies at Virginia Tech at http://ww.arch.vt.edu/crinieprev/pages/ 
hdevbody.html
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Terrorism is a criminal act, and, as with other criminal acts, strategies can be 
undertaken to mitigate the impact of this form o f crime. Former FBI Director 
William Webster told a  congressional subcommittee in 1987 that the most important 
characteristic of the FBI’s definition o f terrorism “is emphasizing the criminal aspect 
o f it” (U.S. House o f Representatives, 1987).
Governments are simultaneously confronted with a rapidly growing number of 
potential terrorist targets that must be secured, and constrained by democratic 
principles from utilizing many technological devices to secure those targets. Creating 
an effective security system that protects against a wide range o f terrorist attacks 
while it continues to afford a maximum exercise o f democratic freedoms and 
privileges is a formidable task indeed. As this study is limited to examining strategies 
to mitigate terrorist attacks on the urban built environment, this chapter will begin by 
examining the basis for mitigating and preventing criminal acts in urban areas.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR A TERRITORIAL DEFENSE 
AGAINST TERRORISM
Defending Space: The Walled City
Lewis Mumford theorized that the paranoid physical structure o f the city 
manifested itself in the walled city. The great cities o f antiquity, he noted in his 
classic work, “The City in History,” controlled access to their space by designing and 
building great walls, with massive gates to control and limit those who entered. In
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Mumford’s words, “The protected economy o f the medieval corporation was, in 
origin, based on the corporate superiority o f  the walled town over the barbarous, 
insecure life o f  the open country” (Mumford, 1961).
Harold Lasswell’s Garrison State Construct
The formulation of the garrison state construct represents Harold Lasswell’s 
most provocative and challenging scenario for the future. In the development of the 
garrison state construct, Lasswell was stimulated by the work of Auguste Comte, who 
had suggested a social evolution moving through feudal to industrial (Comte, 1970) 
and Herbert Spencer, for whom societies were either military or industrial (Spencer, 
1940). Lasswell theorized that the garrison state would develop from the industrial 
state in response to technical advancement (Lasswell, 1941).
Lasswell offered the garrison state construct in 1937 in response to the Sino- 
Japanese War. He reasoned that technological changes within the military would alter 
the relationship between the military institutions and the civilian societies of which 
they were a part. This projection was consistent with his general perspective that 
technological change is always accompanied by social dislocations and that these 
dislocations were responsible for psychological tensions that threaten the rationality 
o f  political processes (Lasswell, 1941).
The crucial technological development that prompted Lasswell’s reflections 
and resulted in the garrison state construct was the introduction o f air power to 
military efforts. He perceived that military air power would make civilians as 
vulnerable to attack as were military installations and personnel. In essence, he argued
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that the development o f military air power generated a democratization o f risk. The 
garrison state construct became a widely embraced theory o f civil-military 
relationships. Many intellectuals subscribed to it, as did representatives o f the mass 
media. The construct o f the garrison state has been expanded to describe any broadly 
applied exclusionary physical barriers among society or segments o f society 
(Lasswell, 1941).
Defense From Within
The concept that physical form could affect the level of security in an urban 
community was perhaps first proposed by Jane Jacobs (1961) in her now seminal 
work, The Death and Life o f  the Great American City. This work was first and 
foremost an attack on the urban planning practices of the 1950's, such as slum 
clearance and urban renewal, which Jacobs saw as unnecessarily destroying a number 
of the older urban neighborhoods. Jacobs argued that several factors within such 
neighborhoods provided a natural security blanket for the entire community: the 
structures were close to the street, with stoops, porches and street-level windows; 
members o f the community used such structures and the street itself for social 
interaction; and through the closeness o f the communities, strangers could easily be 
identified. Thus, the physical nature o f the neighborhoods encouraged social 
interaction, which then increased overall security. When these communities were 
"renewed," the much different physical environment (larger housing and commercial 
complexes, wider and more-traveled streets, etc.) weakened the social community and 
greatly reduced the effectiveness o f this natural method of law enforcement.
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Jacobs countered the accepted wisdom o f the time that demanded wide streets, 
tall buildings well set back from the street and each other, and turned toward 
courtyards rather than out to the sidewalk. She found that the new homogeneity was 
dull, that dullness was a blight that drained vitality from the streets, and that streets 
that did not attract people soon deteriorated. Jacobs theorized that people are 
attracted by people, not by open spaces, and she pointed to the old, richly textured 
neighborhoods that were a mix o f housing, businesses and industry as the models to 
be emulated (Jacobs, 1961).
Today, Jacobs’ observations have become so much a  part o f the theory o f 
urban life that it is hard to imagine how controversial they were at the time — 
principles such as the importance o f neighborhoods, mixed-use developments that 
contain housing shops, and offices, the need for density and the recognition that 
people, more than anything else, ensure the safety o f public areas (Jacobs, 1961).
THEORIES ON DESIGNING TO DETER CRIME
As noted by Mumford, Lasswell and Jacobs, the oldest forms o f crime 
prevention were undertaken with the knowledge that making changes to places might 
prevent undesirable compromises to personal safety. Oscar Newman's (1972) work 
built on Jacob's argument that physical structure was an important aspect o f  creating a 
secure environment. Newman argued that the degree that a space is considered private 
influences whether that place will be secure. Very public places, in which no one can 
claim ownership, are dangerous, in that no one community has a stake enforcing 
security. The key, according to Newman, is to "privatize" many public places around
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where people live. For Instance, Newman argues that multi-family housing complexes 
could be designed in which only a small number o f  units share a common entrance, 
and door and windows all face this common area. Through this physical modification, 
the lobby, stoop and sidewalk area, usually very public, becomes much more private, 
as residents know who should be there, and are aware when "intruders" are present. 
Conversely, potential criminals will see the area as less accessible, and less an 
opportune environment for criminal activity (Newman, 1972).
Newman stimulated interest in the link between the built environment and 
crime. Newman’s theory was based on a comparison o f two urban areas and asserted 
that the differences in design were the principal reasons for the differences in crime. 
However, the limited number o f places observed and the failure to take into account 
other differences suggested to some that his conclusions may have been overstated 
(Mahew, 1979; Mawby, 1977; Merry, 1981; Taylor etal., 1980).
To address these concerns, Newman expanded on his theories in a later book 
(Newman, 1980). Other studies of the influence o f design have compared more sites 
(Coleman, 1985; Poyner, 1983; Poyner & Webb, 1991). All pointed to the association 
of design features and crime, particularly features that allow unfettered movement 
through urban areas.
These theories all generally argue that physical features that offer better 
surveillance and proximity o f sites to well-used locations enable control of spaces 
(Newman, 1972) (Jacobs, 1961). Newman theorized that four elements of physical 
design, both individually and in concert, contribute to the creation o f secure 
environments. The first element of this theory is the territorial definition o f the
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physical environment, which is the area o f influence. This definition works by 
subdividing the environment into zones toward which the users o f the space easily 
adopt proprietary attitudes. These users o f space become responsible for the 
cleanliness and safety of the space as if  it were their own (Newman, 1972).
The second element o f the theory is the positioning of windows to allow the 
users o f the space to survey the exterior and interior public areas o f their environment 
naturally. The goal of surveillance is to avoid designing blind spots and allow 
supervision o f open areas that legitimate users use in a safe manner. The third 
element o f the theory is adaptation o f  the building form to avoid the stigma o f 
peculiarity that allows others to perceive the vulnerability and isolation o f the 
occupants (Newman, 1996).
The fourth element of the theory involves enhancing safety by locating 
buildings in functionally sympathetic urban areas adjacent to non-threatening 
activities. Placing compatible-use building types together is a key concept in zoning 
and building codes and land use plans (Newman, 1995).
Newman based his theory on the assumption that territorial behavior involves 
personalizing or marking a place or object and communicating that it is owned by a 
person or group. Defensive responses may sometimes occur when territorial 
boundaries are violated (Newman, 1976). Newman theorized that a range o f 
territories make up a person’s territorial network. These include public, secondary, 
and private territories. The longer a person occupies a territory, the more 
psychologically comfortable and familiar he or she becomes with it. For example, 
public territories, such as bus seats or city sidewalks, are the least personalized.
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Secondary territories, such as neighborhoods, which are also characterized by shared 
ownership among members of a group or culture, are more familiar and personalized. 
Primary territories, such as homes and apartments, are most personalized (Newman & 
Franck, 1980).
Newman’s fundamental assumption is that most criminals behave with some 
rationality, selecting for their crimes locations they believe will offer high rewards but 
very low risk o f being caught. To deter crime, then, spaces should convey to would 
be intruders a strong sense that, if  they enter, they are very likely to be observed, to be 
identified as intruders, and to have difficulty escaping.
Defensible space theory has received strong supporting evidence from studies 
in Britain and the United States (Newman & Franck, 1980) (Newman & Franck, 
1982) (Perkins et al., 1992) (Taylor e ta l., 1984) (Taylor, 1988). Studies o f varying 
quality began testing these ideas in the early 1970's and continued at a rapid pace for 
the next dozen years. In 1980, a theory was formulated that made a distinction 
between "first generation" and "second generation" defensible space (Taylor et al., 
1980). In the latter version, researchers considered more carefully how the impact of 
physical features on crime mitigation might depend upon other social and cultural 
features in the setting.
Yet many disagreed with defensible space theory. Some have argued that the 
principles are too mechanistic and narrow to account for the complex issues o f  fear 
and crime (Brennan, 1997). Other critics object to the concept o f territoriality that 
forms the basis of the theory, while still others believe that Newman and his 
colleagues did a poor job o f picking matched sites for comparison and analyzing their
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data (Krupat & Kubzansky, 1987). One of the major limitations to expanding the 
number of defensible space designs has been the lack o f research about how potential 
terrorists view or use the physical features in question.
What these arguments clearly suggest, is that natural police power is 
significantly superior to the more artificial, state-imposed police power. In other 
words, the existence o f  a  social community which "looks out for its own," and of a 
physical structure which encourages such community and allows for widespread 
community surveillance, is better able to deter criminals and respond to crime when it 
does happen. While Newman readily admits that in contemporary urban America a 
situation can not be envisioned in which no state police presence was required 
(Newman, 1972), the effectiveness of this artificial police power depends greatly on 
how equipped the communities are to prevent crime.
THEORIES ON “DESIGNING-IN” CRIME PREVENTION
C. Ray Jeffery, a criminologist from Florida State University, coined the term 
"CPTED" and studied the relationship between the physical environment and 
incidence of crime (Cisneros, 1995). Studies were undertaken where criminals were 
interviewed as to why they chose a certain location for the crime that was committed, 
and what the influencing factors, if  any, were to that environment. Based on these 
studies, several theories about "designing-in” crime prevention emerged. Crime 
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a theory that links the design, 
planning and structure o f cities, communities, buildings and neighborhoods (National 
Crime Prevention Council, 1997).
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The CPTED approach is a set o f  widely used techniques based on the 
defensible space argument. It first and foremost emphasizes the need to create a 
natural environment of limited access, surveillance and territoriality. The most widely 
used CPTED design modifications have become extremely popular among designers 
because they are seen as more incremental and less costly to install: for instance, the 
process o f target hardening uses barriers to entry (such as alarms, locks, bars, street 
layout, unbreakable glass, etc.), surveillance tools (better lighting, cameras, etc.) and 
other deterrents (property identification programs) to create a more secure 
environment. In these ways, the CPTED approach is a more practical corollary to the 
defensible space theory. Also, in contrast to the theories of Newman and Jacobs, 
many o f its features would undoubtedly be considered artificial or mechanical.
CPTED theorizes that the physical environment has an important impact on 
the types and location of crime both on small and large scale projects. The concept is 
that the physical environment can be manipulated to produce behavioral effects that 
will reduce the incidence and fear o f crime, and thus improve the quality o f life.
The theory of CPTED was bom in the 1960s after several studies were 
conducted on the effect of the physical environment on crime. Early CPTED 
concepts are associated with the work o f  not only Jeffery but also the already cited 
and ground-breaking theories of Oscar Newman and that of Jane Jacobs.
CPTED differs from traditional target hardening by emphasizing the 
development of three strategies; natural surveillance, natural access control and 
territorial reinforcement. Natural surveillance is a design concept that is directed at 
facilitating or keeping intruders under observation by natural means. Natural access
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control is directed at decreasing criminal activity and opportunity. Proponents o f 
CPTED theorized that one can deny access: to a target and create a perception o f  risk 
to offenders. This is commonly accomplisfcied by designing access to one central 
location.
Theories o f territorial reinforcement expand upon this by advocating the 
establishment o f boundaries by using physical design to differentiate public, semi­
public and private space. Curbs, landscaping, sidewalks and grade changes are 
commonly used tools (Plaster & Carter, 19*93). Clearly, this information is only the 
tip o f  the CPTED iceberg and many o f these strategies overlap.
Theories o f “designing in” crime prevention may be effective, but it is 
extremely difficult to determine if a design is effective. LaVigne (La Vigne, 1997) 
theorized that physical design and crime levels were correlated. She compared the 
Washington, D.C. Metro to three other urt>an rail transit systems and found that the 
Metro had less crime than the other systems. She also compared subway station crime 
to crime in the areas above-ground. If the system  had no influence on crime then the 
above-ground crime levels and station crim e levels should be correlated. I f  the system 
design prevented crime, then there should fce no relationship between station and 
above ground crime. LaVigne (La Vigne, 1997) found that, except for assaults, 
ground level and station crime were not co-rrelated. Although this is not a strong 
research design, it is the best evidence available to date that system design influences 
crime patterns.
Several other scholars have continued to advance theories o f defensible space. 
Concentration o f crime at places is predicted by routine activity theory (Cohen, 1998;
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Felson, 1998) and offender search theory (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). 
Sherman theorized that crime was clustered, in his studies o f  Boston and 
Minneapolis (Sherman et al., 1989).
Additional evidence supporting crime concentration theory at places has been 
found for specific types o f crime. In studies o f Kansas City and Indianapolis, crimes 
were found to be highly concentrated at a few places (Sherman & Rogan, 1995). 
Combining the results from several studies, Spelman theorized that 10 percent of the 
victims in the United States are involved in about 40 percent o f  the victimizations, 
that 10 percent o f the offenders are involved in over 50 percent o f the crimes, and that 
10 percent o f the places are sites for about 60 percent o f the crimes (Spelman & Eck, 
1989). Further, Spelman theorized that the concentration of crimes at a few places is 
relatively stable overtim e (Spelman, 1995a; Spelman, 1995b). These theories suggest 
that something about a few places facilitates crimes and something about most places 
prevents crimes.
THEORIES ON BLOCKING TERRORIST OPPORTUNITIES
Clarke argues that changes to places should involve making crime more 
difficult, risky, less rewarding, or less excusable. This theory is known as opportunity 
blocking (Clarke, 1992; Clarke, 1995). Opportunity blocking does not have to be done 
at places. It can also be built into potential terrorist targets.
A theory that one can design methods for blocking crime opportunities is 
called Situational Crime Prevention (Clarke, 1992; Clarke, 1995). Rather than look 
for a generic solution to a specific crime problem at a place, Situational Crime
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Prevention involves a thorough examination o f the problem and then development o f 
a unique set o f interventions to address this problem. Such an approach is advocated 
by not only situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1992), but also by problem-oriented 
policing theory (Goldstein, 1990).
Situational crime prevention theorizes that environmental approaches are an 
important dimension to any crime prevention strategy. The fundamental thrust is that 
it is possible to avoid “designing crime in(to)” urban areas. Planning developments to 
take advantage o f routine activity theory results in an area less conducive for crime 
(Clarke, 1983).
Critics of a situational theories o f  crime prevention say that it costs too much 
money, therefore it is more likely to redistribute victimization away from the wealthy 
to the poor. It also discounts the fact that not all offenders are determined to offend, 
but are rather opportunistic. Critics o f a situational approach argue that it ignores the 
“diffusion of benefits,” i.e. a theory that says if  there is a reduced concentration of 
targets, the whole area may benefit (Mawby, 1977).
Proponents of opportunity blocking theory argue that it may have a greater 
direct effect on offenders than other crime prevention strategies. This is because 
place-focused tactics might influence terrorists when they are deciding to commit a 
specific terrorist act. Most offender based strategies try to sway offenders weeks, 
months, or years before they confront a tempting criminal opportunity (Clarke, 1983). 
Clarke theorizes that, if offenders pay closer attention to the situation immediately 
before them than to the uncertain long-term risks of their behavior, it is quite possible 
that prevention at places may have a greater impact on offending than increases in
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penalties or less tangible increases in risks (e.g., decreases in police response time, 
increased police presence, or greater numbers o f arrests and convictions).
THEORIES OF TARGET HARDENING
Physical security has, as its objective, “the hardening o f the target against 
which an attack may be made” (Combs, 1997). According to Combs, no blueprint 
for physical security measures against terrorist attack has been adopted. Still, there are 
certain considerations and countermeasures that have begun to achieve acceptance in 
both the government and the business community. The question, can good planning 
and design make potential terrorist targets in urban areas less vulnerable? has not 
yet been answered.
Traditional crime prevention theories typically argue for making a target 
harder to get to by means of psychological and physical barriers (signage/closed 
circuit television/fences/locks), and response methods (security staff adequate 
laws/procedures/education). This is also known as target hardening, and is an 
effective and widely used strategy to reduce crime (Crowe, 1991).
The theory that place-focused interventions may cause the displacement of 
criminals to less protected locations is commonly raised as a threat to their 
effectiveness. Patricia Allatt (Allatt, 1984) has been one o f the few researchers to 
explicitly test this theory for displacement effects. In addition to identifying the target 
areas which received improved security, she examined other locations in the area 
immediately adjacent to the target area. And she used a control area that was far 
enough from the treatment area that it would not be contaminated by displacement.
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She found that crime in the target area increased by 9 percent one year after 
implementation, but in the control area crime had increased 77 percent. This suggests 
the program may have reduced potential crime, compared to what would have been in 
the absence o f the program. Crime increased 86 percent in the displacement area, but 
relative to the control area this was only a 9 percent increase over what could have 
been expected without the program. Thus, she was able to determine that 
displacement may have occurred, but was small relative to the overall program effect 
on the target area (Allatt, 1984).
Target hardening appears to reduce crime without major displacement effects. 
However, with only two studies, more rigorous research would make valuable 
contributions to our knowledge o f what works in place-focused crime prevention.
Assessing Physical Vulnerabilities
It is slowly being recognized by the government and business communities 
that security measures against terrorism must go beyond the level o f normal crime 
prevention. Combs theorizes that, although indeed criminals, terrorists are not 
“normal” criminals: their goals, their willingness to sacrifice innocent lives, and their 
willingness to die in their attacks make them extraordinary criminals, against whom 
extraordinary measures must be taken if  security is to be achieved and maintained 
(Combs, 1997). The nature and extent o f  these measures remain undetermined.
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THE THEORY OF THE RATIONAL TERRORIST
Research indicates that terrorists operate in a rational fashion; that is, they 
prefer to commit acts that require the least effort, provide the highest benefits, and 
pose the lowest risks. Researchers have applied this rational offender theory to a range 
o f crimes (Clarke, 1992) (Clarke, 1983) (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). Some types of 
terrorists follow a multistage planning process that begins with the selection o f an 
area where they feel they can operate comfortably, with low costs in terms o f time and 
effort, and where they stand a good chance o f  obtaining a reward for their efforts 
(Rengert, 1989). Subsequently, they select targets within that area (Taylor & 
Gottfredson, 1986). This view theorizes that terrorist acts are most likely to occur 
when potential terrorists encounter a suitable target where the chances o f detection by 
others are thought to be low or the terrorist, if  detected, will be able to exit without 
being identified or apprehended. The features o f the physical environment can 
influence the chances of a terrorist act occurring. They affect potential terrorists' 
perceptions about a possible attack site.
Rational offender theory would also suggest that crime prevention measures 
may produce diffusion of benefits rather than displacement of crime. This would 
occur if  offenders experience increased fear o f detection (that is, they perceive that the 
risk o f committing a crime has increased) and/or decreased likelihood o f  gain (that is, 
they perceive that the reward o f crime is reduced) beyond the actual scope o f the 
intervention. Diffusion of benefits is defined by Clarke (Clarke, 1992) as "the spread 
o f the beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places which are directly 
targeted, the individuals who are the subject o f control, the crimes which are the focus
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o f intervention, or the time periods in which an intervention is brought." When 
potential offenders are deterred (by increased fear o f detection and greater actual or 
perceived risk o f arrest) or discouraged (by reduced actual or perceived rewards of 
crime) beyond the degree merited by the preventive measures taken, diffusion of 
benefits will occur. Clearly, practitioners should seek to design interventions that 
reduce the total amount o f crime and/or that displace activity to less serious crime or 
to less victimized populations. Better still would be the design o f interventions whose 
effects reach beyond their target and thus produce diffusion o f benefits (Clarke,
1992).
Terrorists may decide whether or not to commit a terrorist act in a location 
after they determine the following:
o How easy will it be to enter the area? 
o How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear? 
o What are the chances o f being seen? 
o If seen, will the people in the area do something about it? 
o Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is 
committed (Clarke, 1983)?
In order to assess the impact of the physical environment on domestic terrorist 
attacks, and in order to suggest strategies to mitigate the impact o f those attacks, the 
questions What types o f  terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built 
environment have taken place already? Who were the attackers? What did they 
attack? Why did they attack it? What are the most likely urban targets fo r  terrorist
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attack? How will they attack the target? What options fo r  reducing the severity o f  
the attack (zoning, codes, etc.)? must be addressed.
LINKING THEORIES OF DEFENSIBLE SPACE TO THEORIES OF THE 
RATIONAL TERRORIST
Beyond Traditional Concepts o f  Defensible Space
Physical design changes are but one first step. Merry studied the criminal’s 
views on areas conducive to  committing crimes. She theorized that there are 
differences between areas that criminals and the general public feel are prime 
locations for crimes. Her m ain conclusion was that design can provide preconditions 
for effective control, but it cannot create such control if  the social fabric o f the 
community is fragmented. For example, in older urban locations in many cities, 
residents and entrepreneurs are often of different ethnic backgrounds (e.g., African- 
American residents vs. Korean or Arab-American entrepreneurs) and therefore have 
different cultures. Merry theorized that it is difficult for each group to interpret the 
behavior o f the other (Merry, 1981), which in turn may impede entrepreneurs' 
contributions to informal control over events on the street. An important role for 
police community-relations councils and local business organizations then, may be to 
develop strategies so these entrepreneurs can contribute meaningfully to resident- 
based control over street life.
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THEORIES OF CRIMES IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM
Richard Quinney presents an interesting theory on the way government should 
respond to crimes in support o f terrorism. He divides crimes into two basic types 
depending upon the motive of the perpetrator: crimes that are intended for purely 
personal profit are referred to as lumpen crimes, while crimes that reflect increased 
social consciousness are referred to as "crimes o f resistance." Although the crimes 
committed may be identical (i.e., robbery may be either a lumpen crime or a  crime o f 
resistance), Quinney suggests that governmental responses vary depending on the 
motive and intended victim. Consequently, i f  the victim of the robbery is simply 
another member o f the working class and the motive is personal profit, the 
governmental response would be substantially different than if  the victim were a 
member of the corporate community and the stolen money was to be used to fund a 
worker's revolution. The latter offense would, o f course, be defined as terrorism and 
subject to more intense law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts (Quinney, 1980).
THEORIES OF TERRORIST BEHAVIOR AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
Durkheim theorized that a certain level o f crime as well as other forms of 
deviant conduct (including terrorism) was viewed as "normal” in any society 
(Durkheim, 1966). Only when levels o f  deviance reached disruptive proportions were 
they perceived as indicative o f social pathology. Crime and deviance came to be seen 
as functional ~  performing some useful purpose for the maintenance o f social order. 
Using this line of reasoning, Kai Erikson wrote: “Deviant forms o f behavior, by 
marking the outer edges o f group life, give the inner structure its special character and
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thus supply the framework within which the people o f the group develop an orderly 
sense o f their own cultural identity” (Erikson, 1966). If deviant behavior is to some 
extent tolerated because o f  its "utility," Erikson asks under what conditions does 
society say enough is enough, and in what manner does society say it? Erikson goes 
on to maintain "we invoke emergency measures when the volume o f deviance 
threatens to grow beyond some level we have learned to consider ‘normal’" (Erikson, 
1966). His analysis o f crime waves in seventeenth century Puritan society resulted in 
a theory suggesting two things: first, that "emergency" social responses to deviance 
occur when society is threatened if  the behavior is allowed to continue; and second, 
that the response is apt to be highly publicized and punitively more severe than that 
toward other deviants (Erikson, 1966).
The application o f  this approach to governmental responses to terrorism is 
identical to that provided by Erikson's deviating Puritans: certain types of terror may 
be "condoned," as long as it is not too violent, too destructive, or too organized. The 
FBI routinely addresses this issue in officially labeling some acts as terroristic while 
ignoring other acts that appear equally harmful. However, once the bounds of 
"acceptability" are crossed, the government will muster all possible resources to 
publicly condemn the offenders. The prosecutor will give the terrorism case the 
highest priority as investigative and law enforcement assets are called in to assist in 
bringing the offenders to justice. At trial, the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” would 
be emphasized in the courtroom, and demands for maximum sentencing become 
common. According to the Erikson’s theory, the theme o f  any governmental response 
to terrorism is to restore the "symmetry and orderliness o f  nature itself," (Erikson,
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1966) to bring society back into a state o f  equilibrium  and thwart social change that 
might accelerate into anarchy.
THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS; AS VARIABLES
Some theorists see evidence of continuing; conflict even in a society 
supposedly characterized by overwhelming stability  and consensus (Turk, 1979). As 
Murray Edelman noted: “We have compelling evridence from a variety o f kinds o f 
observation that political beliefs, demands, and attitudes, far from being fixed and 
stable, are frequently sporadic in appearance, fluc-tuating in intensity, ambivalent in 
composition, and therefore logically inconsistent rin pattern and structure" (Edelman, 
1971). Although non-partisan conflict theory (or cultural deviance theory, as older 
versions in criminology are known) has a long traidition in the criminological 
literature, that perspective has assumed a more prom inent place in sociological theory 
within the past two decades (Blalock, 1989) (Boulding, 1989).
Of the few non-partisan conflict discussioms o f the response to terrorism that 
are available, Austin Turk's model of political crim inality provides the most 
comprehensive examination of the types of behavior one might expect the judicial 
system to exhibit in responding to terrorism (Turkt, 1982b). In particular, he describes 
three distinguishing features of political crimes: 1 ) explicit politically; 2) exceptional 
vagueness; and 3) greater permissiveness regarding law enforcement. Regarding the 
criminalization o f terrorism, Turk’s theory is straightforward: "Politicality, vagueness, 
and permissiveness in the legal definitions o f political criminality are especially 
apparent in the growing preoccupation with terrorism " (Turk, 1982a).
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On some issues, Turk's hypotheses are similar to the suggestions o f  Erikson's 
consensus approach. For example, both perspectives agree that when political 
authority is threatened, governmental agents are apt to focus upon the "consensual 
rather than the coercive foundations o f  law," (Turk, 1982b) maintaining that the 
prosecution o f terrorists is for the common good. Consequently, the terrorist who 
commits murder is defined as an "assassin," the arsonist is guilty o f "sabotage," and 
some minor offenses may be transformed into "conspiracy to overthrow the 
government," "sedition," or "treason." In other places, Turk seems to contradict this 
.basic argument by suggesting that political offenders (such as terrorists) are frequently 
charged with non-political crimes to avoid giving the public the impression that a 
serious social problem exists. The consistency with which government officials have 
persuaded the federal courts that persons charged with assassination or attempted 
assassination o f the president should be committed to mental institutions is cited as 
evidence o f this approach to governmental intervention (Turk, 1982a).
THEORIES ABOUT TERRORIST IDENTITY: EXTREMISTS RIGHT AND LEFT
Profiles and typological theories o f  terrorist groups have become common­
place. Since Charles Russell and Bowman Miller first published their theories in 
"Profile o f a Terrorist" in 1977 (Russell, 1977), attention has been focused repeatedly 
upon the demographic and psychological characteristics o f the men and women who 
turn to terroristic violence (Clutterbuck, 1980). Researchers describe terrorists as 
young, generally between eighteen and thirty-five years old; primarily male, although 
a larger percentage o f women are involved than in traditional criminality; and better
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educated than others in their age group (Rubenstein, 1987). Researchers also say 
that, contrary to Marxist theory, these men and women generally were from middle or 
upper income families whose parents were predominantly professional or white-collar 
workers (Russell, 1977) (Becker, 1977).
Virtually all of these findings are based upon studies of international 
terrorism. With terroristic activity occurring infrequently within the United States and 
with international terrorism dominating the news, the domestic American terrorist has 
been an ignored and frequently forgotten source of violence. Most people assume that 
the extremists in America who are willing to use terrorism as a political or social 
lever are closely related to their European cousins -- politically leftist with anarchist 
overtones (Wilkinson, 1987).
This view of the terrorist as universally leftist and Marxist permeates not only 
the news media but has left its mark upon academic studies of terrorism. The 
typological theories developed to create some order from the numerous terrorist 
groups reveal researchers' fascination and preoccupation with leftist violence 
(Flemming, 1988). Ever since Russell and Miller theories on the three major 
varieties of the 'urban guerilla' as 'anarchist,' 'Marxist-Leninist,' and 'nationalist,' 
research in terrorism has focused upon leftist political violence. We have accepted, 
with few reservations, that "it is the combination of these three in specific contexts 
which produces the variant left extremist philosophies espoused by most terrorists 
today" (Russell, 1977).
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THEORETICAL TYPOLOGIES OF AMERICAN TERRORISTS
Typologies o f terrorists and terrorist groups abound. Peter Flemming, Michael 
Stohl, and Alex Schmid have theorized that there are nearly fifty different typologies 
that attempt to categorize the varieties of terrorism (Flemming, 1988). They further 
reduce these typologies to four major types: (1) those based on terrorist group 
behavior; (2) those based on the motivation o f the terrorist; (3) those that discriminate 
on the basis of the method o f operation or types o f targets selected by the terrorist 
group; and (4) those that use the historical origins o f a terrorist group to distinguish it 
from other groups (Flemming, 1988).
According to the theories o f Flemming and his colleagues, the best typologies 
are mutually exclusive, are valid and reliable, and have a high degree of functional 
utility. In other words, one should be able to assign a terrorist group to one, and only 
one, category in any typology; different persons should be able to correctly label the 
category in which the terrorist group fits within the typology; and finally, the 
categories within the typology should be able to help us predict different behaviors or 
actions by terrorist groups assigned to those categories (Flemming, 1988).
Due to the relatively small number o f persons identified as having been 
involved in terrorism in America, typological theories with large numbers of 
categories limit any efforts to make meaningful statistical comparisons. The FBI has 
categorically divided terrorists’ activities into 'domestic' and 'international' terrorism. 
For the purpose of this study, 'domestic terrorism' will be divided further into: (1) left- 
wing, (2) right-wing, and (3) single-issue terrorism. Single-issue terrorists in the 
United States have focused primarily upon environmental issues. However, due to the
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small number o f persons who have been indicted for these acts, no statistical 
comparisons can be made. These distinctions are very similar to one o f Paul 
Wilkinson's theoretical typologies, which identified four categories o f extremism:
Left, Right, ethno-religious, and single-issue extremist movements (Wilkinson, 1987).
THEORIES REGARDING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LEFT-WING AND 
RIGHT-WING AMERICAN TERRORISTS
Wilkinson theorized that the 'extreme Left' is characterized by extreme 
egalitarianism, an extreme hatred of racism and capitalism, and an overt opposition to 
militarism. He described those within the 'extreme Right' as having "a belief in the 
intrinsic superiority o f  their own race or national group and the need to make their 
own race or national group supreme over other groups ... and a belief in the necessity 
and desirability o f war as a means of realizing national or racial destiny" (Flemming, 
1988).
THEORIES REGARDING TERRORIST IDEOLOGY
While left-wing terrorist groups in America have adopted primarily a political 
focus, most right-wing terrorists are ideologically bound by religious beliefs. The 
Christian Identity Movement provides the link that has tied rightist groups in America 
together. Frequently referred to as the "British Theory," the Christian Identity 
Movement is based on the belief that Aryans, not Jews, are God's chosen people-a 
conviction widely held by many fundamentalist churches in America. Sheldon Emry, 
pastor of the Lord's Covenant Church in Phoenix, Arizona, is one o f the movement's
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chief spokesmen. His radio program "America's Promise" was broadcast widely 
throughout the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. Members and leaders o f 
SPC, the Aryan Nations, and CSA have come from among those sharing that belief. 
The movement, which is anti-Semitic and anti-black, argues that America is the 
Promised Land, reserved for the Aryan people o f  God. Similar to Shiite terrorism in 
its justification o f violence, right-wing religious extremists in America advocate the 
use o f  terrorism as a prelude to war - the Armageddon, which will establish Christ's 
kingdom (Hoffinan, 1988).
Left-wing extremists traditionally have been sympathetic to, if  not ardent 
advocates of, Marxism and, unlike religious rightwing groups in the United States, are 
apt to view religion, as Marx did, as 'the opiate o f the masses.' Advocating the 
overthrow o f capitalism as an economic and political system, Marx maintained the 
necessity o f a 'worker' revolution before a classless society could be installed (Marx, 
1970). Religion, according to Marxist theory, has prevented the development of a 
proletariat collective consciousness necessary for revolutionary action, slows that 
process. While some left-wing extremist groups in America may not explicitly 
espouse Marxism, they share one major ideological similarity — a disdain for U.S. 
capitalism and its 'imperialism' and 'colonialism.' That commonality has led leftist 
groups to seek funding from similar sources. For example, while the El Rukns were 
seeking Libyan funds to bomb buildings in Chicago, Moammar Kaddafi was 
simultaneously funding the travels of such diverse extremists as Vernon Bellecourt, 
Bill Means, and Kwame Ture (a.k.a. Stokely Carmichael).
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THEORIES ON HUMAN NATURE AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
Underlying both left- and right-wing terrorist group ideologies are their views 
on human nature and human motivation. The basic beliefs on these issues provide the 
framework by which extremists o f either type view the world, American government, 
and social programs funded by tax money. The groups categorized as right-wing 
repeatedly write o f their belief that people should be rewarded based on the value of 
their labor. Described by George Homans as'distributive justice/ (Homans, 1974) 
the theory suggests the commonly held belief that humans are motivated by rewards 
and punishments. When combined with the religious influence o f the Christian 
Identity Movement, most right-wing terrorists express a strong belief in the 'protestant 
ethic’ (Weber, 1976). Logically expanded, these basic views are central to the right- 
wing terrorists' opposition to affirmative action, welfare, and educational programs 
for the economically disadvantaged that exclude non-minorities.
With their strong belief in the righteousness o f capitalism and a disdain for 
communism, terrorists o f the right have little sympathy for the wayward and 
dispossessed. While many Americans harbor the same attitudes, the violent extremists 
o f the Right see as futile any attempts to rectify the perceived injustices of affirmative 
action or welfare fraud through legislative change (Beam, 1987). Common to many 
Americans who retain a strong belief in state's rights, right-wing extremists desire to 
maintain control over public funds at the local level. Consequently, the anti-tax 
beliefs o f SPC permeate most o f the groups of the extreme Right. With the Zionist 
Occupation Government (ZOG) firmly in control, the seemingly disparate extremists 
o f the Christian Identity Movement turned to militant action under the guise of
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preparing for Christ's Second Coining (Anti-Defamation League o f B'nai B'rith,
1982).
Leftist ideology holds to Marx's maxim "From each according to his abilities, 
to each according to his need” (Marx, 1956). Believing that capitalist societies 
unleash and encourage a  manipulative greed in humans, leftist terrorist groups in 
America today typically aspire to create a social system devoid o f the greed they 
maintain characterizes American society. Consequently, such disparate groups as the 
FAUN and the Macheteros, the UFF, and the NAPF held similar views regarding the 
United States (Cullen, 1984). All o f these groups were allied ideologically by their 
opposition to capitalism's presumed exploitation o f  blacks, Hispanics, and the 
working class (Fernandez, 1987). They perceived welfare and affirmative action 
programs as inadequate efforts to reform postindustrial capitalist society while 
maintaining the corrupt status quo. Such efforts were viewed as attempts to pacify the 
dissatisfied masses and prevent the development o f the collective consciousness 
necessary for revolutionary action. Having given up on their ability to change the 
system without violent action, these left-wing extremists turned to Leon Trotsky's 
views on 'heroic terrorism' out o f frustration and despair (Trotsky, 1974). The 
effectiveness o f the Puerto Rican nationalist groups was greatly diminished in 1987 
with the imprisonment o f  most o f its key leadership. Most o f  these leaders, however, 
were released by President Clinton in September o f 1999.
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THEORIES ABOUT WHY CITIES ARE IDEAL TARGETS: THE URBAN 
CONNECTION
Leftist groups found urban areas more to their liking, while right-wing 
extremists have preferred the countryside. Many members o f leftist groups are blacks 
or Hispanics, and large concentrations o f  Puerto Ricans live in Chicago and Hartford. 
Blacks also disproportionately live in urban areas. Much o f the explanation has to do 
with the ideological and tactical differences between the two (Janke, 1983).
The Christian Identity Movement spawned its radical terrorists during the past 
decade only. In contrast, violent left-wing extremists in America have been in the 
business o f terrorism at least since the 1960s. During that time, leftist radicals learned 
to focus their attention on urban areas in America and, to some extent, developed a 
fear o f basing their operations in the countryside. According to Janke, part of that 
fear grew because of revolutionary failures in the 1960s (Janke, 1983).
When Fidel Castro defeated the Batista regime in Cuba in 1959, he became 
the darling o f the oppressed masses. By mounting a campaign of extortion, terror, and 
conventional guerilla warfare, Castro first concentrated on taking the rural 
countryside o f Cuba. Since the export o f sugar was the economic base of the island, 
Castro gradually strangled Havana by capturing and controlling the plantations o f  
rural Cuba (Janke, 1983).
With Che Guevara at his side, Castro became the leading spokesperson for 
revolution in the Americas. At the Tricontinental Conference in 1966, Guevara 
presented the idea of exporting Castro's revolution to Bolivia. By mounting a rural 
revolutionary campaign, he believed the Bolivian government could be overthrown
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and the base created there could be used to further export revolution to neighboring 
countries, particularly to his homeland o f Argentina. (Janke, 1983) However, 
Guevara's capture and death in October o f  1967 had a chilling effect on the advocates 
o f rural revolution. The failure o f the National Liberation Army (ELN) to wage a 
successful rural campaign in Bolivia was carefully scrutinized by leftist strategists in 
Latin and North America. They turned to a more radical approach, one brought 
forward by despair and frustration at being unable to mount a successful conventional 
guerilla campaign or to develop the collective consciousness of the masses. The urban 
strategies of Carlos Marighella and Abraham Guillen became the logical alternative to 
rural revolution (Marighella, 1971) (Guillen, 1973).
The urban setting was described by Marighella in the Mini-manual o f  the 
Urban Guerilla as the ideal location for terrorist operations. Originally published in 
1967, the Mini-manual has been found among the possessions of almost every leftist 
terrorist group in America, perhaps due to Castro's distribution of it to the 
Venceremos Brigades, the leftist students who came to Cuba in the late 1960s to help 
with sugar cane harvests. The manual advocated an urban location for two reasons. 
Theoretically, it provided the opportunity to strike at the very seat o f  capitalism; 
tactically, it offered the anonymity o f the crowd as a safe haven for its revolutionary 
members (Marighella, 1971).
But even though Leftist have targeted urban areas in their doctrinal 
publications, the literature shows that terrorist attacks from the right on the urban 
built environment cannot be dismissed (Beam, 1987). Almost exclusively based in 
rural America, violent extremists o f the right have met with much the same fate as
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Guevara's army. With their fixed bunker-style camps, they have been identified with 
ease, and were arrested and prosecuted in large numbers during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Despite these weaknesses, they had specific reasons for choosing to locate in the 
hinterlands of America. With the purported imminence o f Armageddon, these groups 
viewed their survivalist camps as necessary and required by God. They interpret 
biblical passages that speak o f end-time events as being addressed directly to and for 
them. Numerous scriptures are interpreted by the militant Right as commands by God 
to prepare for Armageddon (Beam, 1987) .
However, the camps o f the Christian Identity extremists were more than just a 
tactical choice; they represented an effort to escape the pollutants o f  urban life — large 
concentrations of ethnic minorities, a tolerance for homosexual rights, and a liberal 
press. (Beam, 1987) These camps frequently housed entire families, with a church as 
the center o f social life. CS A, for example, at one time housed upwards o f one 
hundred persons. Most o f the camp's inhabitants never became involved in terrorist 
activity (Beam, 1987).
THEORIES ABOUT HOW THE TERRORISTS MAY ATTACK: THE TACTICAL 
APPROACH
Extremist groups that engage in violent action to overthrow established 
governments are faced with a paradox. On the one hand, the criminal nature of much 
o f their activities requires that they maintain a clandestine existence. On the other 
hand, the organization must engage in political and propagandists activity to elicit
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public support for the movement. All violent extremists, whether leftist or rightist, 
are faced with the dilemma o f  needing both secrecy and publicity (Laqueur, 1977).
Inspired by the writings o f  noted South American revolutionary theorists 
Abraham Guillen and Carlos Marighela, leftist revolutionaries in the United States 
adopted the use of cellular structures: safe houses, "mail drops" as a means of 
communication, and a variety o f  other clandestine tactics that have been successful in 
maintaining the anonymity o f  group members. The best example is provided by 
members o f the UFF, the leftist revolutionary band headed by Levasseur. Members o f  
the group successfully evaded capture for nearly a decade before their arrests in 1984. 
The leader o f the UFF, Raymond Levasseur, had been on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted 
list since 1977. As James Greenleaf, an FBI special agent involved in the manhunt, 
explained, "UFF members have an ability to blend in with the community as average 
citizens.... If you are willing to cut your ties with the past, it's pretty easy to disappear 
in this country" (Cullen, 1984). In adopting a clandestine cellular approach, however, 
their ability to recruit and to engage in legitimate political propagandizing is severely 
restricted (Laqueur, 1977).
According to Laqueur, Christian Identity extremists chose to build popular 
support by creating 'survivalist' camps. Such camps also allowed male members to 
bring their families to live on the compound. Unfortunately, from the terrorist's point 
o f view, such permanent sites are easily located and observed by law enforcement 
personnel (Laqueur, 1977). Abraham Guillen made the same observations regarding 
the failures o f the Tupamaros in Uruguay: the establishment of'fixed fronts' for
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supplies, support, and propaganda were easy targets for governmental responses 
(Guillen, 1973).
In addition, the right-wing terrorist groups chose to link their organizations 
nationally rather than develop distinct clandestine cells. Apparently, this issue was 
debated extensively by the members o f various Identity groups. Within two years the 
major leaders o f right-wing terrorist groups from around the country were on trial for 
conspiring to overthrow the U.S. government. Major pieces o f evidence introduced 
during their trials included verbal and written communications to almost every known 
leader in the movement, newsletters, and evidence o f a computerized national 
telephone network (United States v. Miles et. al.).
THEORIES ABOUT WHAT THE TERRORISTS MAY ATTACK: TARGETS
Almost all violent extremist movements select two basic types of targets: 
those that help to fund their operations and those that help to further the political or 
social causes advocated by the organization. Marighela referred to the first o f these 
targets as "the appropriation o f government resources" (Marighella, 1971). Both left- 
and right-wing extremists in America have found robbery necessary for funding the 
revolution. Few have found sufficient external support to make ends meet otherwise. 
Others, like the El Rukns, have solicited funds from outside sources (Laqueur, 1977).
Consequently, most violent extremist groups, Left and Right, are forced to 
stoop to "ordinary" criminality to support their causes. In fact, some o f the biggest 
armored car robberies in American history have involved American terrorists. It is 
one o f the few similarities between the two polar types (Laqueur, 1977).
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Beyond the issue o f funding, however, leftist and rightist groups bear marked 
differences in target selection. Since terrorism is, in many ways, a staged media event, 
the symbolic nature o f the target frequently is as important to the terrorist as the 
extent of damage the incident causes. For both, the targets ultimately selected bear the 
mark o f their respective ideologies (Bowman, 1994).
Bowman theorizes that targets generally follow broad categories based on the 
motives of the group or on the individual planning the attack. Domestic groups, 
including right-wing, issue-oriented, radical organizations and separatists, often 
choose targets for a specific purpose. Targets normally fall into five broad categories, 
some that overlap, depending on the motives of those planning the attack (Bowman, 
1994).
According to Bowman’s theory, symbolic or public message targets represent 
the first, the most common, and by far the largest, category. These may include 
prominent landmarks, electrical utilities, pipelines, state and local government 
buildings, universities, certain federal government buildings, and businesses and 
industries involved in such areas as chemical production, animal research, forest or 
wood products, and refineries (Bowman, 1994).
The second category includes government-owned or -operated facilities. These 
consist of tunnels, computer facilities, airports, state capitols, bridges and overpasses, 
maritime facilities (e.g., locks and harbors), and law enforcement buildings and 
support structures (Bowman, 1994).
The third category involves military targets (e.g., military bases, museums, 
and testing facilities). While generally more secure than other potential targets, these
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offer an immense opportunity to embarrass the military and the U.S. government 
(Bowman, 1994).
Cyber targets comprise the fourth category o f potential targets. An enormous 
psychological impact could result from targeting utilities, hacking into their networks 
and control systems, and shutting them down. Other potential cyber targets include air 
traffic control centers, financial networks, utility distribution networks, emergency 9- 
1-1 centers, and other vital services that rely on computer-operated control systems 
and networks (Bowman, 1994).
Individual victims represent the fifth and last major target category. 
Kidnapping, extortion, assassination, and other human target attacks accomplish 
terrorist objectives. While intimidation remains the most common tactic used against 
individuals to gain compliance, domestic terrorists continue to employ violence. 
Individuals most likely targeted include elected government officials, law 
enforcement personnel, tax collectors, court clerks, members o f the judiciary and 
prosecution systems, and families in each of these categories (Bowman, 1994).
Threat assessment in this area requires not only evaluation o f the individual or 
group making the threat but also an assessment o f the vulnerability o f the potential 
victim. This last category is beyond the scope of this study.
Militant members of the Christian Identity movement have frequently spoken 
o f  striking out against Jews. In reality, their activities have been limited primarily to 
strikes against Jewish persons and property or against groups supportive o f  activities 
considered immoral by Identity members, such as adult theaters and organizations 
allegedly promoting homosexual rights. Order members were indicted for
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firebombing the Embassy theater in Seattle, Washington; attempting to bum the 
Congregation Ahavath Israel Synagogue in Boise, Idaho; and for machine-gunning 
Jewish talk show host Alan Berg outside his home in Denver, Colorado. Similarly, 
two Aryan Nations members were arrested in Seattle in May 1990 for conspiring to 
bomb black bars in Tacoma, Korean businesses in south Tacoma, and a Jewish 
synagogue in Seattle, Washington (FBI Says Two Men Planned Bomb Attack on 
Homosexual Bar, 1990). CSA member Richard Wayne Snell was convicted o f the 
1984 shooting death of a black Arkansas state trooper and is now on death row for the 
slaying o f a Jewish Texarkana, Arkansas pawnshop owner. Another CSA member, 
William Thomas, was linked with the August 1983 firebombing o f the Jewish 
Community Center in Bloomington, Indiana.
Although the violent acts of right-wing extremists have been limited primarily 
to racial and religious "enemies," there have been ominous and foreboding exceptions 
that indicated the leaders o f the extreme Right intended to expand their terrorist 
activities. James Ellison, CSA leader turned prosecution witness, testified at the 1988 
national trial o f right-wing extremist leaders that Robert Miles, former KKK leader, 
gave him a thirty-gallon barrel of cyanide and declared: "The ones who would be 
killed would not really matter. It would be a good cleansing."" Ellison claimed the 
Washington, D.C., water system was suggested as a possible target. Although Miles 
was acquitted o f the charges, more recent threats have been received that suggested 
the release of dangerous chemicals in densely populated areas. The evidence suggests 
a move toward more indiscriminate violence by right-wing terrorists (Group Weighed 
Cyanide Assault, 1988).
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Extremists of the Left have been much more politically oriented in their 
selection o f targets. Rather than churches, synagogues, homosexual bars, and non­
governmental individuals, leftist terrorists have focused upon (1) representatives of 
government, civil and military personnel, buildings, and equipment; and (2) large 
corporations — symbols of capitalism. For example, the 1986 federal indictments of 
eight members o f the UFF listed the bombings of two county courthouses in 
Massachusetts; twelve bombings of major corporations such as EBM, Honeywell, 
Mobil Oil and Union Carbide; one bank; and four Army and Navy reserve centers or 
recruiting offices. They financed their operations from 1976 to 1984 by robbing eight 
banks in Maine, Connecticut, Vermont, New York, and Virginia. M19CO was 
responsible for a series o f similar bombings from 1983-1985. During that period the 
group bombed five federal and military installations, including the U.S. Capitol, and 
three other targets: the South African Consulate, the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association, and the Israeli Aircraft Industries Building. FALN bombings in Chicago 
followed similar patterns. The 1983 indictment of four FALN leaders cited the 
bombings of four banks, thirteen corporate buildings, five military installations or 
buildings, as well as the headquarters o f the Chicago Police Department, the Cook 
County Building, and a U.S. Post Office building (U.S. House of Representatives, 
1987).




According to Crowe, a fair amount is known about designing and redesigning 
locations so that a setting's physical features—given certain social and cultural 
conditions—help discourage criminal acts (Crowe, 1991). Yet what other strategies 
contribute to mitigating the impact o f terrorist attack against the urban built 
environment? What might be the unintended effects of these strategies? Research to 
date clearly counters the notion that physical environment features have stand-alone 
effects on criminal acts and related problems. Their effectiveness depends on other 
features of the setting in question, especially local social, cultural, and organizational 
dynamics. Too little is known to test specific hypotheses at this stage.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This research will use an exploratory approach to examine three major 
questions regarding strategies to mitigate the impact o f terrorism on the urban built 
environment. It will suggest policies and strategies to mitigate the impact o f terrorist 
attacks. To do that, it will answer the following questions (potential data sources are 
provided after the sub-questions on the following page):
1. What strategies can be implemented to mitigate the impact o f terrorist 
attacks on urban areas — attacks using either conventional and/or weapons o f mass 
destruction?
2. What might be the unintended effects o f these strategies?
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3. Where are the gaps in existing terrorist/crime mitigation theories — 
especially in light o f  emerging threats from “weapons o f mass destruction” i.e. 
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
To best answer these questions, several sub-questions will be answered 
("attack” for the purposes of the research is generally synonymous with "attempted 
attack."):
1. What types of terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built 
environment have taken place already? (retrospective data — case study o f 
entire population of cases over past twenty years that meet criteria for this 
study).
a. Who were the terrorists?
b. What did the terrorists attack?
c. When did the terrorists attack?
d. Where did the terrorists attack?
e. Why did the terrorists attack?
f. How did the terrorists attack?
2. What are the weaknesses/vulnerabilities in the preparedness for
attack against the build environment o f American urban areas? (retrospective 
data — case studies, government reports, independent reports and analysis; 
prospective data — expert interviews).
3. What should be done differently? (retrospective data — 
government reports, independent reports and analysis; prospective data — 
expert interviews).
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4. How can. the involved agencies play a more effective role in 
ensuring the readiness o f the urban built environment for terrorist attack? 
(retrospective data — government reports, independent reports and analysis; 
prospective data — expert interviews).
STUDY DESIGN
This study investigated the theoretical and applied aspects o f implementing 
strategies to mitigate the impact o f terrorist attacks against the urban built 
environment using a descriptive research design. A qualitative method o f data 
collection and analysis was used to more fully document mitigation strategies.
THE INVENTORY OF RECENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE 
URBAN BUILT ENVIRONMENT
As the first step in the study, it was necessary to take inventory o f who the 
domestic terrorists were, what in the urban built environment they were attacking, 
when they were attacking their targets, where they were attacking the urban target, 
why they were conducting the attack, and how they were attacking. To do this, it was 
necessary to carefully examine the population o f incidents o f domestic terrorist 
attacks against the urban built environment.
The study began with a thorough examination o f terrorist attacks against the 
U.S. urban built environment over the past twenty years. The twenty-year time period 
was used because it was in the early 1980s that domestic terrorism first became a real 
concern for U.S. policy makers (FBI, 1996). The 1980s saw a significant increase in
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the number of terrorist incidents throughout the world beginning with the highly 
visible release o f American hostages in Iran, and through the evolution of “get tough” 
Reagan initiatives toward terrorists, both domestic and international. The incidents 
were selected to ensure that they were domestic incidents, that they were viewed as 
acts of terrorism based on F.B.I. guidelines, that they occurred in urban settings based 
on the Census Bureau’s criteria for 'iirban,” and that the targets were some form of 
the urban built environment, as opposed to an assassination, airport, or a unique 
political target such as an embassy or national monument.
SPECIFIC CASE SELECTION CRITERIA
All cases selected were post 1980. This is because, as a result o f the Iran 
hostage crisis in 1979, the ability of terrorism to directly affect the American 
populace was generally realized by most citizens, and certainly government 
leadership. It was also the period when, beginning with airports, the federal 
government took the first steps to mitigate the impact o f terrorism on our citizens, 
both internationally and domestically. It was, in effect, the genesis of domestic 
preparedness efforts.
A second of the criteria was that the terrorist attack took place in an urban 
area, and was primarily targeted against some part of an urban built environment, i.e. 
not a targeted assassination. This was important in order to eliminate “non- 
generalizable” attacks - attacks on national monuments, embassies, consulates, the 
UN — that could not easily be viewed as having broad, metropolitan applicability o f 
mitigating strategies.
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As a result o f  careful study o f these cases, a matrix was developed showing 
the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how” o f attacks. A condensed 
version o f that matrix is provided in Appendix A. The overall purpose o f  analyzing 
the wide range o f  terrorist attacks over the period 1980-2000 was to identify 
commonalities o f attacks and provide a common framework for identifying 
weaknesses.
THE INVENTORY OF CURRENT REPORTS ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
AGAINST THE URBAN BUILT ENVIRONMENT
After determining the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how” of 
the domestic terrorist attacks against the urban built environment over the past twenty 
years, it was then necessary to carefully determine what had been done, and what 
measures were in place, to mitigate future attacks. To do this, it was necessary to 
review government and independent reports on domestic terrorism preparedness 
policy initiatives from myriad agencies at the federal, state, regional and local level. 
The purpose o f examining the reports was to further identify weaknesses in domestic 
urban terrorism defenses, determine what has already been done, and identify 
promising initiatives.
INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS
Based on information generated by both the inventory of terrorist incidents in 
the cases studies, and a review' o f current reports, an analysis of policy direction 
conducted through interviews was conducted with a purposeful sample o f  subject
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matter experts. The interviews would provide an opportunity to clarify policy 
alternatives, develop additional strategies, and prioritize those strategies to mitigate 
domestic terrorist attacks.
According to Rubin and Rubin (Rubin & Rubin, 1995), the design o f a study 
guides the researcher in what and whom to ask. They note that whom the researcher 
chooses to interview should match the definition o f the subject o f the research. The 
Rubins point out that the people interviewed should satisfy three requirements: they 
should be knowledgeable about the cultural arena or the situation or experience being 
studied; they should be willing to talk; and when people in the arena have different 
perspectives, the interviewees should represent the range of points o f view (Rubin & 
Rubin, 1995).
The next step in the study involved semi-structured face-to-face interviews 
with a purposeful sample o f twelve first-line disaster planners and responders. 
Easterby-Smith notes that this type o f interview is particularly appropriate when “it is 
necessary to understand the constructs that the interviewee uses as a basis for her 
opinions and beliefs about a particular matter or situation.” (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1991). The participants for the interviews consisted of 12 key disaster planners from 
federal, state and local agencies that have responsibilities for responding to terrorist 
attacks against the urban built environment. The specific criteria for selection as an 
interview participant was middle- to senior level administrative responsibility in one 
o f the government agencies that Governor Gilmore of Virginia, at the direction of 
President Clinton, tasked in 1998 with assessing domestic terrorism preparedness. 
The participants are among the most knowledgeable in the field.
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An explanatory letter was mailed to the 12 interview participants to describe 
the purpose and extent o f involvement in the interview, the method o f selection, and 
secure their agreement to participate. In the event that the primary participant could 
not participate, they were asked to name a key staff member who best represented the 
agency position to participate in the interview. Telephone contact was made with the 
prospective experts to confirm participation and to identify the key staff member 
where applicable. No identified experts declined participation.
INTERVIEW FORMAT AND QUESTIONS GUIDE
The importance o f  interviews is summarized by Burgess, who notes that “the 
importance o f interviews is the opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply to 
uncover new clues, open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, 
accurate, inclusive accounts that are based on personal experience” (Burgess, 1982). 
In the structured interviews that this study will use, Lincoln and Guba point out the 
importance of defining the problem before the interview, formulating the questions, 
and expecting that the respondent answers in terms o f  the interviewer’s framework 
and definition o f the problem (Lincoln, 1985).
One instrument was used in this study: an interview format and questions 
guide. The interview format and questions guide (Appendix B) provided the structure 
and framework for conducting the interviews with the selected experts from federal 
and local agencies. The guide lists the introductory comments by the interviewer, a 
review of agreement to participate and tape the interview, a list o f questions (from
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general to specific, with a conclusion back to the broad question), and the debrief 
comments.
The purpose o f the interviews was to develop a deeper understanding of, and 
to enhance the broad strategies suggested by the literature review and case analysis. 
One to two broad questions were asked to prompt the initial response in the manager, 
and seven more focused questions were used when the interviewee had not provided 
depth in explanation in their initial responses. The questions included:
1. What do you consider the most likely urban target(s) for terrorist attack?
2. Why?
3. Why do you think it/they are they vulnerable?
4. Which terrorist group(s) do you consider the most likely to launch a 
domestic attack? Right/left, foreign/domestic, specific?
5. What do you consider the most likely method(s) of terrorist attack against 
an urban target? (conventional/nuclear/biological/chemical)
6. Given the broad range o f weapons, including weapons o f  mass destruction, 
that may be employed by terrorists, what ways of protecting urban targets 
do you consider most promising? Least promising?
7. What should we be doing differently to protect urban targets?
8. Who should be primarily responsible for ensuring our cities are prepared 
for a terrorist attack?
9. How can involved agencies play a more effective role?
10. WTiat do you consider to be the downside or unintended impacts o f 
enhancing the protection o f urban areas against terrorist attack?
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11. What might be some unintended outcomes that must be considered in 
strengthening the preparation o f urban infrastructure for terrorist attacks?
The same researcher conducted all twelve interviews. The Interview Format 
and Questions Guide is included as Appendix B.
DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES
This study will use in-depth interviews as part o f the strategy to collect data. 
Kahn and Cannel (Patton, 1990) note that in-depth interviewing is a data collection 
method relied on quite extensively by qualitative researchers. They describe it as “a 
conversation with a purpose.”
According to Burgess, (Burgess, 1982) the primary purpose o f the interview is 
to understand the meanings interviewees attach to issues and situations in contexts 
that are not structured in advance by the researcher’s assumptions. He summarizes 
the importance o f interviews by saying: “(the interview) is . . .  the opportunity for the 
researcher to probe deeply to uncover new clues, open up new dimensions o f a 
problem and to secure vivid, accurate inclusive accounts that are based on personal 
experience.” Most interviews are conducted on a one-to-one basis, between the 
interviewer and the interviewee.
The label ‘qualitative interview’ has been used to describe a broad range of 
different types o f interview, from those that are supposedly totally ‘non-directive’ or 
‘open’ to those where the interviewer takes to the interview a prepared list o f 
questions which he or she is determined to ask. Notes Burgess, “. . .  between these
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two extremes is an abyss o f  practice and therefore theory about the purpose and nature 
o f the qualitative interview” (Burgess, 1982). Burgess says the main reason for 
conducting qualitative interviews is to understand ... “how individuals construct the 
meaning and significance o f their situations . . . from . . .  the complex personal 
framework of beliefs and values, which they have developed over their lives in order 
to help explain and predict events in their world.” It is important, then, to be able to 
conduct interviews so that the opportunity is present for these insights to be gained. 
Failure to achieve this might well result in a superficial exchange of information, 
which might well have been better and more cost effectively achieved via a sem i- 
structured questionnaire (Patton, 1990).
According to Burgess, semi-structured or unstructured interviews are 
appropriate methods when:
• It is necessary to understand the constructs that the interviewee uses 
as a basis for opinions and beliefs about a particular matter or situation;
• The aim o f the interview is to develop an understanding o f the 
respondent’s ‘world’ so that the researcher might influence it, either independently or 
collaboratively, as might be the case with action research.
Burgess adds that they are also useful when:
• The step-by-step logic o f a situation is not clear;
• The subject matter is highly confidential or commercially sensitive;
• The interviewee may be reluctant to be truthful about this issue other
than confidentially in a one-to-one situation.
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Jones (Jones, 1998) highlights a number o f issues that must be considered in
order for interviews to be successful. The first is the problem of how much structure
to put in the interview. She makes the point that:
. . .  there is no such thing as presuppositionless 
research. In preparing for interviews researchers will 
have, and should have, some broad questions in mind, 
and the more interviews they do and the more patterns 
they see in the data, the more likely they are to use this 
grounded understanding to want to explore in certain 
directions rather than others.
According to Jones, researchers are free and encouraged to make choices as 
they collect their data as to which line o f questioning they should explore further and 
which lines o f  inquiry to discard. They do need a framework from which to begin to 
plot out the developing themes, but cautions that although researchers are to some 
extent tied to their frameworks, they should not be ‘tied up by them’. Jones goes on 
to suggest that one way in which this can be achieved is to prepare a ‘topic guide’, 
which can be used as a loose structure for the questions. Although there may be some 
deviation from the sequence so as to follow interesting lines o f inquiry and to 
facilitate an unbroken discussion, the interviewer should attempt to cover all the 
issues mentioned (Jones, 1998).
On the subject of structure, Jones warns against assuming that a  “non­
directive” interview, where the interviewee talks freely without interruption or 
intervention, is the way to achieve a clear picture of the interviewee’s perspective. 
She says that it is more likely to produce no clear picture in the mind o f the 
interviewee o f what questions or issues the interviewer is interested in, and in the
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mind o f the interviewer o f what questions the interviewee is answering. According to 
Jones, too many assumptions o f this kind lead to poor data that is difficult to interpret. 
She says that researchers are likely to be more successful i f  they are clear at the outset 
about the exact areas o f  their interest.
McClelland says that understanding issues from an interviewee’s point o f 
view can be extremely difficult, especially when the respondent may not have a 
clearly articulated view o f the answers to the questions posed, or may not wish to 
divulge sensitive information. He conducted studies about common sense notions 
concerning motivations, claiming that people cannot be trusted to say exactly what 
their motives are, as they often get ideas about their own motives from commonly 
accepted half-truths. Often people simply are not aware o f their own motives. 
Mangham (1996) met this problem in his studies o f managerial competence. He found 
that although many managers complained that they needed subordinates who could 
better motivate staff, when they were asked what exactly they meant by motivation 
they gave ambiguous answers and became confused.
According to Mayo, the skills of an interviewer center around the ability to 
recognize what is relevant and remember it, or tape it, so that afterwards detailed 
notes can be made. This requires the interviewer to be perceptive and sensitive to 
events, so that lines o f inquiry can be changed and adapted during the interview. 
Above all, interviewers need to be able to listen, and to refrain from projecting their 
own opinions or feelings into the situation. This is more difficult than it sounds, since 
one o f the ways o f obtaining trust is to empathize with the respondent. The
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interviewer needs to listen to what interviewees want to say, and what they do not 
want to say, without helping them (Mayo, 1949).
The interviewer needs also to understand the importance placed on the social 
interaction between interviewer and interviewee. Jones suggests people will attribute 
meaning and significance to the particular research situations they are in. The 
questions an interviewer may ask and the answers an interviewee gives will often 
depend on the way in which their situations are defined (Jones, 1998).
According to Jones, preliminary telephone calls are best followed up by letter. 
This fulfils three purposes. One is credibility, especially if  the letter is on the 
notepaper o f an independent body such as a university. Secondly, it may assist 
cooperation in the future; and thirdly, it provides the opportunity to send further 
details about the research. This, says Jones, is the opportunity to set out in detail what 
is required. The location of the interview and the setting in which it takes place can 
also be important (Jones, 1998).
Tripp notes that there is also the question o f  the effects o f using audio tape 
recording in interviews. The decision on whether or not to use a tape recorder depends 
much on an interviewee’s anxiety about confidentiality and the use to which any 
information divulged could be put. The deciding factor should not be whether or not 
to tape, or whether permission will or will not be given, but rather what effect its use 
will have on the interview interaction in terms o f the relationship and the data created 
(Tripp, 1983).
Patton points out that the relevance o f the research to interviewees is another 
factor that will affect the quality of the data provided. In addition, interest and
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commitment shown by the interviewer often produces far better results than clinical 
detachment. This can be achieved in several practical ways. One way is by conducting 
more than one interview, or by offering the interviewee the opportunity to comment 
on the transcripts o f the tape or on completed field notes. Another is to offer 
interviewees a summary of the results or conclusions, and to make sure that one is 
sent to them. These strategies are not just ‘ploys’ to obtain compliance with a 
researcher’s wishes; they can, for example, form important ways of validating data 
and gaining new insights (Patton, 1990).
Twelve agencies throughout the United States that had responsibility for 
domestic preparedness against terrorist attack were telephoned and requested to 
provide assistance in the study. The interviews were briefly described as part o f a 
larger study to determine strategies to mitigate the impact of terrorist attack against 
the urban built environment. Agencies were asked for access to a key person on their 
staff, usually by name based on earlier identification of someone with specific policy­
making responsibility, who might be interviewed about their judgments on terrorist 
mitigation strategies. Telephone contact was made with the representative to confirm 
their willingness to participate and an interview time was arranged. All interviews 
took place during the five month period between May 20th, 2000 and October 31st, 
2000.
The interview was conducted in either the participant’s office or another quiet, 
private area within the agency. During the initial two to three minutes o f conversation 
the researcher focused on gaining a professional rapport with the manager, and 
answered any questions the manager had about the study, confidentiality, and taping
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o f  the interview. All interviewees were assured that their comments would be kept 
confidential and, if  used as a verbatim comment in the written study, no identifying 
information would be used.
In all interviews, the tape recorder was placed in an unobtrusive location 
between the two persons. The tape ran throughout the entire interview and upon 
completion of the formal interview, the tape was turned o ff and the researcher asked if  
the manager had further comments/questions, responded as necessary, and ended the 
meeting. The taped interviews ranged from 20 to 40 minutes, and were transcribed 
verbatim.
The broad question, "where do you think cities in general are most vulnerable 
to terrorist attack?" was used to initiate the interview. Techniques to seek elaboration 
on specific areas were used (Babbie, 1973), such as "how are they vulnerable to 
biological (chemical, nuclear, conventional) weapons," "what makes water supplies 
vulnerable targets," "what would you suggest as an effective strategy to meet this 
vulnerability." The more focused questions listed on the interview format were used 
as follow-up in areas that had not been mentioned or where the interviewee needed 
more structured questioning to focus their thoughts. These interview data provided 
information about the vulnerability o f infrastructure to terrorist attack and suggested 
strategies to address these vulnerabilities.
DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
The analysis was based on what Marshall & Rossman (Marshall, 1989) call 
data “reduction” and “interpretation,” where a  large amount o f information is reduced
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to key patterns, categories and themes, and then interpreted. Tesch (Tesch, 1990) 
calls this process “de-contextualization” and “re-contextualization;” a process 
resulting in a “higher level” analysis. According to Tesch, “While much work in the 
analysis process consists o f ‘taking apart,’ the final goal is the emergence o f a  larger, 
consolidated picture” (Tesch, 1990).
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEWS
Data analysis o f the interview transcriptions included identification o f  the 
vulnerabilities o f the urban built environment to terrorist attacks. The coding 
procedure used to reduce the information to categories is one recommended by Tesch; 
“segmenting” the information and then generating categories (Tesch, 1990) 
(Marshall, 1989) through a systematic process o f analyzing textual data. All phrases 
or bullets o f data that indicated a vulnerability were lifted from the interview in 
verbatim form. A master list o f phrases/sentences was then organized to reflect 
categories of like items. Judgments of which items were similar were made based on 
the researcher's background knowledge o f both terrorism and the urban built 
environment.
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
Validity and reliability related to the qualitative methodologies used in the 
study are reviewed here, specifically validity o f the qualitative data collection 
methods and the predictive validity of these qualitative techniques. As Kirk and 
Miller (Patton, 1990) point out, the language o f validity and reliability was originally
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developed for use in quantitative social science, and many procedures have been 
devised for assessing different facets of each.
According to Lincoln & Guba, there are several canons that can be phrased as 
questions to which all research must respond (Lincoln, 1985). First, how credible are 
the particular findings o f the study? By what criteria can we judge them? Second, 
how transferable and applicable are these findings to another setting or group o f 
people? Third, how can we be reasonably sure that the findings would be replicated if 
the study were conducted with the same participants in the same context? And, fourth, 
how can we be sure that the findings are reflective of the subjects and the inquiry 
itself rather than a creation o f the researcher’s biases or prejudices?
Lincoln and Guba (Lincoln, 1985) refer to these questions as establishing the 
‘Truth value” o f the study, its applicability, consistency, and neutrality. They point 
out that every systematic inquiry into the human condition must address these issues. 
Although Lincoln and Guba match these terms to the conventional positivist 
paradigm - internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity - they then 
demonstrate how inappropriate these constructs are for naturalistic or qualitative 
inquiry.
Lincoln and Guba propose four alternative constructs that more accurately 
reflect the assumptions of the qualitative paradigm. The first is credibility, in which 
the goal is to demonstrate that the inquiry was conducted in such a manner as to 
ensure that the subject was accurately identified and described. The inquiry then must 
be “credible to the constructors of the original multiple realities. According to 
Lincoln & Guba, the strength of the qualitative study that aims to explore a problem
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or describe a setting, a process, a social group, or a pattern o f interaction will be its 
validity. An in-depth description showing the complexities o f variables and 
interactions will be so embedded with data derived from the setting that it cannot help 
but be valid. Within the parameters o f that setting, population, and theoretical 
framework, the research will be valid (Lincoln, 1985).
The second construct Lincoln and Guba propose is transferability, in which 
the burden of demonstrating the applicability of one set o f findings to another context 
rests more with the investigator who would make that transfer than with the original 
investigator. Kennedy (Kennedy, 1979) refers to this as the second decision span in 
generaliz ing- That is, the first decision span allows the researcher to generalize the 
findings about a particular sample to the population from which that sample was 
drawn (assuming adequate population specification and random selection o f the 
sample). The second decision span occurs when an investigator wants to apply the 
findings about the population o f  interest to a second population believed or presumed 
sufficiently similar to the first to warrant that application. This second decision span 
entails judgments about the relevancy o f the first study to the second setting.
According to Lincoln & Guba, a qualitative study’s transferability or 
generalizability to other settings may be problematic. The generalization o f qualitative 
findings to other populations, settings, and treatment arrangements - that is, its 
external validity - is seen by traditional canons as a weakness in the approach. To 
counter challenges, the researcher can refer back to the original theoretical framework 
to show how data collection and analysis will be guided by concepts and models. By 
doing so, the researcher states the theoretical parameters o f the research. Then those
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who make policy or design research studies within those same parameters can 
determine whether or not the cases described can be generalized for new research 
policy and transferred to other settings, while the reader or user of specific research 
can see how research ties into a body o f  theory (Lincoln, 1985).
Lincoln & Guba note that one additional strategic choice can enhance a  
study’s generalizability: triangulating multiple sources o f  data. Triangulation is the act 
o f bringing more than one source o f data to bear on a single point. Derived from 
navigation science, the concept has been fruitfully applied to social science inquiry 
(Denzin, 1978) (Jick, 1979) (Rossman, 1994) (Rossman, 1985). Data from different 
sources can be used to corroborate, elaborate, or illuminate the research in question 
(Rossman, 1985). Designing a study in which multiple cases, multiple informants, or 
more than one data gathering method are used can greatly strengthen the study’s 
usefulness for other settings.
The third construct discussed by Lincoln & Guba is dependability, in which 
the researcher attempts to account for changing conditions in the phenomenon chosen 
for study as well as changes in the design created by increasingly refined 
understanding o f the setting. This represents a  set o f  assumptions very different from 
those shaping the concept o f reliability. Positivist notions o f reliability assume an 
unchanging universe where inquiry could, quite logically, be replicated. This 
assumption o f an unchanging social world is in direct contrast to the 
qualitative/interpretive assumption that the social world is always being constructed, 
and the concept o f replication is itself problematic (Lincoln, 1985).
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The final construct, confirmability, captures the traditional concept of 
objectivity. Lincoln and Guba stress the need to ask whether the findings of the study 
could be confirmed by another. By doing so, they remove evaluation from some 
inherent characteristic o f the researcher (objectivity) and place it squarely on the data 
themselves. Thus the qualitative criterion is: Do the data help confirm the general 
findings and lead to the implications? This is the appropriate qualitative criterion 
(Lincoln, 1985).
According to Marshall (Marshall, 1985a) qualitative research does not 
pretend to be replicable. The researcher purposefully avoids controlling the research 
conditions and concentrates on recording the complexity o f situational contexts and 
interrelations as they occur. The researcher’s goal of discovering this complexity by 
altering research strategies within a flexible research design, moreover, cannot be 
replicated by future researchers, nor should it be attempted.
Marshall says that qualitative researchers can respond to the traditional social 
science concern for replicability by taking the following steps. First, they can assert 
that qualitative studies by their nature (and, really, all research) cannot be replicated 
because the real world changes. Second, by keeping thorough notes and a journal or 
log that records each design decision and the rationale behind it, researchers allow 
others to inspect their procedures, protocols, and decisions. Finally, by keeping all 
collected data in well organized, retrievable form, researchers can make them 
available easily if the findings are challenged or if  another researcher wants to 
reanalyze the data (Marshall, 1985b).





This dissertation used multiple qualitative research methods to identify 
patterns o f attack used by terrorists against urban targets in the United States. It 
began by creating an inventory o f domestic terrorist attacks against the urban built 
environment over the past twenty years. Through careful analysis o f each o f the 
domestic terrorist attacks against the urban built environment, both successful and 
unsuccessful, shared patterns o f attack were analyzed and vulnerabilities identified.
These shared patterns o f attack and vulnerabilities identified in the case 
analysis formed the basis for the next part of the study. Using the trends identified 
through the cases, a review o f the current literature on domestic terrorism 
preparedness was conducted. This review was very broad, and included not only the 
specific thirty cases that were the subject o f this study, but a macro-level review of 
domestic preparedness given the constantly changing domestic and political 
environment. This macro-review was also necessary to provide a basis for 
understanding the threats posed by a domestic terrorist attack from those avenues not 
evident in the cases: i.e. other terrorist groups that may now pose a threat but were not 
represented in the thirty cases studies, or the very significant threat posed by Weapons 
o f Mass Destruction — weapons greatly feared by those charged with preparing our 
cities for domestic terrorist attack, but not used against urban targets to date.
The product o f the case studies and review o f  the literature on domestic 
terrorism preparedness was an understanding o f what had previously happened and
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what was currently being considered as means to mitigate domestic terrorist attacks 
against the urban built environment. This provided a basis for developing the broad 
questions for the interviews. Expert testimony was gathered through interviews with 
experts in terrorism, design, and emergency management. An explanatory letter was 
mailed to the participants to describe the purpose and extent o f involvement in the 
interview process, the method o f selection, and to secure the participant's agreement 
to participate. Follow-up telephone contact was made.
The interviews aided in identifying weaknesses in the current urban 
environment, discussed cutting-edge plans to mitigate domestic terrorist attacks on 
the urban built environment, provided a  deeper understanding o f the problems faced 
in preparing urban areas for terrorist attacks, and refined the initial suggestions for 
reducing the severity of terrorist attack developed previously through the case study o f 
incidents and literature review.
FINDINGS
General Trends In American Terrorism
Law enforcement experts theorize that there are three types o f terrorist 
organizations active in the United States; ethnic separatist and emigre groups, left- 
wing radical organizations, and right-wing racist, anti-authority survivalist-type 
groups (Hoffman, 1986). The threat posed by these domestic terrorist groups is not 
negligible.
Terrorist acts steadily increased in America during the early part o f  the 1980s. 
The increase in terrorism on American soil during the early 1980s was the primary
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catalyst for the escalation of the FBI's counter-terrorism program to a  Priority 1 
program in late 1982. Whether or not these changes had a major impact on future 
levels o f American terrorism is hard to assess. The deterrent effect o f  most law en­
forcement initiatives is extremely difficult to measure empirically. In this instance, 
however, strong circumstantial evidence exists that the hardened governmental 
attitude had a profound impact on the level o f American terrorism for the remainder 
o f the decade.
The number of terrorist incidents dropped approximately forty percent in 1983 
from that o f the previous year. Although the number of terrorist victims killed during 
1983 reached an all-time high, decreases in subsequent years suggest that increased 
FBI expenditures on counter-terrorism and the expansion of domestic security 
investigations begun that year had a substantial adverse effect on terrorism in this 
country. In a three-year period, the number o f acts o f terrorism fell from a record fifty- 
one in 1982 to only seven in 1985 (FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 
1985).
Although leftist terrorists on the East Coast, right-wing affiliates o f  the 
Christian Identity Movement, and Puerto Rican extremists all suffered major blows 
during 1984 and 1985, by 1986 several o f the organizations had regrouped and 
embarked on a renewed campaign o f terror. Twenty-five acts o f terrorism were com­
mitted during 1986, most o f which were carried out by Puerto Rican nationalists. 
Neo-Nazis carried out five bombings in the Coeur d'Alene, Idaho area. The most 
violent and successful of the terrorists during 1986 were Jewish extremists. Although 
only committing two of the twenty-five incidents, they were responsible for seventeen
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o f the nineteen injuries that occurred that year from terrorist bombings and 
assassination attempts (FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, 1987).
By 1987, federal indictments began to have a major effect on the leadership 
and organizational management o f domestic terrorist groups in America. The leaders 
o f right-wing terrorist groups were either in prison or awaiting trial. The Aryan 
Nations, the CSA, the White Patriot party, and the Order were all in states of disarray 
because o f FBI operations and federal indictments. Similarly, members of the major 
leftist terrorist groups, the UFF and M19CO, were awaiting trials in Boston and in 
Washington, DC. Even the previously immune leaders o f the Macheteros in Puerto 
Rico found themselves under federal indictment in Hartford (FBI Terrorist Research 
and Analytical Center, 1988).
With terrorist groups attempting to reorganize and recruit to replace lost 
personnel, acts of terrorism waned during the late 1980s. The number o f incidents 
dropped from twenty-five in 1986 to only nine in 1987 and eventually to a decade low 
of four in 1989. Had it not been for the emergence of the environmental terrorists 
during the closing years o f the decade, terrorism in America would have been 
virtually non-existent during the late 1980s. The number o f  persons killed or injured 
because of terrorism also reflects this trend. The last three years o f the decade 
witnessed no injuries or deaths due to terrorist bombs or assassins (FBI Terrorist 
Research and Analytical Center, 1990). Although the number o f terrorist incidents 
increased to seven in 1990, that was the fourth consecutive year in which America 
experienced no deaths or injuries due to terrorism (FBI Terrorist Research and 
Analytical Center, 1991).
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In the 1990s, domestic terrorist attacks claimed more American lives than they 
did in any other decade. The Gulf War, continued forays into Iraq, right-wing 
extremists, Muslim fundamentalists, and anti-abortion activists all contributed to 
significant loss o f life and property. Weapons o f  Mass Destruction were, for the first 
time, a genuine concern as a possible terrorist tool. Legislation was introduced to 
provide funding for domestic terrorism awareness and first-responder training, and 
initial steps were and are being taken to prepare for domestic terrorist attacks. Table 
2 on the following page presents a list o f  the terrorist attacks against the urban built 
environment chosen for this study. The attacks listed are consistent with the selection 
criteria for domestic terrorist attacks against the urban built environment outlined in 
Chapter III. A more detailed description of each o f these attacks is provided in 
Appendix A.
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TABLE 2.
INCIDENTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE DOMESTIC 
URBAN BUILT ENVIRONMENT DURING THE PAST TWENTY YEARS





Building — Women's clinic 
that performed abortions
Bomb Anti-abortionists
2 July, 1997 
(a)
New York City, 
New York
Subway Bombs Muslim extremists
3 July. 1996 Atlanta. Georgia Park Pipe bomb Unknown
4 April, 1995 Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma
Building Car bomb Right-wing anarchists
5 June, 1993 New York City. 
New York
Building, tunnels Bomb Muslim extremists
6 February,
1993
New York City, 
New York
Building Van bomb Muslim extremists
7 July, 1990 Houston. Texas Chemical storage tanks Bombs Muslim extremists





Building Fire bomb Muslim extremists
10 May. 1988 Miami. Florida Building Pipe bomb Cuban extremists
11 April, 1988 
(a)
New York City, 
New York
New York City subway system Bombs Japanese Red Army
12 May, 1987 New York City, 
New York





New York City, 
New York
Building Fire bomb Jewish Defense League
15 September,
1986
Coeur d’ Arlene. 
Idaho
Buildings Bombs White supremacists





Building Bombs United Freedom Front











New York City. 
New York


















New York City, 
New York
Building Bomb FALN -  Puerto Rican 
nationalists
23 July, 1982 New York City, 
New York
Building Pipe bomb Croatian Freedom Fighters
24 July, 1982 New York City, 
New York
Building Pipe Bomb Croatian Freedom Fighters
25 March,
1982
New York City, 
New York




New York City, 
New York




New York City, 
New York




New York City, 
New York




New York City, 
New York






Building Bombs Puerto Rican nationalists
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General Conclusions About Trends
According to the data developed for this study in the case analyses, four 
distinct patterns o f American terrorism and counter-terrorism emerged during the 
1980s and 1990s. First, the period began with terrorism at an all-time high, followed 
by intense federal initiatives to combat the problem. Second, by the mid-1980s, as 
successful federal prosecutions decimated terrorist organizations in the United States, 
some groups tried to rebound from the devastation o f arrests and indictments by 
staging retaliatory strikes. These efforts generally were short-lived and represented 
short-term increases in the decade's statistics. Third, the decade closed on an ominous 
note with the arrival o f environmental terrorism. Finally, during the 1990s right wing 
and international terrorist groups made a spectacular resurgence, most visible in the 
Kansas City and World Trade Center bombings.
Unlike many types o f crimes, terrorism occurs rather infrequently and is 
committed by relatively few persons. Terrorist organizations typically are not as large 
or as well entrenched in legitimate business activities as most organized crime groups. 
Consequently, the effect of intense federal intervention efforts is felt more critically 
by terrorist groups than by traditional organized crime elements. Federal criminal 
investigations into some organized crime groups occasionally net the leaders o f these 
organizations incidental to law enforcement efforts. Unfortunately, many of these 
underworld organized crime groups are so large that their leaders are quickly replaced 
by aspiring, younger proteges. The organizational structure of the group remains 
intact despite the loss of its leadership, and the group's criminal enterprises continue 
unabated. Terrorist groups generally are not so fortunate. The arrests and indictments
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o f the leaders o f relatively few terrorist organizations can have a dramatic impact on 
terrorism statistics.
In Puerto Rico, the rather large infrastructure and support groups o f extreme 
nationalist groups account for the ability o f  Puerto Rican terrorist groups to continue 
operations. On the other hand, levels o f terrorism in the western United States 
remained high due to changes in the types o f  groups that operated in that area.
Who Were The Terrorists?
The answer to this question has changed significantly over the 20-year period 
that spans the cases used in this study. The research showed that there are 
dramatically fewer international terrorist incidents than in the mid-eighties. Many o f 
the groups that targeted America's interests, friends, and allies have disappeared. The 
Soviet bloc, which once provided support to terrorist groups, no longer exists. 
Countries that once excused terrorism now condemn it. This changed international 
attitude has led to 12 United Nations conventions targeting terrorist activity and, more 
importantly, growing, practical international cooperation.
Threats From Abroad 
Although most o f the world's countries are firmer in opposing terrorism, some 
still support terrorists or use terrorism as an element of state policy. Iran is the clearest 
case. The Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry o f Intelligence and Security 
carry out terrorist activities and give direction and support to other terrorists. The 
regimes o f  Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan provide funding, refuge, training bases, and
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weapons to terrorists. Libya continues to provide support to some Palestinian terrorist 
groups and to harass expatriate dissidents, and North Korea may still provide weapons 
to terrorists. Cuba provides safe haven to a number o f terrorists. Other states allow 
terrorist groups to operate on their soil or provide support which, while failing short 
o f state sponsorship, nonetheless gives terrorists important assistance.
Increased Lethality
The data showed that terrorist attacks have become more lethal during the
period included by the cases meeting the criteria for this study. The bombings o f the
World Trade Center and the Murrah Building in Oklahoma were the most visible.
One o f the respondents pointed out that:
Most terrorist organizations active in the 1970s and 
1980s had clear political objectives. They tried to 
calibrate their attacks to produce just enough bloodshed 
to get attention for their cause, but not so much as to 
alienate public support. Groups like the Irish 
Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization often sought specific political 
concessions, yet this has changed over the past ten 
years.
The more recent cases studied for this dissertation showed that a growing 
percentage o f terrorist attacks were designed to kill as many people as possible. In the 
1990s a terrorist incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death or 
injury than an incident two decades ago (calculated from casualty figures obtained 
from case analysis data used in this study). The World Trade Center bombing in New 
York killed six and wounded about 1,000, but the terrorists' goal was to topple the
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twin towers, killing tens o f thousands o f people (Mickolus, 1993). The thwarted 
attacks against New York City's infrastructure in 1993— which included plans to 
bomb the Lincoln and Holland tunnels— also were intended to cause mass casualties 
(Mickolus, 1993).
Domestic Terrorist Groups
Analysis o f the cases used in this study showed that, unlike many international
terrorist groups, the groups operating from a domestic base in the United States
function more on emotional issues than on deeply entrenched political ideologies.
Said one of the participants in this study,
Members o f radical international groups often were 
bom and raised in a society that supports their view of 
the United States, or some other outside entity, as an 
evil force. By contrast, members of domestic radical 
groups usually were loners whose beliefs gamer little 
support from mainstream American society.
In these cases, such emotional variables as fear, anger, or hatred motivate 
group membership and methods o f operation. The emotional responses of domestic 
groups appear to be significantly less entrenched and thus more transient than the 
ideological beliefs o f their overseas counterparts. Still, their destructive nature 
remains strong.
National/Geographic Affiliation 
Analysis o f the data used for this study showed that almost two-thirds of the 
terrorists implicated in domestic attacks against the urban built environment were
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native-born Americans. O f these, slightly less than one-third were Puerto Rican, and 
two held dual citizenship and strong ties to Israel. The next largest group, those of 
Middle Eastern residency, accounted for one-sixth o f all domestic terrorist attacks. 
Examination o f all attacks showed residency in only a handful o f  countries/areas. 
These were the United States (to include Puerto Rico), the Middle East/Africa 
(Egypt/Sudan/Libya/Jordan/ Lebanon/Iraq/Iran/Pakistan), Cuba, Japan, and Croatia. 
Figure 3, below, provides a depiction o f terrorist residence or regional affiliation.
















No clear conclusions can be drawn about national/geographic affiliation and 
the domestic urban terrorist for several reasons common to clandestine operations. 
Investigations o f terrorist cells have shown a confusing pattern o f linkages to 
countries. For instance, terrorists who are American residents may be recruited by an 
Egyptian-based group, trained in Sudan, and funded by Afghans who are in turn
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funded by Saudis (this seems to have been the case with terrorists involved in attacks 
and attempted attacks in New York City, and continues to be a common pattern, 
particularly with Usama Bin Laden’s group). Another reason is the commonality o f 
multiple passports and long periods of residency in several countries. For instance, 
several extremist Jewish groups’ members hold dual American/Israeli citizenship, and 
frequently live for long periods in different countries.
Cause Identification of the Domestic Terrorists 
The cases analyzed for this study showed that there three major divisions in 
the “causes” that domestic urban terrorists ascribed to. These are either political 
causes, ethno-religious causes, or non-specific left-wing terrorism. Although there is 
some degree o f  overlap, for example, Puerto Rican terrorist actions may be considered 
either political or ethnic — in this study they have been considered ethnic because 
these Puerto Rican groups believe that their ethnicity is the root cause for their failure 
to gain independence from the U.S., the division is generally clear. Political causes 
involved either Cuban or Croatian liberation, or anarchistic causes. Ethno-religious 
causes included Jewish militant responses to perceived anti-Semitism; Jewish actions 
against Russian targets in the U.S.; Puerto Rican independence; attacking the 
decadent Western influence and culture; anti-Muslim reactions; killing those who 
performed abortions; and Rajneesh and anti-Rajneesh reactions.
The third grouping, non-specific left wing terrorism, consists of terrorist acts 
committed by groups espousing broad left wing ideologies such as “freedom for the
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workers” reminiscent of the groups operating worldwide in the 1960s and 70s 
(Japanese Red Army, United Freedom Front).
The Ideology o f Terrorists: Attacks from Throughout the Political Spectrum 
Detailed analysis o f the thirty terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built 
environment over the past twenty years showed that the terrorists had widely varying 
political orientations. Some were right-wing religious zealots that included anti­
abortionists or anarchists, four were by left-wing extremists, five attacks were by 
Muslim extremists, two attacks were by persons unknown, two were by Cuban 
extremist groups, two were by Jewish extremist groups, one was by white 
supremacists, one was by an anti-Muslim group, one was by an anti-Rajneesh faction, 
eight attacks were by Puerto Rican extremists and two were by Croatian extremists.
World events have overcome many o f the political issues that provided the 
impetus for the domestic terrorist attacks. Yet new political issues present significant 
probabilities for new attacks against American cities. For example, in at least one of 
the attacks by Jewish extremist groups, the target was a building that was holding a 
reception for a Soviet dance troupe. In the case of the terrorist attacks by the Puerto 
Rican extremists, the incidents by this group ceased after all o f its members were 
incarcerated (although all members were released last year by order o f then President 
Clinton). A general conclusion that will be drawn here is that it is not very useful to 
implement strategies for mitigating terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built 
environment based on terrorist group identity or ideology, whose causes are often 
brought about, made volatile, and extinguished in a relatively short period.
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Personal Characteristics Of Domestic Terrorists
Age: Older than in Previous Studies 
Previous research provided an often inaccurate demography of the terrorist 
(see Chapter H, Theories About Terrorist Identity: Extremists Right and Left). 
Virtually all studies of the personal traits o f terrorists conclude (or assume) that the 
average terrorist is young, usually between twenty to twenty-five years old. (Russell, 
1977) (Rubenstein, 1987) (National Governor's Association). A National Governors 
Association publication listed the average age o f domestic terrorists as twenty 
(National Governor’s Association). A review o f the characteristics o f those persons 
involved in the cases that were the subject of this study reveals, however, that the 
average age at indictment was considerably older — thirty-five. While some o f the 
crimes for which these persons were indicted took place when the individuals were 
much younger, the vast majority of offenses occurred during the year or two before 
indictment. The data used in this study showed the average age of the American 
terrorist would place him at no younger than thirty-two or thirty-three, again 
considerably older than previous estimates of all terrorists.
Prior studies included not only those involved in terrorism itself but also the 
remaining members of extremist groups. It may be that older, more experienced 
members are more likely to be involved in the actual terrorist incidents committed by 
a particular group. Another possible explanation, at least among leftist extremists in 
America, is that many of the leftist terrorists indicted in the last 20 years have been 
involved in terrorism for many years. Indeed, the data shows that many of the leftist
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extremists finally apprehended in the last 20 years had been involved with the 
"revolution" for a decade or more.
Terrorists from the Political Right are Significantly Older 
According to data analyzed for this study, the ages o f left- and right-wing 
terrorists differed significantly. The average age o f right-wing terrorists involved in 
the incidents under study was thirty-nine, higher than the average age either o f 
domestic left-wing group members or o f international terrorists. Over one-third o f the 
right-wing terrorists were over forty. In contrast, less than 20 percent o f the leftist 
terrorists were over forty. Much o f this difference is found in the leadership o f the 
Christian Identity Movement. Four o f those acquitted at the national trial o f white 
supremacists in 1988 were over sixty years old. Aryan Nations leader Richard Butler, 
Order member Artie McBrearty, fCKK leader Robert Miles, and CSA member 
William Wade were over sixty years old, while the most active o f the white 
supremacists, Richard Scutari, was only thirty-nine at the 1988 trial. Members o f the 
UFF were all under forty at their indictment in 1986.
Terrorists from the Left were also older than portrayed in previous studies. 
Levasseur, leader o f the UFF, was thirty-nine at his indictment in 1986; Marilyn Buck 
of Weather Underground and M19CO fame was forty at her indictment in 1987. Even 
examination o f  the Puerto Rican separatist groups, the FALN and the Macheteros, as 
well as members o f the El Rukns, the NAFF, and other leftists indicted for terrorist 
activities reveals a membership averaging in their thirties. Fifty percent o f the leftist
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extremists indicted for terrorist-related activities during the last 20 years were 
between thirty-one and forty years old.
Gender
While terrorism remains a  predominantly male phenomenon, the proportion o f 
females involved in the cases that were the subject of this study was far greater than in 
traditional crime. Approximately 5 percent o f  America's prison population are females 
(Bureau o f Justice Statistics, 1998) while slightly over 12 percent o f the persons 
indicted for terrorist-related activities for the cases under study were females 
(calculated from case analysis data used in this study). If international terrorists are 
excluded, the percentage is even greater. O f 131 persons indicted for domestic 
terrorism, twenty (15 percent) were females (calculated from case analysis data used 
in this study).
According to the data, substantial differences exist between leftist and rightist 
groups regarding female involvement. It has been suggested that the role o f women 
in terroristic violence in America is directly related to the ideological foundations of 
the groups to which they belong (Georges-Abeyie, 1987) (Holland, 1989). O f fifty- 
six leftist extremists indicted, slightly over one-fourth (27 percent) were females.
Extremists of the Left have a long history of advocating egalitarianism. Some 
groups like M19CO are predominantly female: Marilyn Jean Buck, Susan Lisa 
Rosenberg, Laura Whitehom, Linda Sue Evans, and Elizabeth Duke all have played 
major roles in the activities o f that group. Similarly, almost half o f the members o f the 
UFF and the NAFF were females. Female participation within Puerto Rican separatist
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groups was substantially lower, just over 10 percent, but is still higher than levels o f 
female participation within rightist groups.
Among the right-wing terrorist groups that were the subject o f this study, 
females presented an interesting dilemma. Although many right-wing extremists 
moved their wives and children to remote survivalist camps, it did not appear that 
these women became involved in actual terrorist or criminal acts with nearly the same 
frequency as those among leftist groups. Only five of the seventy-five (7%) right-wing 
extremists indicted for terrorist-related activities were females. In almost all of these 
cases, the women were married to active members of violent elements of the extreme 
right (calculated from case analysis data used in this study). Only two played major 
roles in terroristic violence: Margaret Jean Craig performed the surveillance on Allen 
Berg prior to his assassination, and Deborah Dorr, along with her husband, was a 
leader o f the Order 11.
Ethnicity: Color on the Left, White to the Right 
According to one o f  the participants, “members o f  minority groups are more 
likely than whites of English heritage to believe that they have been exploited by 
American expansionism and colonialism.” The case studies used in this research also 
suggested that this belief permeates the violent left in America. Consequently, these 
groups have been able to attract a large following of minority group members. 
According to the data developed for this study from the case analyses, nearly three- 
fourths (71 percent) of the leftists indicted for terrorist-related activities were 
minorities. The NAFF and the El Rukns are all-black groups; the Macheteros and
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FALN are overwhelmingly comprised o f white Hispanics; even the violent members 
o f the M19CO, the UFF, and the Provisional Party o f  Communists are racially mixed.
In contrast, the data showed that violent extremists of the Right, with their re­
ligiously based beliefs in the superiority o f  the Aryan race, are virtually all white. O f 
seventy-five members o f  the extreme right indicted for terrorist-related activities, only 
two claimed to be o f other than Aryan extraction. William Wade and his son, Ivan, 
both affiliated with the CSA and the SPC, listed their ethnic background at their 1987 
trial as American Indian. The Wades claimed to be descendants of the Wade clan o f 
tribal Indians who came into the Oklahoma territory in the 1800s. Consistent with the 
beliefs o f SPC members, they maintained that the federal court at Fort Smith had no 
jurisdiction over their activities. With an abiding hatred for blacks and Jews and a 
disdain for federal policies allowing the immigration o f Mexicans, Vietnamese, and 
other Asians, the extremists of the far Right leave little room for minority 
participation in their activities.
Education and Occupation: Not in Keeping with Previous Typographies o f the
‘Typical” Terrorist 
Previous research, discussed in Chapter II, often painted an inaccurate picture 
o f the terrorist. For instance, the National Governor’s Association study of terrorism 
concluded that terrorists are university educated, middle or upper class, and 
professionally trained (National Governor's Association). It described the 
characteristics o f the American terrorist as: “an average age of 20; male and female; 
single or separated; middle or upper class; urbanites; university graduates; Marxist
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and anarchist in ideology; recruited at universities; and (composed of) students, 
lawyers, doctors, government employees, sociologists, and psychologists” (National 
Governor's Association). Russell and Becker described terrorists as being generally 
from middle or upper income families whose parents were predominantly 
professional or white-collar workers (Russell, 1977)(Becker, 1977).
The data gathered for this study showed, however, that while leftist terrorists 
in America closely resemble this description, violent extremists o f the Right are 
significantly different. Although over half o f the leftists indicted during the 1980s for 
terrorist activities were college or university graduates, only 12 percent o f the right- 
wing terrorists held college degrees. A third of the violent extremists o f  the Right had 
not graduated from high school.
These educational differences resulted in significant differences in the 
occupations and incomes o f the leftist and rightist group members. Violent leftist 
groups were more likely to have members who were physicians, attorneys, teachers, 
and even government workers. For example, the eighteen members o f the Macheteros 
indicted in 1986 for the 1983 robbery o f the Wells Fargo depot in West Hartford, 
Connecticut included Jorge Farinacci Garcia, Roberto Maldonero Rivera, and Paul 
Weinberg - all attorneys. Most o f the remaining indictees in this case have university 
degrees in political science, sociology, and anthropology and are employed as 
teachers, occupational therapists, and independent artisans.
The cases involving members o f M19CO and the NAFF reveal similar 
educational and occupational backgrounds. M19CO member Alan Berkman is trained 
as a physician, while his associate, Susan Lisa Rosenberg, is the daughter o f a
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prominent physician. NAFF leader Coltrane Chimurenga, previously known as 
Randolph Simms, pursued his doctorate at Harvard University, while other members 
o f the group, most of whom have college degrees, were employed in government 
service.
By contrast, violent extremists associated with the Christian Identity 
Movement are much less likely to be college educated. Although some o f the leaders 
o f the various groups are well educated, many cadre members lack even minimal 
educational and job skills. The better educated members o f these groups have 
evolved, of course, as leaders o f the extreme right - Richard Butler, head of the Aryan 
Nations, is an engineer as is Wilhelm Schmitt of the SPC.
The generally lower educational and job skills o f the extreme right required 
group members to rely more heavily on petty theft and robbery to finance their 
operations. In fact, many o f the members of these groups were drawn to these 
organizations by the lure o f a place to stay and a modest monthly salary in exchange 
for work at the compounds.
Summary o f Who the Terrorists Are
This study found that one major threat to American urban areas comes from 
terrorists who may be from one of a handful of largely, but not exclusively, Middle 
Eastern countries that provide state support to those organizations who espouse 
terrorism. Yet, in contrast to previous theories about the demography of terrorists, it 
was found that terrorism in the United States during the last two decades was not 
overwhelmingly leftist. While persons advocating Marxist revolution have done their
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share o f  terrorism in America, a substantial number o f  those involved in terroristic 
violence in this country during the past decade have been members of or associated 
with right-wing groups.
However, the terrorist groups that were active in the United States during the 
past tw o decades closely fit the descriptions provided in the theoretical groupings o f 
Flemming, Stohl and Wilkerson previously described in Chapter II (Flemming, 
1988>(Wilkinson, 1987). The data used in this study showed that left- and right-wing 
extremists involved in terrorism in America, for example, differ significantly in 
certain characteristics and traits. Yet the similarities within the categories are 
sufficient to allow generalizations to be made about groups falling within one or the 
other categories. Unlike the concerns raised by Flemming and Stohl, these categories 
are unlikely to result in different observers assigning groups to inappropriate 
categories; in other words, they are generally reliable. The characteristics used to 
distinguish various terrorist groups are mutually exclusive and o f functional utility for 
predicting terrorist activities. The contrasting ideological traits o f left- and right-wing 
groups in America produce interesting demographic distinctions between the two 
categories.
According to the data used in this study, with the exception of the single-issue 
terrorist (e.g., animal rights activists), Americans indicted for terrorism or terrorist 
related activities fall readily into one o f  these two categories. The right-wing groups 
are easiest to label since most are tied together by the Christian identity Movement. 
The Aryan Nations; Arizona Patriots; CS A; various factions of the Ku Klux Klan; the 
Order and Order II; SPC; and the White Patriot Party fit this category. However,
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F lem m ing  notes that simply labeling the remaining groups as leftist presents some 
problems. The El Rukns, Macheteros, FALN, M19CO, UFF, New African Freedom 
Front (also known as the New African Freedom Fighters or NAFF), and the 
Provisional Party o f Communists are different from each other in many ways. For 
example, one might think that the El Rukns street gang would have little in common 
with Puerto Rican independence groups like the FALN and the Macheteros. Yet on a 
number o f major identifying characteristics all o f these groups bear striking 
resemblances. In particular, the data used in this study show left-wing terrorists in 
America are bound together by at least five major similarities: 1) their ideology and 
beliefs about human nature; 2) their views on economics and the distribution of 
wealth; 3) their bases of operations; 4) their tactical approach; and 5) the targets they 
select.
The data gathered in this study shows terrorists that threaten America tend to 
be older than previously thought by scholars, with those from the right being 
somewhat older than terrorists from left wing organizations. Women play an 
important role in terrorist organizations that threaten the urban built environment.
Recent terrorist attacks have shown that domestic attacks are much more 
lethal than those in the past, often with terrorists trying to kill as many Americans as 
possible. There is no one, clear political ideology of terrorists who pose a threat to 
American urban infrastructure. Table 3, below, compares domestic terrorists who 
have attacked urban infrastructure by ideology. All data is obtained from the 
population fitting the criteria for this study.
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TABLE 3.
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDY POPULATION OF 
TERRORISTS BY POLITICAL ORIENTATION/IDEOLOGY
1980-2000






Age Average: 34 A verage: 33 Average: 39
Gender 73% male 
27%  fem ale
92%  m ale  
8% fem ale  





Ethnicity 71% non-white 
29%  white
60%  non- 
w hite/M iddle Eastern 
40%  w hite  
(w hite presence in 
anti-abortionists, anti- 
Rajneesh and Jew ish  
groups on ly)
100% w hite
Sponsorship 0% direct foreign  
governm ent
20%  indirect foreign 
(Japanese Red Army, 
Red Brigade, Croatian 
Liberation)
20%  non-foreign  
(B lack , Puerto Rican)
15% direct foreign  
governm ent (L ibya, 
Y em en, Sudan, PLO) 
65% indirect foreign  
(U sam a bin Laden, 
Hamas, H ezbollah)
20% unknown
0% direct foreign  
governm ent 
0% indirect foreign
10% unknown  
90%  non-foreign  
(KKK, Aryan N ation , 
etc.)
Education 60% university 50% university 12% university
Occupation Professional (lawyers, 
doctors, government 
em ployees, sociologists, 
psychologists)
W hite co llar  










50% Puerto Rican 
5% Croatian 
5% Japanese 
40%  native-born 
Am erican (B lack  
extrem ists)
60% M iddle-Eastern  




20% A m erican, but 
with " oth er’ origin  
(Jew ish extrem ist)
90% native-born  
American  
10% Cuban
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What Did The Terrorists Attack?
According to the data, the targets in the urban built environment chosen by 
terrorists for attack generally were buildings. Out of the thirty incidents that fit the 
criteria for this study, twenty-five targets were buildings. Other targets were subways 
(two incidents), a public park, a chemical plant, and a municipal water supply (Chart 
2, below). Although one would conclude that buildings are the most likely target, it is 
important to consider the displacement effects of target hardening discussed in 
Chapter II of this study.





Targets generally followed broad categories based on the motives o f the group 
or on the individual planning the attack. Domestic groups, including right-wing, 
issue-oriented, radical organizations and separatists, often chose targets for a specific 
purpose. Targets fell into two broad categories, some that overlap, depending on the 
motives o f those planning the attack.
Symbolic or public message targets represent the first, the most common, and 
by far the largest, category. These were prominent landmarks, electrical utilities, 
pipelines, state and local government buildings, universities, certain federal 
government buildings, and businesses and industries involved in such areas as 
chemical production, animal research, forest or wood products, and refineries. One
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expert interviewed for this study described these types o f structures as “signature” 
structures.
The second category included government-owned or -operated facilities.
These consisted o f tunnels, computer facilities, bridges and overpasses, maritime 
facilities (e.g., locks and harbors), and law enforcement buildings and support 
structures. These findings are consistent with Bowman’s theories about what targets 
terrorists may choose to attack, discussed in Chapter H in the section “Theories About 
What the Terrorists May Attack: Targets.”
The Potential o f Defensible Space and Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design (CPTED)
The theories o f  Oscar Newman discussed in Chapter II suggest that designing 
for street crime and crimes o f opportunity is going to reduce the opportunity for acts 
o f terrorism. Newman’s ideas were supported by both the experts interviewed for this 
study, as well as the current terrorism literature. CPTED must be part o f the redesign 
process of courthouses, office buildings, and corporate America. CPTED represents a 
planning process that reduces the architectural vulnerability.
One o f the participants interviewed for this study stressed
security standards are needed for a minimum standard 
o f care, just as fire disasters have created a uniform 
standard for fire protection. Protecting people, 
information, and property must be a high priority for all 
buildings. The goals fo r  designing to protect against 
terrorism are different than designing to resist crime 
but the process is the same... (italics mine)
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After the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993, the principles of 
defensible space design were put into place there. In addition to concrete planters 
parking is no longer open to everyone. Tenant parking is tightly controlled and 
includes a hydraulic barrier - a  latter-day drawbridge - lowered by a guard only after 
proper credentials are shown, and capable o f stopping a truck at 50 miles an hour.
Even before the bombing o f the World Trade Center, commercial parking in 
the country was being reviewed to prevent the 1,400 violent crimes that occur daily. 
The new garages favor fewer columns, larger spans, and high ceilings. They have flat 
floors, instead of sloping, blind ones and glass elevators to observe occupants and 
high lighting brightened further by painted ceilings.
Much of the movement toward safeguarding public spaces centers around 
rethinking them with a CPTED paradigm. Compare the Washington Metro, wide 
open for surveillance, to the New York City subway, closed-in and dim. The premise 
is that design can help reduce terrorism. Unlike high-tech security systems, 
successful design minimizes the opportunity for predatory crimes like burglary, 
robbery, rape, and murder, as well as terrorism, through more natural methods of 
surveillance and controlled access and design that fosters a sense o f ownership in a 
given area.
According to the experts interviewed for this study, in high-risk security 
situations more sophisticated tools are needed. Ronald J. Massa, an engineer who is 
president of Lorron Corporation in Burlington, Mass., has developed BombCad, a 
software program designed to help architects and engineers determine whether a 
building will collapse from a bomb. The program takes analytical three-dimensional
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drawings of a building and simulates a bomb's effect, providing detailed estimates o f  
injury and accidents. One interviewed expert advocates 10- to 20-foot "stand-off 
areas," or buffer zones around buildings and well-policed traffic "choke points," like 
the barricaded checkpoints in London's financial district.
One participant in this study with responsibility for assessing the 
vulnerabilities of buildings to terrorist attack pointed out that “the number-one source 
of property damage and injury in a bombing is falling and flying glass from the 
immediate building as well as from those nearby.” A CPTED approach would 
suggest that a good tool for mitigating the effects o f glass injury would be to increase 
in the use of laminated windows, in which soft plastic is bonded to a two-piece 
sandwich o f glass to prevent shattering.
Liability Litigation Threatens the Creation o f More Defensible Space
One of the participants interviewed for this study pointed out that
The creation o f basic minimum security standards (for 
buildings) is needed. The federal government has just 
recently established a minimum standard of care for 
federal buildings, but not even minimum standards 
apply to other buildings. Unfortunately, in the private 
sector,
the threat o f  premises liability litigation has driven the 
major organizations for hotels and motels, shopping 
centers, retail association, and builder associations to 
try and block all efforts of minimum standards—
A legal and physical benchmark would put all o f corporate America on notice
to make their buildings safe against terrorism, not just the remote occurrence of fire.
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Insurance companies are strongly supporting standards that they could measure a 
business against and reduce their losses.
When and Where Did The Terrorists Attack Their Urban Targets?
Most terrorist attacks against the domestic urban built environment took place 
in mid-morning or mid-evening, although there were incidents across the whole 
spectrum o f the clock. General predictions o f the most likely time for a  domestic 
terrorist attack cannot be made.
The most common area o f the country for domestic terrorist attacks against the 
urban built environment is New York City. Although attacks against the urban built 
environment took place throughout a wide range o f places around the country, almost 
two-thirds o f the attacks were on targets in New York City or its immediate 
surroundings. Several factors could contribute to New York’s high incident count. 
One may be its status as a “World City,” with the plethora of media channels that can 
immediately broadcast associated terrorist platforms to the world. Another factor may 
also be related to New York’s “World City” status — the constant filtering in and out 
o f policymakers and international events on the world stage — all making an attractive 
venue for terrorist actions.
The selection of major, urban centers is consistent with current theory and 
leftist doctrine, particularly as described by Marighella in his classic work, Mini­
manual o f  the Urban Guerilla. Here, Marighella describes the city as the ideal 
location for terrorist operations, and advocates an urban location for two reasons. 
Theoretically, it provided the opportunity to strike at the very seat of capitalism;
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tactically, it offered the anonymity o f  the crowd as a safe haven for its revolutionary 
members.
Why Did The Terrorists Attack?
The trend toward higher casualties, discussed earlier in this chapter, reflects, 
in part, the changing motivation o f today's terrorists. Analysis o f  the cases used in 
this study showed that religiously motivated terrorist groups, such as Usama bin 
Ladin's group, al-Qaida, which is believed to have bombed the U.S. Embassies in 
Africa, represent a growing trend toward hatred o f the United States. Other terrorist 
groups are driven by visions o f  a post-apocalyptic future or by ethnic hatred. Such 
groups may lack a concrete political goal other than to punish their enemies by killing 
as many of them as possible, seemingly without concern about alienating 
sympathizers. Increasingly, attacks are less likely to be followed by claims of 
responsibility or lists of political demands.
The data suggests that the shift in terrorist motives has contributed to a change 
in the way some terrorist groups are structured. Because groups based on ideological 
or religious motives may lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda, they have 
less need for a hierarchical structure. Instead, they can rely on loose affiliations with 
like-minded groups from a variety o f countries to support their common cause against 
the United States.
Al-Qaida, a terrorist organization involved in several o f the cases used in this 
study, is the best-known transnational terrorist organization. In addition to pursuing 
its own terrorist campaign, it calls on numerous militant groups that share some of its
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ideological beliefs to support its violent campaign against the United States. But
neither al-Qaida's extremist politico-religious beliefs nor its leader. Usama bin Ladin,
is unique. As one o f the interviewed participants pointed out,
. . .if  al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin were to disappear 
tomorrow, the United States would still face potential 
terrorist threats from a growing number o f  groups 
opposed to perceived American world domination...
Moreover, new terrorist threats can suddenly emerge from isolated conspiracies or
obscure cults with no previous history of violence.
Intelligence will continue to be an important first line o f defense against the
domestic terrorist. Coupled with the close ties to the local pulse fostered by a
community policing approach to law enforcement, the evidence suggests the potential
utility o f monitoring trends and indicators. One o f the interviewed experts pointed
out that,
the more loosely affiliated, transnational terrorist 
networks are difficult to predict, track, and penetrate.
They rely on a variety of sources for funding and 
logistical support, including self-financing criminal 
activities such as kidnapping, narcotics, and
petty crimes. Their networks of support include both 
front organizations and legitimate business and 
nongovernment organizations. They use the Internet as 
an effective communications channel.
How Did The Terrorists Attack Their Urban Targets?
Of the thirty domestic terrorist attacks against urban infrastructure that met the 
criteria for this study, twenty six used conventional explosives, three used fire bombs, 
and one was an attempt to poison an urban water supply. It was evident from the
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cases that guns and conventional explosives have so far remained the weapons o f 
choice for most terrorists. Such weapons cause many casualties and are relatively easy 
to acquire and use. Yet the potential for the use o f chemical, biological, or nuclear 
(Weapons of Mass Destruction) materials remains an ominous possibility that must be 
considered in plans to mitigate the effects o f an attack on American cities. Several of 
the experts interviewed for this study noted that, while it is extremely difficult to 
predict the likelihood o f a Weapons o f  Mass Destruction attack, today’s terrorists “are 
seeking the ability to use such agents in order to cause mass casualties.” This is 
consistent with Finding One, which noted that terrorist attacks are becoming more 
deadly.
Weapons of Mass Destruction give a non-state sponsored terrorist group 
significant technical challenges. Participants in the interviews noted that, while lethal 
chemicals are easy to come by, getting large quantities and weaponizing them for 
mass casualties is difficult, and only nation states have succeeded in doing so. 
Biological agents can be acquired in nature or from medical supply houses, but 
important aspects of handling and dispersion are daunting. To date, only nation states 
have demonstrated the capability to build radiological and nuclear weapons.
The 1995 release o f a chemical agent in the Tokyo subway by the apocalyptic 
Aum Shinrikyo group demonstrated the difficulties that terrorists face in attempting to 
use Weapons o f Mass Destruction to produce mass casualties. The group used scores 
of highly skilled technicians and spent tens o f millions of dollars developing a 
chemical attack that killed fewer people than conventional explosives could have. The 
same group failed totally in a separate attempt to launch an anthrax attack in Tokyo.
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A small Weapons o f  Mass Destruction attack could be successful if  the 
terrorists' goal is to challenge significantly Americans’ sense o f safety and confidence. 
Terrorists could acquire more deadly Weapons o f  Mass Destruction capabilities from 
another country. Five o f the seven nations the United States identifies as state 
sponsors o f terrorism have programs to develop Weapons o f  Mass Destruction.
The Gaps — The Analysis O f Policy Initiatives Related To Domestic Terrorist Attacks 
Against The Urban Built Environment
Federal
According to both the current literature on domestic preparedness, as well as 
the comments o f  several experts interviewed for this study, the primary deterrent and 
investigative unit for matters associated with terrorist attacks has been federal law 
enforcement. A recurring comment from the interviews relating to law enforcement 
approaches was that "criminal acts of terrorism occur locally, but are generally 
investigated federally.” Because o f this trend, most contemporary local law 
enforcement officers confronted with a terrorist act would probably be unable to 
differentiate it from a traditional crime without assistance.
As one interviewed participant pointed out,
there is a risk that, in preventing or responding to a 
catastrophic terrorist attack, federal officials may 
hesitate or act improperly because they do not fully 
understand their legal authority or because there are 
gaps in that authority....
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This comment is supported by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in 
its report on Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and 
Efficiency, which noted that federal agencies' individual efforts to enhance 
consequence management o f possible incidents involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction terrorism are not guided by an overarching strategy for achieving a 
defined end state (General Accounting Office, 1998).
The GAO noted that local officials in most o f  the cities visited for their study 
raised the issue that the many Weapons o f Mass Destruction training, equipment, and 
consequence management programs are evidence o f a fragmented and possibly 
wasteful federal approach toward combating terrorism. This sentiment was echoed by 
several of the experts interviewed. The GAO noted that cities pointed to similar 
federal agency training and equipment programs, such as those offered by the 
Department o f Justice and FEMA and the new initiative to give 
the National Guard a WMD response role, as examples of the unfocused federal 
approach to combating terrorism (General Accounting Office, 1998).
State and Local
Although the FBI assumes the lead federal role in the investigation and 
prevention o f domestic terrorism, every act o f terrorism occurring within the United 
States remains local in nature. Such acts, and the threat thereof, fall within the 
purview of state and local law enforcement and present significant challenges, far 
removed from the daily concerns, priorities, and operational considerations o f most 
police administrators.
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Both the interviewed experts and the Government Accounting Office
emphasized that FBI activities cannot succeed without cooperation and assistance
from local law enforcement agencies (General Accounting Office, 1998). Particularly
in light o f the proven effectiveness of a Community Policing approach, local police
officers and deputy sheriffs, along with troopers and state investigators, have the
ability to sense the discontent among terrorist movements, monitor the advocacy o f
extreme causes, respond to hate crimes, and serve as the foundation for an effective
assessment of threatening activities within their communities. As one of the
interviewed participants pointed out,
...in all probability, state or local law enforcement 
officers will respond first to a terrorist threat or
incident however, state and local administrators
should remember that the FBI's unique role in the 
nation's counter terrorism efforts makes it a critical 
component in any terrorism-related investigation....
Several o f the interviewed experts noted that activity by right-wing extremist 
groups has remained difficult to assess from the data available because o f the cell- 
type structure and other clandestine tactics many groups have adopted. Problems 
have appeared to increase since the Oklahoma City bombing. Klanwatch—a project of 
the nonprofit Southern Poverty Law Center that attempts to curb Klan and racist 
violence through litigation, education, and monitoring-reported that "[tjhere were 
858 groups operating in the United States in 1996, a 6 percent increase over the 809 
groups noted in 1994 and 1995'’ (Southern Poverty Law Center, 1997). Although the 
interviewed experts acknowledged the difficulty when determining the level o f  threat, 
a concern for future activity remains. Said one o f the participants,
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The potential for increased violence, including the 
possibility of biological and chemical attacks, really 
worries me. We need to prepare and plan for the 
possibility of an incident occurring in any jurisdiction, 
regardless of location or size.
State and Local Intelligence 
According to the data, complicated and legally challenging intelligence issues 
surround the deterrence o f  domestic terrorism. Many terrorist groups rely on the 
constitutionally protected rights o f advocacy and assembly. Therefore, determining 
the curiosity seekers, followers, and those who may advocate violence requires an 
intelligence assessment o f known and observed activities. A Community Policing 
approach to law enforcement may maximize the potential for timely, accurate 
intelligence concerning terrorism in a domestic, urban environment.
One interviewed expert said “critical ingredients to success include 
coordinated planning, intelligence sharing, and a unified, informed response to 
terrorist threats among federal, state and local agencies.7’ The prevention and 
response to terrorist acts require unified efforts.
All levels o f law enforcement must implement effective antiterrorism efforts 
in combating this threat to ensure the safety o f all American citizens and their 
communities. Yet the data suggests that state and local law enforcement agencies are 
not sharing a great deal o f useful intelligence gathered at the federal level.
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A Need To Review And Modify Current Statutes That Target Terrorism
There are, for the states, conceptual problems in reaching a  legally acceptable 
definition o f terrorism, as none o f the statutes have enacted into law statutes that 
actually deal explicitly with terrorism. Most statutes are modeled after the American 
Law Institute's exemplar called "terroristic threatening." Enacted into legislation with 
the promise of "doing something about terrorism," these statutes do little more than 
cr im inalize  verbal threats (Smith, 1988). If severity o f sanction can be used as a rough 
gauge o f deterrent value, these statutes have had little preventive effect. Relegated to 
misdemeanor or m inor felony status, these statutes have been used only once or twice 
during the past decade to prosecute crimes that might be labeled "terroristic” (Smith, 
1988). If  anything, they open the door for governmental overreaction, enabling local 
officials to label selected offenders as terrorists.
The problem in criminalizing terrorism, according to several interviewed 
experts, lies in translating academic definitions into legally permissible definitions of 
terrorism. To adequately study the phenomenon of terrorism, most academicians add 
a number o f qualifying characteristics to their definitions. For example, Jordan Paust 
argues that any definition of terrorism must consider the outcome, violence used, 
motivation, and goals o f the terrorist to define adequately the concept (Paust, 1977). 
Likewise, Grant Wardlaw notes, "for a definition of terrorism to be universally 
accepted it must transcend behavioral description to include individual motivation, 
social milieu, and political purpose" (Wardlaw, 1982). Unfortunately, these salient 
features conflict with efforts to create legal definitions of terrorism.
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According to Paust, efforts to transform academic definitions of terror into 
legal definitions are doomed under constitutional scrutiny. He says that the law must 
go beyond the goals of empirical study, and decisions must be made regarding the 
social acceptability of an act, subsequently rendering empirical definitions 
unworkable. Consequently, motive or political purpose no longer become useful 
variables in legislating statutes in a system o f justice where motive is not normally an 
essential element of an offense. Finding a universally accepted definition of terrorism 
has not met with much success in United States courts (Paust, 1977).
The conceptual difficulties are magnified when one attempts to write 
legislation that makes an act criminal because it was intended to invoke political 
change or influence an audience beyond the immediate victims, two widely accepted 
aspects o f an academic definition o f terrorism. One of the interviewed participants 
noted, “the issue is really one o f requiring proof of motive as an element required in 
criminal liability.”
Typically, proof that the act occurred (actus reus) and that the particular act 
was accompanied by the required intent (mens rea) is sufficient for criminal liability 
(Wardlaw, 1982). Normally, motive relates only to why a person might commit a 
given act to achieve a desired result. For example, A murders B to obtain money from 
B's wallet. A's intent was to kill, and it must be established in court to convict on a 
murder charge. Ars motive was to steal, but it does not have be established in court as 
an essential element o f the offense except for use as circumstantial evidence in 
establishing intent. Most academic definitions of terrorism, however, include as an
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element o f  the crime the motive o f the perpetrator, i.e., to invoke political or social 
change.
The review o f the current literature on terrorism preparedness showed that 
only one state, California, has attempted to criminalize terrorism explicitly. 
Subsequently challenged because o f its attempt to criminalize motive, a California 
Supreme Court decision, People v. Mirmirani, held that the phrase "to achieve social 
or political goals" was unconstitutionally vague (People v. Mirmirani).
California's attempt to make terrorism a  criminal act represents the only effort 
to retain a definition o f terrorism similar to that used in academe and generally 
believed by the American public to constitute terrorism. Although it may be doomed 
by its purist approach, the statute reflects the enormous conceptual difficulty faced in 
specifically criminalizing acts o f terrorism.
Lack O f Effective Coordination And Communication
As with any form of disaster planning, planning for a terrorist attack against 
the urban built environment presents a complex balancing act between the risk o f the 
incident, the potential for casualties and the tremendous costs involved in attempting 
to mitigate such an incident. As a result o f both the expert interviews and the review 
o f the terrorism-related literature, it became evident that there is a wide range of 
“potential expense” vs. “likelihood o f terrorist attacks by various methods” available 
to the terrorist. That balance can best be illustrated by Figure 2 below:
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Cost of Mitigation Effort
Potential
Casualties
Both the knowledgeable persons interviewed and several government-initiated 
reports confirmed that policy-makers are now realizing that a proper response to 
terrorism requires effective coordination and open communication. Unfortunately, it 
may still be lacking in some instances. "The working relationships among key 
agencies at all levels o f government are limited," said one o f the interviewed 
participants. "In many places they're nonexistent." A study sponsored by the National 
Institute o f Justice (NIJ) confirmed that state and local law enforcement agencies view 
the threat o f terrorism as real, but their response to the threat varies widely according 
to the size and resources o f the department and the nature o f  the threat in any given 
community.
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Several knowledgeable persons interviewed pointed out that, in the past, major 
cities developed preventive and preparation programs, often in cooperation with the 
FBI and its joint terrorism task forces, whereas smaller cities and counties usually 
operated on their own. This was corroborated by the NIJ report, which noted that 
antiterrorism resources varied according to the existing threat potential. Some smaller 
jurisdictions developed regional alliances to address specific extremist groups and 
organizations operating within locales. However, the majority o f jurisdictions only 
recently realized the threat presented by extremist individuals and groups and now 
assess the threat that such groups may pose to their respective communities and to 
related operational planning and readiness issues.
Improvement in Intergovernmental Coordination and Relations is Needed
As one of the participants noted, “the federal government cannot prepare for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents on its own.” The experts generally agreed 
that improvements are needed in intergovernmental relations between federal, state 
and local governments. For example, federal agencies developed some o f their 
assistance programs without coordinating them with existing state and local 
emergency management structures. In addition, the multitude of federal assistance 
programs has led to confusion on the part o f state and local officials. One promising 
step to improve coordination and reduce confusion has been the creation o f the 
National Domestic Preparedness Office within the Department o f Justice to provide 
"one stop shopping" to state and local officials in need of assistance. This office has 
recently prepared a draft plan on how it will provide assistance, but the experts
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interviewed for this study stressed that much work has yet to be done to promote true 
intergovernmental cooperation.
One participant stressed that an important intergovernmental issue requiring 
immediate resolution is “the matter o f command and control at the site o f  a terrorist 
incident.” Roles o f the federal government versus the state and local governments 
need to be further clarified to prevent confusion.
The Urban Built Environment is Vulnerable to Conventional Attack
According to The Sentinel (Vol 1, No. 3, Third Quarter 1993) a publication o f
the Industrial Risk Insurers, explosion has the highest average dollar loss o f  all
hazardous events. Therefore, another cost factor entering today's construction and
building operation economy is blast mitigation costs. Military installations for years
have been designed to resist conventional weapons or blast attacks, with the single
focus toward sustaining the structure for the purpose o f maintaining the mission.
Noted one participant,
for buildings in American cities, the single most 
important design consideration is to construct buildings 
to save lives in the event o f  a  terrorist attack. There 
should be absolutely no concern for saving the structure 
other than to save the people.
One o f the unintended consequences o f designing for defensible space to
mitigate terrorism may be that people do not want to work in fortress-like structures.
Designing commercial buildings as military installations is very impractical, as
ordinary people do not want to work in bunker-like buildings. Commercial buildings
serve a very different purpose and therefore must be designed to a different standard.
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Accepting that fact, the experts noted that commercial buildings should be designed 
to sustain a certain amount o f  attack, meaning they are designed to allow for limited 
localized damage-not total failure-to permit rescue teams to evacuate the victims.
The goals of building designers should be 1) to design safer buildings that will not fail 
when attacked and 2) to help rescue professionals gain entrance to a damaged 
building to tend to the survivors.
Planning collaboration, well before construction begins, is essential. As noted 
by one interviewed expert, “when considering protection for a building, the building 
owners and architects must work with structural engineers and blast consultants to 
determine which threats they are trying to protect against.” For bombings, the 
terrorist threats range from the large truck bomb to the mid-size car bomb to the small 
package or letter bomb. For these assaults, the source can originate either external or 
internal to the structure. No matter what size the bomb, there will always be some 
localized damage and some unavoidable deaths. However, by limiting the localized 
failure, catastrophic structural failure can be prevented. Optimally, noted the 
interview participant, “blast mitigation provisions for a new building should be 
addressed in the early stages o f  the design. However, existing buildings can be 
upgraded to behave better when attacked.”
As was pointed out in the case study of the World Trade Center bombing, one 
bomb disabled the primary utility feeds and their backup systems. However, 
accidental or terroristic, these events not only disrupted the operations o f the facility 
but also impaired the rescue operations.
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Rescue Operations Are Affected By Urban Design
“Protection for a building, which comes in active and passive forms, will 
impact the damage sustained by the building and the rescue efforts o f the emergency 
workers,” said one study participant. Several methods that enhance the building's 
structural performance will directly benefit the emergency response team. As the 
building cannot be designed to be bombproof, the key is to limit the acceptable 
damage to a confined area.
Acceptable damage is a relative term, with the spectrum of damage ranging 
from a few broken windows to regional slab failure to confined structural frame 
failure. In any case, the ultimate goal is to prevent widespread structural failure or 
progressive collapse. The damage at the World Trade Center was extensive but 
somewhat localized, relative to the massive twin structures. Unfortunately, the 
damage to the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which was very 
extensive, could have been limited had the design included provisions to mitigate 
progressive collapse.
The Urban Built Environment Is Most Vulnerable To Biological Attack
One o f the bio-terrorism experts interviewed for this study pointed out that, 
“in the past, an attack with a biological agent was considered very unlikely; however, 
now it seems entirely possible.” The experts believe that it is no longer a matter o f 
“i f ’ but “when” such an attack will occur. They pointed to the accessibility of 
information on how to prepare biologic weapons and to activities by groups such as
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Aum Shinrykyo, which, in addition to releasing nerve gas in Tokyo's subway, 
experimented with botulism and anthrax.
Massive Impact on an Unprepared Metropolitan Health System
An attack with an agent such as smallpox poses a threat 
to large populations because o f the potential for person- 
to-person transmission, enabling spread to other cities 
and states. Such a disease would quickly culminate in a 
nationwide emergency. International involvement 
would be sure to follow. Control of such an epidemic 
would require the coordinated effort of the entire public 
health community. — study participant
Several of the participants noted that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
has significant experience in responding to explosion and chemical related terrorism 
events and emergencies. Chemicals are plentiful and many o f the world’s worst 
disasters have involved the release o f industrial compounds. However, the experts 
noted, special risks are attendant with biological terrorism. For example, when people 
are exposed to a pathogen like plague or smallpox, they may not know that they have 
been exposed, and they may not feel sick for some time. This delay between exposure 
and onset of illness, or the incubation period, is characteristic of infectious diseases. 
The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on 
the exposure and pathogen. During this period, patients may continue to travel, visit 
family and friends, or attend public meetings at a time when they may be highly 
contagious. Consequently, a disease may be well established in the population before 
the first cases appear ill and require medical attention.
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Numbers o f Casualties Would Overwhelm Metropolitan Public Health Systems
American cities must be prepared for a potential 
spectrum o f domestic bio-terrorism that ranges from 
hoaxes and use o f nonmass casualty devices and agents 
by individuals and small groups to state-sponsored 
terrorism that employs classic biological warfare agents 
and can produce mass casualties. — Interviewed expert
The agents o f  anthrax, plague, brucellosis, smallpox, viral encephalidites, and 
viral hemorrhagic fevers were cited by the participants as those o f particular concern: 
they are relatively easy and inexpensive to produce, cause death or disabling disease, 
and can be aerosolized and distributed over large geographic areas. If released under 
ideal environmental circumstances, these agents can infect hundreds of thousands o f 
persons and cause many deaths. Such scenarios would present serious challenges for 
patient management and for prophylaxis of exposed persons; environmental 
contamination could provide a continuing threat to the population (especially those 
exposed at the beginning of the crisis) and generate panic in the community.
The interviewed experts stressed that bioterrorist attacks could be covert or 
announced and could be caused by virtually any pathogenic microorganism. In one o f 
the cases examined for this dissertation, the Rajneeshee religious cult in Oregon 
provided an appropriate example. The cult planned to infect residents with 
Salmonella on election day to influence the results o f county elections. To practice for 
the attack, they contaminated salad bars at 10 restaurants with S. Typhimurium on 
several occasions before the election. A community wide outbreak of salmonellosis 
resulted; at least 751 cases were documented in a county that typically reports fewer 
than five cases per year.
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In the Rajneeshee case, although bioterrorism, was considered a possibility 
when the outbreak was being investigated by public health officials, it was considered 
unlikely. The source of the outbreak became known only when the FBI investigated 
the cult for other criminal violations. A vial o f S. Typhimurium identical to the 
outbreak strain was found in a clinical laboratory on the cult's compound, and 
members o f the cult subsequently admitted to contaminating the salad bars and 
putting Salmonella into a city water supply tank. This incident, among other recent 
events, underscores the importance o f improving preparedness at all levels.
Biological Agents are Extremely Difficult to Detect
A bioterrorist attack may be difficult to distinguish from 
a naturally occurring infectious disease outbreak.
Investigators must first examine the epidemiology of an 
outbreak to identify its source, mode of transmission, 
and persons at risk — Interviewed bio-terrorism expert
Certain clues may indicate whether an outbreak is the result of purposeful 
release o f microorganisms. Naturally occurring diseases are endemic to certain areas 
and involve traditional cycles o f transmission; some diseases occur seasonally, and 
sentinel cases are not uncommon. In contrast, a disease outbreak due to bioterrorism 
could occur in a nonendemic-disease area, at any time of year, without warning, and 
depending on the agent and mode o f transmission, thousands of cases might occur 
abruptly.
Biological weapons have an unmatched destructive potential, noted the 
interviewed experts. Pound for pound, biological agents are the world's most lethal 
substances. The lethality of biological agents makes it unnecessary for terrorists to
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maintain large stockpiles. Some biological agents are self-replicating, which sets them 
apart from chemical and nuclear weapons. Increasingly sophisticated genetic 
engineering techniques also raise the haunting possibility o f terrorists exploiting 
antibiotic and vaccine-resistant bacteria, as well as biological agents altered to 
facilitate aerosol dissemination.
One interviewed expert noted that the technology for dispersing biological 
agents is becoming more sophisticated. Analysts often have downplayed the potential 
for bioterrorist strikes to inflict mass casualties, considering the difficulties associated 
with disseminating biological agents. Although aerosol dissemination presents 
technical challenges, they are not insuperable. Biological agents could be 
disseminated as an aerosol cloud and infect a large area with potentially lethal 
infective doses.
According to the Department of Defense's 1997 report on proliferation (Office 
of the Secretary o f Defense, 1997), in 1990 Iraq attempted to modify spray tanks 
capable o f delivering 2,000 liters of anthrax via remotely piloted aircraft. In Japan, 
the Shinrikyo cult bought a Russian helicopter and two remotely piloted vehicles 
capable o f disseminating biological agents. Spurred by market pressures, technology 
for dispersing biological agents, such as that used by farmers to spray insecticide, is 
certain to improve. One interviewed expert stressed, “It would be a  serious mistake to 
think terrorist groups would not seek to exploit such enhancements.”
According to the experts interviewed, the lag time between infection and the 
appearance o f symptoms generally is longer for biological agents than with chemical 
exposures. The incubation period will vary, depending on the biological agent. For the
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plague, the incubation period is two to three days; for anthrax, one to five days. 
Terrorists seeking to cover their tracks will find this lag time appealing; so might 
states seeking plausible denial or attempting so-called false flag operations, in which 
one power wrongly implicates another. Clearly, the gap between infection and the 
appearance o f symptoms will complicate efforts to pursue bioterrorists. Law 
enforcement officials, in fact, took more than a year to ascertain that the 1984 
salmonella outbreak in Oregon resulted from intentional contamination.
Bioterrorist Weapons Are Easy and Cheap to Produce 
The interviewed experts stressed that lethal biological agents can be produced 
easily and cheaply. Analysis o f one o f the cases used in this study showed that many 
biological agents suitable for terrorist strikes can be cultivated easily. For example, 
the Patriot's Council, the Minnesota-based militia group that schemed in 1992 to 
assassinate a deputy U.S. marshal and a sheriff, reportedly manufactured enough ricin 
toxin from a book recipe to kill 125 people. Detailed techniques for extracting ricin 
from castor beans are available in numerous publications. The cost o f procuring lethal 
biological agents is also relatively low. One o f the interviewed participants estimated 
that “a significant biological arsenal could be cultivated in a 15-foot square room with 
$10,000 worth o f  equipment.’’
As many as ten countries possess offensive biological weapons programs, 
including the People's Republic of China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and 
Syria. The existence o f  these programs greatly increases the danger o f bioterrorism. 
Countries seeking to sponsor bio-terrorist acts always have the option o f sharing their
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expertise with extremist groups. For their part, terrorists groups interested in bio­
terrorism may attempt to lure disgruntled scientists to support their causes.
The interviewed experts emphasized that biological agents are easier to 
produce clandestinely than are either chemical or nuclear weapons. Said one 
knowledgeable person,
Biological research can be used for peaceful or 
malevolent purposes. The equipment required for the 
production of biological agents for either purpose is 
generally the same, which raises the so-called dual-use 
problem. The dual-use problem also makes it easy for 
countries to conceal their biological weapons programs.
Even small terrorist groups could develop lethal 
biological agents, or genetically altered agents, 
clandestinely.
Urban Areas Are Ideal Terrorist Targets 
The global transportation links usually found in close proximity to urban areas 
facilitate the potential for biological terrorist strikes to inflict mass casualties. In 1918 
and 1919, a globe-girdling strain o f influenza killed 22 million people, including 
500,000 Americans. The advent o f rapid transportation links has made the world even 
more vulnerable to the rapid spread o f contagious diseases. Thanks to the reach and 
rapidity o f modem je t travel, a person carrying the Ebola virus, for example, could 
infect hundreds or thousands o f  people across several continents in a matter of hours. 
To be sure, the contagion potential o f biological agents would not appeal to terrorists 
intent on narrowly focused attacks. But for a nihilistic or apocalyptic group aiming to 
cause mass casualties, this potential would be very attractive.
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Urbanization provides terrorists with a wide array o f lucrative targets. In 
densely populated areas, even a partially successful biological attack would have a 
devastating impact. The potential to generate mass panic is greatest in city 
environments. The emergence o f global, real-time media coverage increases the 
likelihood that a major biological incident will induce panic. One o f  the experts 
interviewed for this study noted that a major biological attack on U.S. soil would 
unleash an avalanche o f media attention. Grossly inaccurate or sensational media 
coverage of even a limited bioterrorist incident, including a well-planned hoax, could 
induce widespread panic and confusion. In a world already awash with low-level 
violence, bio-terrorists seeking to gain attention for their cause may find this potential 
for pandemonium particularly appealing.
Anthrax And Smallpox Pose The Most Serious Civilian Threat To Urban Areas
The most serious threats from a bio-terrorist attack 
come from those agents that have the greatest 
availability, ease o f production, that are lethal or 
incapacitating, have stability in storage, have high 
infectivity/toxicity, and are stable/deliverable in aerosol.
— Interviewed bioterrorist expert
Terrorist criteria for a biological agent are that the agent is pathogenic for 
humans, plants or animals; causes the onset of severe disease or disability; is effective 
at low dose rates; has a high rate o f disease following infection; is highly infectious 
but not contagious and can be weaponized in a variety o f  munitions or aerosol 
generation equipment. The intent of the terrorists are to kill large numbers, 
overwhelm resources, and cause massive societal disruption.
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The interviewed experts stressed that the highest threat is posed from those 
biological agents that are dispersed in aerosol, are highly lethal, that lack treatment or 
vaccine, and that are communicable- According to the interviewed experts, two 
candidates emerge from the long threat list: anthrax and smallpox. Both have well 
demonstrated historical devastation potential, both are highly lethal agents, both have 
devastating psychological impact, are easy to produce, and can be aerosolized.
Organizational Issues And Lines O f Communication Are Unclear
Should an attack against an American city take place, consequence 
management responsibility would be that o f the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). FEMA is responsible for ensuring that the Federal Response Plan 
is adequate to respond to the consequences o f terrorism directed against large 
populations in the United States, including terrorism involving Weapons o f Mass 
Destruction.
The Federal Response Plan is a  generic template designed to coordinate the
delivery o f federal assistance—personnel, technical expertise, and equipment—in the
event o f  natural disaster or federal emergency. Although the general lines o f
responsibility appear reasonably clear, the federal government’s plan to cope with the
threat o f bio terrorism suffers from several weaknesses. Noted one interviewed expert,
The reactive nature o f the federal government’s 
approach has helped spawn an "alphabet soup" o f 
counter-terrorism programs. The sheer number o f 
actors involved has created immense coordination 
problems in the unwieldy counter terrorism 
architecture, which includes more than 40 different 
federal agencies, bureaus, and offices.
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In theory, the U.S. National Security Council is supposed to coordinate 
disparate elements o f the counter terrorism effort by managing various working 
groups. The reality, according to the data, is very different. A government bioterrorist 
simulation conducted in March 1998 revealed serious interagency coordination 
problems. According to former CIA director James Woolsey, who recently served as 
the co-chair o f a classified study on terrorism and Weapons o f Mass Destruction, 
"The system is not well organized at all.”
According to the experts interviewed for this study, the federal government 
has failed to develop a public education program to explain the dangers posed by 
bioterrorism. This shortcoming is alarming, noted the experts, especially because the 
specter o f bio-terrorism has attracted considerable attention. It has become a frequent 
topic o f newspaper stories and magazine articles, many of which express serious 
doubts about the government's ability to deter bioterrorist attacks, let alone manage 
the horrific consequences. The absence o f a modulated public education campaign 
increases the likelihood of mass panic in the aftermath of such a strike.
Too Much Reliance On The Military
According to the interviewed experts, the military's ability to assist state and 
local officials in coping with bioterrorism on U.S. soil has lagged. To help remedy 
these shortcomings, Congress passed the 1996 Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA), Richard Lugar (R-EN), 
and Pete Domenici (R-NM). This act directed the Department o f Defense, in 
conjunction with other federal agencies, to manage a training and equipment program
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in 120 cities over a five-year period. The law was designed to nurture, at the local 
level, the expertise to cope with the consequences o f major terrorist strikes involving 
Weapons o f Mass Destruction. As of April 1998, the program had reached roughly 
25 percent o f the designated cities. The interviewed experts noted that the program 
has experienced "growing pains," particularly with respect to allocation and funding 
o f equipment.
In March 1998, the Department of Defense announced plans to give the 
National Guard a greater domestic role in responding to terrorist strikes involving 
Weapons o f Mass Destruction. The Pentagon's fiscal year 1999 budget request 
included money to field ten 22-member Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection 
(RAID) teams to respond to chemical or biological attacks.
The interviewed experts were in agreement that, although the creation o f 
RAID teams is important, they should not be considered the "cornerstone" of U.S. 
policy. Instead, it was constantly stressed by several experts that the cornerstones 
should be 1) the training and equipping of the "first responders," the local police and 
fire officials who will arrive at the scene hours, perhaps even days, before federal or 
state assets can be deployed in force, and 2) the strengthening participation of public 
health providers (no priority should be inferred for these two items). The first few 
hours are critical in responding to chemical and biological attacks; this time 
represents a narrow window in which local officials can manage the casualties from 
the attack and reduce the risk of mass panic.
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The Public Health System Should Have More Resources And Play A Larger Role
In addition to the Department o f Defense, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention has a vital role in the consequence management o f biological attacks. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. public health system lacks the resources to handle such a 
contingency. Indeed, the system has problems even with the resurgence of infectious 
diseases such as tuberculosis. A recent White House-backed interagency working 
group on infectious diseases found that at least "29 previously unknown diseases have 
appeared since 1973, and 20 well-known ones have reemerged, often in new drug- 
resistant or deadlier forms.”
These findings raise serious questions about the ability o f the U.S. public 
health system to cope with major biological terrorist attacks. Dr. Donald Henderson, 
dean emeritus of the Johns Hopkins School o f Public Health, argued that “the United 
States is ill-prepared to confront a terrorist attack using biological weapons, and 
health officials need more money to prepare against such attacks.” In 1972, for 
example, the United States ceased giving routine smallpox vaccinations. Dr. 
Henderson, who led the global effort to eradicate smallpox, believes the United States 
should increase its store o f smallpox vaccine by 20 million doses.
According to the interviewed experts, other public health system issues 
germane to bioterrorism require urgent attention beyond the vaccine deficiencies. As 
late as 1995, U.S. laws and regulations provided few barriers to prevent an individual 
from legally procuring biological agents. The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act made it a crime to threaten the use of biological weapons and 
established tighter regulations concerning the transfer of biological agents. As Senator
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Jon Kyi (R-AZ) emphasized in recent hearings before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, although the CDC published the regulations required by the act, it "failed 
to provide the funds needed to implement and enforce safeguards designed to prevent 
the diversion of lethal agents into the hands of terrorists."
It was stressed by several interviewed experts that the overall structure of the 
public health system is incapable o f  managing the consequences o f a major 
bioterrorist strike. An interviewed participant with public health responsibilities 
stressed that,
...the U.S. emergency system overall is geared to 
respond to small numbers of people injured primarily 
due to trauma, including transportation accidents, 
medical emergencies such as heart attacks, and 
localized cases of violence. The responses to these 
types of emergencies are not as relevant to injury 
caused by chemical and biological attack.
According to the interviewed experts, public health agencies at the municipal, 
county, state and federal levels will be central participants in efforts to recognize and 
respond to bioterrorist attacks. Public health response activities will be especially 
essential to shaping the scope and outcome of a bioterrorist attack. Containment of 
transmissible disease outbreaks is a  formidable undertaking. The mobility of urban 
populations, the global availability o f high-speed transportation networks, and 
limitations on public health's legal authorities, are factors that impact on epidemic 
management.
The experts that were interviewed for this study noted that, while it is possible 
that electronically based surveillance systems will be helpful in detecting an attack; it 
is certain that such systems will be essential tools in managing an epidemic. Thus, the
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ability o f local and state health departments to analyze and monitor the 
epidemiological situation is a key component o f any national response system. 
Epidemiologic analysis o f initial victims may be critical in determining where the 
attack occurred, who is at risk, and who requires prophylactic treatment.
A key component o f efforts to limit the number who become ill will include 
the identification o f contacts requiring vaccination, antibiotics or quarantine. 
Epidemiologic tracking o f the epidemic will be necessary to determine if response 
efforts are succeeding, where resources should be invested, and whether additional 
attacks have occurred. Governments' ability to describe accurately the course of 
disease outbreaks has a  great impact on public credibility and on citizens' willingness 
to follow the recommendations o f public health authorities.
Several interviewed experts stated that, unfortunately, the public health 
infrastructure in the U.S. has been neglected for decades. This was corroborated by 
Institute of Medicine, that wrote, in 1988, "public health in the United States has been 
taken for granted" and that "our current capabilities for effective public health actions 
are inadequate" (Institute o f Medicine, The Future o f  Public Health, National 
Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1988). The experts interviewed for this study felt 
that the situation has only gotten worse. City and state health agencies remain 
seriously under-funded and understaffed, a situation that presents a real danger in our 
nation's potential to manage effectively an epidemic among the civilian population.
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Hospitals In American Cites Are Not Prepared To Respond To A Terrorist Attack
Should a terrorist attack on US civilians occur, hospitals would be frontline
institutions for dealing with the response, regardless of the type or scale o f the attack.
As a knowledgeable person emphasized,
the current hospital system is not well prepared to deal 
with a mass disaster. Economic pressures have reduced 
staff and the number o f available hospital beds.
Intensive care and isolation beds are particularly scarce.
Drugs and equipment are purchased on an "as needed" 
basis, which has resulted in reduced stockpiles available 
for immediate use.
Another knowledgeable person noted that hospitals have been largely missing 
from bioterrorism response planning to date. Efforts to include hospitals in exercises 
sponsored by the Domestic Preparedness programs have not been successful in 
engaging hospital leaders, who are preoccupied with the changing and financially 
competitive terrain o f modem health care. Most hospitals are not in a position to 
accept unfunded mandates, and are unlikely to respond to bioterrorism response plans 
unless the nation establishes a thoughtful menu of incentives and programs that 
motivate and enable them to do so.
Summary
While the United States has the greatest intelligence system in the world, the 
country does not have a national antiterrorist emergency unit, organizational chain of 
command, or the capability to respond directly to a domestic terrorist attack. With
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regard to terrorist countermeasures, we do not have a capability for the equivalent of a 
911 call in response to a domestic terrorist incident.
A national response team capability does exist through the Bureau o f Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), but both these agencies respond to incidents after the fact, when the damage 
has already been done. The ATF has developed a program to help federal, state, and 
local investigators meet the challenges they face at explosives crime scenes. This 
program involves specialized teams that can respond within twenty-four hours to any 
scene o f a major explosion or fire. This specialized response capability is the only one 
o f  its kind offered by a federal law enforcement agency.
FEMA has the responsibility o f dealing with the consequences of domestic 
terrorism. However, FEMA is ill-equipped and is not experienced in rapid and 
effective response to infrastructure attacks, including responding to the destruction o f 
the urban built environment to include key portions of the power grid, water supplies, 
and other logistical networks.
Another problem is the lack of national security standards in this field. The 
Department o f Transportation has not developed detailed guidance explaining how 
transit and port authorities could best meet security requirements, for example. 
Neither do industry volunteer guidelines exist. Without detailed guidance and 
standards, an effective response to attacks cannot be assured.
Explosives detection capabilities are a concern as well. Current explosives 
detection methods are ineffective to cope with the terrorist threat o f today, as they
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lack the range, throughput, and technical specificity to perform in the real-time 
operational environment necessary for transportation and infrastructure operations.




This study was designed for the prime purpose o f determining strategies that 
could mitigate the impact o f terrorist attacks on urban areas -- attacks using either 
conventional and/or weapons of mass destruction. While exploring these strategies, 
careful attention has been directed to possible unintended effects o f these strategies. 
In addition, a thorough examination o f the gaps in existing terrorist/crime mitigation 
strategies was conducted -  especially in light o f emerging threats from ‘"weapons of 
mass destruction” i.e. biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
Specific areas o f inquiry included a focus on what types o f terrorist attacks 
had taken place already, who the terrorists were, what they attacked, when they 
attacked, where they attacked, why they attacked, and how they attacked. Based on 
this initial step, an assessment of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the 
preparedness o f the urban built environment o f American cities was made. The 
outcome o f this initial assessment is a series o f suggestions as to what should be done 
differently, and how involved agencies at federal, state, regional and local levels can 
play more effective roles in ensuring readiness against terrorist attacks. Based on the 
information developed in Chapter IV, several conclusions and recommendations are 
presented in this chapter.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Overall Planning Process Does Not Sufficiently Involve Agencies at the State and 
Local Level
According to both the GAO (United States General Accounting Office, 1997) 
and the experts interviewed for this study, adequate planning is generally coordinated 
across federal agencies, but state and local agencies are often left out o f the process or 
have minimal involvement. This is particularly true for smaller metropolitan areas.
One solution to this problem would be th e  creation o f a domestic terrorism 
planning process at the state and local level. B y  creating a domestic terrorism 
planning process at the state and local level, administrators can respond better to a 
terrorist incident and also help to identify and prevent an incident from occurring. 
First, law enforcement officers must recognize a domestic terrorism threat. Next, as 
with other important law enforcement challenges, agencies should develop a state o f 
readiness to prevent, deter, and interdict terrorist attacks. Planning, an essential step, 
should include identifying potential threats andl those areas that may be vulnerable to 
attack, maintaining an inventory of relevant agency resources, and creating 
interagency agreements. Such agreements should include information exchange, 
planning oversight, a survey of available resources, and formal involvement in an 
incident command structure. Agencies also sho»uld engage in contingency planning to 
prepare for “what i f ’ scenarios by exploring th e  various alternatives for attack in a 
particular jurisdiction. An effective planning effort also includes an enhanced ability 
for multi-agency response.
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The Public Health System is Not Prepared to Meet the Threat O f Domestic Terrorism, 
Particularly Bioterrorism
Unlike an explosion or a tornado, in a biological event, it is unlikely that a 
single localized place or cluster o f people will be identified for traditional first 
responder activity. In every one o f the cases used in this study that resulted in an 
actual attack, local personnel were the first on scene. These people were either local 
law enforcement, firefighters or paramedics. The next group involved were other 
health professionals such as hospital personnel. In the only actual biological attack 
used in this study, the Rajneesh case, the victims of the biological attack started 
showing up at the local hospital within days after the attack. This strongly suggests 
that in future attacks, the initial responders to such disasters, especially a biological 
attack, will most likely include county and city health officers, hospital staff, 
members o f the outpatient medical community, and a wide range o f response 
personnel in the public health system.
An increased investment in the Public Health system would be an important 
step toward meeting the threat o f domestic terrorism, and bioterrorism in particular. 
Protection against terrorism requires investment in the public health system. This 
point was stressed repeatedly by the interviewed experts, and is underscored in a 
report commissioned by the Department o f Health and Human Services Office of 
Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and recently released by the Institute o f Medicine and 
the National Research Council, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and 
Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response, which stresses the need for
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long-term public health improvements in surveillance and epidemiology 
infrastructure.
Increased vigilance and preparedness for unexplained illnesses are an essential 
part o f the public health effort to protect the American people against bioterrorism. 
Toward this end, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), working in collaboration 
with State and local health departments, many other public health agencies, and other 
Federal agencies, should begin an effort to upgrade public health capabilities locally 
and nationally to respond to biological and chemical terrorism. Specifically, the 
CDC, in partnership with state and local governments, should focus upon detection o f 
unusual events — i.e. public health surveillance. Because the initial detection of 
bioterrorism will most likely occur at the local level after a period when patients have 
incubated the disease, it is essential to educate and train members o f the medical 
community — both public and private — who may be the first to examine and treat the 
victims. State and Federal epidemiologists must be trained to consider unusual or rare 
threat agents when a suspicious outbreak occurs and must be prepared to address 
questions related to their transmission, treatment, and prevention. It is also necessary 
to upgrade the surveillance systems of State and local health departments, which will 
be relied upon to identify unusual patterns of disease occurrence and to locate any 
additional cases o f illness as the disease spreads throughout the community and 
beyond.
The CDC should also promote the development o f new disease surveillance 
networks which will better link critical health care facilities and components of the 
emergency medical system to public health agencies. CDC should also pilot and
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evaluate new surveillance systems to improve the nation’s ability to detect low 
incidences o f unexplained illnesses or track critical health resource utilization.
In the response to an outbreak caused by an act o f bioterrorism, the most likely 
scenario will be that CDC — as well as DOD and security agencies — will be alerted to 
the event only after State or local health officers, medical practitioners, or other 
workers in the health sector have identified and validated a cluster of cases that are 
highly unusual and potentially unexplained. For this reason, it is imperative that State 
and local health departments have sufficient resources to conduct disease outbreak 
investigations. CDC should provide State and large metropolitan health departments 
with tools, training, and financial resources for local outbreak investigations, and help 
develop rapid public health response capacity at the State and local levels. 
Additionally, in the event o f a suspected or an actual attack, CDC should be prepared 
to assist in identifying threat agents and their modes of transmission, in instituting 
control measures, and in providing consultation on medical management.
Strengthening communication among clinicians, emergency rooms, infection 
control practitioners, hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and public health 
personnel is of paramount importance. In the event o f an intentional release o f a 
chemical or biological agent, rapid and secure communications will be especially 
crucial to ensure a prompt and coordinated public health and medical response. 
Further, in the event of such an attack, the CDC will need to ensure that the public is 
provided with accurate and timely information. An act o f terrorism is likely to cause 
widespread panic, and on-going communication o f accurate and up-to-date 
information will help calm public fears and limit collateral effects of the attack.
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CDC should work to ensure that all levels of the public health community — 
Federal, State, and local — are prepared to work in coordination with the medical and 
emergency response communities to address the public health consequences of 
biological and chemical terrorism. The CDC must work to assure that first responders 
are better prepared against biological and chemical exposures. CDC has significant 
experience in the areas o f detector technology, personal protective equipment, 
including protective clothing and respirators, and the necessary training to work in 
hazardous environments. The challenge is to expand these capacities to better protect 
first responders from the perils o f biological and chemical terrorism.
Strategies to create protocols for immunizing at-risk populations, isolate large 
numbers o f exposed individuals; assess methods o f safeguarding food and water from 
deliberate contamination; and explore ways to improve linkages between animal and 
human disease surveillance networks should be developed since threat agents that 
affect both humans and animals may first be detected in animals.
Collaboration between public health departments and the medical community 
is also critical to bioterrorism response. The gulf between medicine and public health 
is well documented and significant. Communication between hospitals and state 
health agencies is extremely limited, according to both the literature and the 
interviewed experts. For example, few state health agencies have the ability to 
determine how many intensive care unit beds in the state are occupied at any given 
time, and few physicians know how to contact government health agencies were they 
to suspect a case o f smallpox or anthrax. Re-establishing the linkages between
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medical practitioners and hospitals and public health agencies will be extremely 
important (and is likely to yield dividends beyond bioterrorism response).
It is likely that many physicians will be reluctant to devote time or resources in 
preparing to treat diseases with low probabilities of occurrence. Physicians must be 
educated about the potentially calamitous consequences o f  bio terrorism, and the 
critical role that astute clinicians could play in recognizing such attacks. It is essential 
that at least a core o f practitioners in selected medical specialties - such as emergency 
medicine, infectious disease, internal medicine, hospital epidemiology, etc.- are aware 
o f the basic clinical manifestations and management of diseases caused by biological 
weapons.
Effective response to a bioterrorist attack that results in hundreds or thousands 
o f patients will require extensive coordination and cooperation among dozens of 
hospitals and Health Maintenance Organizations in a city or region. The protocols and 
infrastructure for implementing such collaboration should be examined, especially in 
view o f the autonomous and financially competitive nature o f health care 
organizations.
First Responders Lack Sufficient Training
Maintaining effective disease surveillance is an essential first step in 
preparedness and is important in helping law enforcement officials to react swiftly. 
Preparations must include plans for rapid identification and characterization o f agents 
involved and for emergency distribution of large quantities o f medical supplies, 
especially antibiotics and vaccines. Coordination and communication links also need
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to be strengthened to minimize response time, especially at first when exposed but 
asymptomatic persons may still be treated prophylactically. Also, when response time 
is shortened, the possibility of apprehending perpetrators increases. Education and 
training in bioterrorism and its potential consequences must become national 
priorities.
Increased emphasis on training and equipping "first responders" according to 
the specific needs o f individual locales would be one solution to this problem. No 
matter how well-trained or quickly mobilized they are, federal response teams never 
will match the responsiveness of local officials because o f time and distance. 
Therefore, Congressional efforts to train and equip first responders must remain a top 
priority. This assistance must be tailored specifically to address local circumstances, 
because clearly, the requirements for New York City are not the same as for Wichita, 
Kansas. Cities each have a very broad range of varying infrastructure that may serve 
as potential terrorist targets. For instance, subways, bridges, skyscrapers, tunnels, 
water supplies, power plants, and signature sites such as the St. Louis Arch, the 
Seattle Space Needle, Lincoln Center, each present city-unique problems for first- 
responders. Federal and state officials will be successful to the extent they sustain 
working partnerships with local officials.
American Cities Need an Early Warning System
Several knowledgeable persons stressed the importance of having an early 
warning system established to inform citizens o f terrorist attacks. Said one 
knowledgeable person,
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if  I can identify the symptoms o f anthrax in a timely 
manner, say within twelve hours, I can give you a shot 
and you will live. If  it’s been over twelve hours since 
you’ve contracted the disease, you’re dead. And, we 
can’t bury you... .your body must be burned.
It is therefore important that a system which could provide early warning o f  terrorist
attacks be developed and implemented. Reliance solely on the intelligence capability
o f  law enforcement may not provide sufficient warning. Unlike a chemical agent
attack, which would cause an almost immediate reaction, a biological attack would
not cause a reaction until after an incubation period. Noted one o f the interviewed
experts, "Generally it takes 24, 36, 48 hours before (victims) would start showing
what oftentimes are nondescript, flu-like symptoms which then progress to whatever
symptoms the specific agent would normally cause."
According to several knowledgeable people, the best defense comes from 
using a combination of immunization and physical protective measures. They pointed 
to the anthrax vaccine as a key countermeasure against a biological warfare attack. 
When vaccines are not available as a biological countermeasure, the answer according 
to one interviewed expert, is "rapid detection, warning, and reporting."
Technology currently exists to deploy sensors capable of providing early 
warning o f biological attacks in major U.S. cities. The Defense Department is 
developing and fielding smaller, lighter, and simpler biological detectors. One of 
these is the Biological Integrated Detection System, or BIDS. After detecting what 
appears to be an unnatural agent, the systems first provide a warning, then determine 
specifically what the biological agent is. In summer 1998, the Department o f Defense 
deployed a system of biological agent detectors (called the "Portal Shield") at select
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U.S. m ilitary bases in South Korea and the Middle East. This system, originally 
deployed in the Persian G ulf region, is about two-thirds the size o f a typical office 
desk. It's fully modular, self-contained and can detect eight different agents.
"The beauty o f this device is that it's a network sensor," noted one 
respondent. “Depending on the geography, as many as 18 sensors may be arrayed 
around a port or an airfield.” The sensors talk to one another, he said, so you're not 
relying on just one o f  them sounding an alarm. Using sensor arrays, the false positive 
rate very quickly gets down to zero. In Bahrain, U.S. forces have run more than 3,000 
tests during round-the-clock monitoring by the Portal Shield deployed there. The false 
positive rate was less than one half o f 1 percent. U.S. citizens living in major
metropolitan areas should be afforded a comparable measure o f warning.
Current Criminal Laws Are Not Adequate fo r Addressing Terrorism
Any response to a threat o f domestic terrorism should include assessing and 
separating lawful, constitutionally protected rhetoric from criminal threats. To 
accomplish this difficult and sensitive task, state and local agencies should initiate a 
formal process of threat assessment. The vast majority o f individuals who hold 
extremist beliefs pose no real threat to law enforcement or society. Most remain 
content with espousing inflammatory rhetoric and attending meetings, rallies, and 
exhibitions to reinforce their beliefs. Distinguishing between the individuals and 
groups who advocate extreme views and those who advocate harm becomes the 
challenge that law enforcement agencies must address effectively.
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A Citizen Watch Approach Should be Implemented
To strengthen the ability of law enforcement to monitor those who may 
engage in bioterrorism, the equivalent o f Megan's Law for individuals convicted of 
violating state and federal laws regarding the possession o f biological agents should 
be implemented. Megan's Law was developed to alert local communities o f the 
presence o f convicted child molesters. Because national security concerns sometimes 
outweigh an individual's right to privacy, the same principle should be applied to 
individuals who violate laws and traffic in biological agents. Such a law would 
require local law enforcement officials to be notified o f the presence of persons 
convicted o f such federal and state related crimes.
Developing a Community Focus Remains Appropriate fo r  Deterring Terrorism
One o f the most promising tools for assisting law enforcement with detecting 
the presence o f potential terrorist activity is the Community Policing philosophy.
This approach includes the presence o f law enforcement personnel at the 
neighborhood level. The police officer's primary duty is, or course, to control crime. 
However, the most important thing an officer needs to carry out that mandate is 
information. The rapport engendered by having the same officer in the same 
geographic area every day facilitates a two-way information flow, where the officer 
receives input on community priorities in exchange for which the residents provide 
vital information. The officer becomes a "member" o f  the community. The officer 
can be the catalyst in the formation of block clubs and associations so that people can 
be the "eyes and ears" o f their neighborhoods.
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Law enforcement personnel can attend public meetings to monitor a n d  assess 
the threat potential or seriousness o f the proposed actions. Still, administratEors should 
exercise caution to avoid opening investigations based on beliefs alone. If, However, 
those beliefs encourage or elicit others to commit violence to accomplish extrem ist 
objectives, then a legitimate law enforcement interest exists. Oversight should  focus 
on criminal actions, not mere advocacy or impassioned pieas for legitimate action to 
correct perceived wrongs. An unintended consequence may be some perceived 
diminishment o f First Amendment rights to free speech with regard to the sseparation 
o f constitutionally protected speech and terroristic speech. It will be imporrtant to 
carefully distinguish between passionate, inflammatory speech and crimina_l speech.
The Public Should be Made More Aware o f  the Threat Posed by Domestic .Terrorism
At a press conference in November 1997, Secretary Cohen held alotft a five- 
pound bag of sugar to dramatize how little anthrax would be needed to in flic t mass 
casualties in a city like Washington, D.C. The Secretary’s actions may serwe to 
dramatize national security threats, but should not be confused with a sustained 
campaign to heighten awareness about the danger o f terrorism. Such a camjpaign 
would explain, in a sustained and carefully modulated fashion, U.S. coun ter terrorism 
policy as well as the nature o f the terrorist threat. This could be achieved thorough a 
variety of different media, including public service announcements on television and 
radio. Although some analysts might find this approach alarmist, a carefulLy 
modulated educational campaign could serve, in fact, as an important confiadence- 
building measure and reduce the possibility o f mass panic. To address public
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education issues related to the threat o f terrorism, a sustained campaign to educate the 
public on the threat o f terrorism should be conducted. However, an unintended 
consequence o f a sustained campaign to educate the public on the threat of terrorism 
may be the potential to cause some degree o f panic if  not carefully implemented.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Remains Applicable, and Design 
Training is Essential fo r  Protection Against Terrorism
Structural Approaches 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) emphasizes 
problem seeking before moving into problem solving. The theory is consistent - the 
process o f assessment is the same for assessing threats from terrorism as for more 
traditional crime. CPTED starts with the threat and vulnerability analysis to 
determine the weakness and potential for terrorist attack against some part of the 
urban built environment. The process and challenges of a CPTED approach to 
mitigation of terrorism are the same for designing to deter terrorism as for other 
crimes — only the level of the threat is changed. CPTED and Defensible Space 
planning are a planning process, as compared to fortressing or target hardening. When 
designing against crime or terrorism, the security consultant must resist the rush for 
quick answers.
What the CPTED process does is ask the questions about 1) access control; 2) 
natural surveillance; 3) territorial reinforcement; 4) maintenance ; and 5) management 
strategies. The CPTED process provides the direction to solve the challenges of
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terrorism with organizational (people), mechanical (technology and hardware), and 
natural design (architecture and circulation flow) methods.
In response to the increased threat o f domestic terrorism against the urban 
built environment, military engineers and architects should work with civilian 
building professionals to adapt to commercial use some o f the technologies and 
designs developed to protect military buildings from bomb blasts. One military 
approach that is applicable to civilian buildings is increasing the strength of a 
structure's lower levels to make it more bomb resistant — an approach that also would 
improve its ability to withstand natural forces such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and 
earthquakes. Commercial building designers should have access to selected technical 
manuals, computer programs, and other materials developed by the military for use in 
evaluating the risk o f terrorist attack and the effects o f bomb blasts, and for mitigating 
blast damage and deterring future bomb threats. In many cases, however, research will 
be needed to adapt these resources for civilian use. For example, the military uses 
special computer programs for predicting the force o f a bomb blast and how a 
building's structure will respond to that blast. But it is not clear how readily these 
programs can be used to model blast effects on civilian buildings, which typically are 
lighter in construction but more complex than military structures.
Several modes of protection were suggested by the data for commercial use. 
These include buffer zones or controlled-access areas around buildings, thus avoiding 
situations like that in Oklahoma City, where the building sat next to a public road.
A "keep-out zone" ensures a minimum guaranteed distance between the explosion and 
the target structure. This keep-out zone is achieved by placing at the site perimeter
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planters, fountains, and other barriers that cannot be compromised by ramming with a 
vehicle. While this is the most effective measure to lessen the effect o f a terrorist 
attack, it also can work against rescue teams since the barriers could deter access to 
the rescue and firefighting vehicles. In most urban settings, the typical setback 
distance from the street to the building facade is 10 to 25 feet, which does not pose 
any access problems for emergency vehicles. However, when designing prestigious 
buildings, including landmark office towers, hospitals, and museums, the setback is 
often increased to create a grand public space. These setbacks could create keepout 
distances of more than 100 feet with barriers to guarantee protection but which also 
could limit emergency vehicle access. Details that may provide operational barriers or 
fences should be included in the design to allow emergency access. If plaza or 
monumental stairs were used, some secondary access must be incorporated to 
similarly allow entry.
Engineering Approaches 
Building professionals also should look at ways to increase the blast resistance 
o f a building's subsystems — lighting, plumbing, communications, and ventilation. 
These non-structural elements have been largely overlooked in blast mitigation 
designs, but they can be crucial to the survival of a building's occupants. Such 
analysis also should be done for some existing buildings, such as those determined to 
be at particular risk from terrorist attack and those already scheduled for renovation. 
For a planned new building, incorporating reasonable blast hardening would add
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around 5 percent to construction costs, but both the costs and benefits of such 
measures should be considered on a case-by-case basis.
A research program that examines critical structural and non-structural 
components o f civilian buildings is needed. The program would include testing and 
developing more blast-resistant interior partitions, such as metal stud and drywall 
partitions that could be bonded together to reduce fragmentation from an explosion. 
Research also is needed on the blast resistance of common materials and equipment 
used in lighting, plumbing, communications, and ventilation systems.
In addition to making buildings safer, efforts should be made to improve 
preparations for rescue and recovery operations in case o f an attack. This emergency 
planning should include ensuring rapid availability o f building plans and structural 
drawings to rescuers, as well ensuring their ready access to computer-based modeling 
and other methods for assessing the extent o f blast damage to the building.
Buildings’ operational control areas and utility feeds should be protected from 
direct attack to lessen the negative effects o f a blast. Therefore, it is important to 
design operational redundancies to survive all kinds of attack. Simple structural 
modifications include designing redundancies into the structure to carry additional 
loads imposed after a bomb attack. These provisions include properly designing 
beams, girders, and columns to carry damaged slabs or columns. In the Oklahoma 
City Bombing, the beam floor system used did not have any redundancy or backup 
support system for slab or beam failure. By properly designing and detailing the 
building's structural elements, the slab may fail locally, but the entire floor will not 
collapse. Similarly, columns should be designed to carry additional loads such that if
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one column is severely damaged to the point where it cannot properly function, the 
load will be distributed to the neighboring columns.
These changes all attempt to enhance the structure's response to the severe 
dynamic loading by adding strength to resist the blast, ability to absorb the energy, 
and redundancy to reduce the chance o f progressive collapse. Many of these steps 
incorporate some o f the recommendations made for the Department of State-Office o f 
Foreign Buildings Operations after the attacks on American embassies. It remains 
today the only design guideline approved for government design or construction.
The last major structural consideration includes the construction o f the 
exterior facade. Second only to the impact the standoff distance has on the effects of 
the blast, the facade remains the occupant's last form o f true protection. Not only does 
the building's skin protect the occupants from the weather, but it also limits the 
amount o f blast that can actually enter the workspace. The facade is built o f two 
elements-the structural skin or wall section and the window or glazing. By 
constructing the exterior wall o f a  more durable material such as reinforced cast-in- 
place concrete instead of block walls or curtain walls, at least for the lower floors, the 
building will be able to resist or curtail certain blast loads, resulting in significantly 
less bodily injury and building damage. In addition, a properly designed concrete wall 
will aid in preventing progressive collapse, as the wall will assist in carrying the load 
o f  a damaged column.
While most blast engineers would like to eliminate windows, they remain an 
essential element in building design. Windows, unfortunately, are the weak link in the 
facade design, as they typically will fail before any other element. The two keys to
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protecting the workspace are attempting to prevent the windows from failing and then 
ensuring that the windows fail properly if overloaded.
Standard annealed glass used in window sections for both homes and office 
buildings behaves quite poorly in blast loading and failure. Not only is the peak 
allowable pressure less than two psi, but this type of glaring breaks into sharp shards. 
It is these "knives and daggers" that cause most o f the injuries so vividly seen in the 
news clips.
Several other types o f glazing are available for building design, including 
thermally tempered glazing (TTG) and polycarbonate glazing, also known as bullet- 
resistant glass. TTG is commonly used in special areas where glass breakage and 
bodily injury are likely to occur; the most common examples are the side and rear 
window's o f automobiles. This glazing, which can be designed for loads up to 30 and 
40 psi, breaks into rocksalt pieces and would cause significantly fewer injuries to 
people occupying the building under attack. The polycarbonate glazing also performs 
quite well under blast loading but does not experience the same failure mode as the 
TTG. Instead of breaking into small pieces, it remains a single unit as it dislodges 
from its support frame.
The most common use o f  polycarbonate glazing is the front windshield of an 
automobile. When damaged, it develops spider web cracks but does not break into 
small shards. The downside o f this mode o f failure is that the glass unit can become a 
large flying object, causing additional injury and damage. Other window treatments 
include adding a Mylar film to the glass, which will reduce the shards but can discolor 
and be easily vandalized, reducing its effectiveness. Furthermore, the failure
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mechanism is similar to the bulletproof glass, which creates large flying obstacles. 
Blast curtains, which collect the glass fragments, also can be used but reduce the light 
and view that the windows are trying to provide in the first place.
While these glazing window solutions appear to function quite well, some 
drawbacks in these high-performance glazing systems include cost and high 
maintenance. Not only are the windows themselves very costly, but to fail properly, 
their support and attachment systems must be properly designed, which further 
increases the cost. Even though a great number o f  human injuries are related to flying 
glass shards, it is not the only significant source o f  injury, though usually a more 
visible one. The other visible cause o f injury is falling debris.
One o f the less visible causes o f human injuries is blast pressure, which can 
rupture the ear drum, collapse the lung, or even crush the skull as a result of the blast 
wave's getting into the workspace. These injuries, which begin at pressures near 15 
pounds per square inch (psi), can be reduced if  the level o f blast pressures entering the 
space is curtailed. The amount of blast that enters the space is directly proportional to 
the amount o f openings on the facade o f a structure.
With the cost for installing these windows reaching several million dollars, the 
protective design money would be better spent keeping the structure standing rather 
than keeping the windows in place. This is because the anticipated blast pressures 
from a car or truck bomb far exceed the allowable pressures any window system can 
resist. As a point o f  reference, the blast pressures felt on the facade in the Oklahoma 
City Bombing were on the order o f4,000 psi-100 times higher than the design 
pressures described above.
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The biggest structural engineering lesson learned from the Oklahoma City 
Bombing was that the building's response to the dynamic loading o f a terrorist bomb 
must be improved. The single most important improvement would be to mitigate 
catastrophic failure or progressive collapse by incorporating some structural 
redundancy. This measure alone, regardless o f glazing or facade improvements or 
maximizing the standoff distance will significantly reduce the number o f  fatalities. 
When more than 80 percent o f the deaths are caused by the structure's falling on top 
o f  occupants who otherwise would have survived the blast, construction money would 
be most prudently spent to properly design, reinforce, and detail the building to 
improve its response to explosions. While the localized damaged zone will not be in 
pristine condition, it will remain safe enough to facilitate the rescue o f potential 
victims.
Additional benefits for strengthening buildings, especially key signature 
structures, would be a resistance to destruction caused by a wide variety o f  naturally 
occurring phenomenon. These include hurricane, tornado and earthquake events. On 
the other hand, a potential unintended consequence might be a reduction in personal 
freedom due to the limits imposed by access control, metal detectors and other 
restrictions.
Yet another unintended consequence created by the use o f “keep-out” barriers 
may be to impede access o f emergency vehicles to crisis sites. This consequence may 
be overcome, however, by carefully considering limited access areas throughout the 
protected site.
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There is a Need for More and Improved Consequence Management Training, 
Coordination, and Clarification o f  Responsibilities
“Consequence management” describes ways and means to alleviate the short- 
and long-term physical, socio-economic, and psychological effects o f a terrorist 
attack. It describes the coordination o f international, national, regional, and local 
assets to deal with the effects of such an attack. The term includes preparatory work in 
response to a WMD threat—against the Super Bowl, for example—that would include 
site surveys; assessment of the ability of local hospitals to treat or decontaminate 
victims, and the size, condition, and locations o f local stocks o f various antidotes. 
Preparation could include determining the locations, size, and availability o f other 
national antidote stocks as well as international stocks available to support planning 
for surge capacity.
More and improved consequence management training, better coordination, 
and clarification of responsibilities is needed. This should become the foundation on 
which to develop a certification process for all levels of response. Such a process will 
enable the nation to begin standardizing its response to the consequences of Weapons 
o f Mass Destruction. Without a certification process, disparate approaches will 
inevitably inhibit communication and coordination. Therefore, consequence 
management and training should receive additional emphasis.
Seminars and conferences should be conducted with far more frequency than 
at the present time. If only to define the scope o f the problem and to establish an 
awareness o f just how many types o f  organizations and people are involved, 
conferences may offer a significant national return for a relatively small investment.
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All national assets are generally not going to be able to respond to an incident 
within 6 to 12 hours. In that case, local responders will have to carry the burden o f  the 
immediate response. And while there is a good plan for federal agencies to educate 
and train metropolitan police, fire, health, and other emergency providers, the 
operational role o f the "feds" interacting with the affected state remains largely ill- 
defined. Participants in any aspect o f consequence management must be selected 
with great care. With so many organizations and agencies involved in consequence 
management, unity of command is probably impossible.
Responsibility And Authority is Fragmented
In terms o f agency responsibility for mitigating the effects o f terrorist attacks 
against the domestic urban built environment, authority is fragmented. Agencies and 
levels of government protect their own facilities and guard their own prerogatives. 
Physical obstructions, security guards, and other security measures are largely 
controlled by individual agencies. Local governments assume responsibility for local 
security, except when there is a compelling reason for state or national assistance or 
intervention as in the cases of the Los Angeles Olympics, the New Orleans World’s 
Fair, and nuclear power facilities. In the latter case, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission is the responsible agency for on-site security and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Is responsible for off-site concerns such as responding to 
nuclear accidents (terrorist or otherwise) that create danger for the surrounding 
populace. Therefore, lines of authority and responsibility must be clarified and 
carefully delineated.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
This dissertation began by examining several passive approaches to mitigating 
criminal acts as suggested in the theories o f defensible space originally proposed by 
Jane Jacobs. Oscar Newman, Lewis Mumford and Harold LasswelL Posing 
somewhat different strategies, they all agree that physical forms o f urban space affect 
security.
The Passive Mitigation Theories o f  “Natural ” Police Powers
These early theorists contended that “natural” police power is significantly 
superior to the more artificial, state-imposed police power. Their theories were 
largely based on the view of a social community which "looks out for its own," and of 
a physical structure which encourages such community and allows for widespread 
community surveillance. Yet even Oscar Newman noted that the effectiveness of 
natural police power was limited, and that there was room for alternative approaches 
to ensure safety and security. He argued that, in contemporary urban America, a 
situation cannot be envisioned in which state police presence is not required 
(Newman, 1972). He points out that the effectiveness of this community-based 
surrogate for actual police power depends greatly on how well-equipped the 
communities are to prevent crime.
The present study has moved well beyond an examination o f  the traditional 
defense o f urban space, and has expanded the concept of urban defense to include 
emergency preparedness operations involving a very broad range o f law enforcement, 
emergency disaster response, public health response and the intergovernmental
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matrix. The evidence suggests that with their emphasis on such concepts as 
neighborhood cohesion and sense of community, Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman 
provide a  sound basis for defending against terrorism. While these theories were 
proposed at a time well before recent acts o f domestic terrorism, their contention, that 
one can design defensible space to maximize safety, would appear to have utility for 
planning mitigation strategies. The potential to structure the environment so as to 
ensure safety, serves as a useful reservoir of ideas to defend against terrorist attacks.
Active Mitigation Theories on “Designing-in ” Safety and Security
More recent theorists, such as Jeffery (CPTED), Clarke (Opportunity 
Blocking and Situational Crime Prevention) and Crowe (Target Hardening), build on 
the work o f earlier defensible space pioneers by suggesting that proactive changes 
could be made to urban spaces that would “design-in” safety. They suggest that once 
a community has defined and analyzed its vulnerabilities, it is time to begin planning 
for change. This approach continues to serve as the basis for mitigating terrorist 
attacks. Selecting the strategies and tactics to be implemented at a likely target site 
involves the same careful analysis needed to understand any crime problem. Some of 
the specific strategies suggested by CPTED included target hardening, which were 
improvements that make unauthorized access more difficult. Installing strong doors, 
locks, and window screens, reinforced glass, and alarms were several other 
approaches suggested by CPTED to reduce the chance that terrorists will gain access 
to the structure.
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Still other strategies suggested by CPTED include access control, which can 
be achieved by keeping doors and gates locked and interior common spaces fenced off 
from public access. Establishing visitor check-in booths and guard houses, reducing 
the number o f entrances and exits, and issuing pass cards can help management 
maintain control o f a site. Emergency stairwells can be restored to their intended 
purpose by equipping them with alarm-connected panic bars and removing exterior 
door handles.
The findings in this study suggests that a CPTED approach is one o f the 
most effective approachs for mitigating the consequences o f terrorist attacks against 
the urban built environment. The theory CPTED can be successfully applied to 
making a difference in preventing acts o f  terrorism. CPTED emphasizes problem 
seeking before rushing into problem solving through a careful threat and vulnerability 
analysis to determine the weakness and potential for attack. Attack from criminal 
behavior or attack from terrorist activity only reflect a change in the level and types of 
threats.
CPTED and Defensible Space planning provide a very useful planning process 
for mitigating the consequences o f terrorist attacks. What the CPTED process does is 
direct attention to such considerations as 1) access control; 2) natural surveillance; 3) 
territorial reinforcement; 4) maintenance ; and 5) management strategies that can a) 
increase the effort to commit crime or terrorism; b) increase the risks associated with 
crime or terrorism; c) reduce the rewards associated with crime or terrorism; and d) 
remove the excuses why people do not comply with the rules and conduct 
inappropriate behavior. The CPTED process provides the direction to solve the
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challenges o f crime and terrorism with organizational (people), mechanical 
(technology and hardware), and natural design (architecture and circulation flow) 
methods.
A More Systematic Approach to CPTED is Necessary
While CPTED is one o f the most promising approaches for mitigating the 
consequences o f terrorist attacks, the literature shows that CPTED has generally been 
practiced without the benefit o f a systematic process or assessment as dictated in the 
scientific method. Most practitioners are in law enforcement and have gained their 
CPTED expertise by attending one or several trainings. The police officer CPTED 
practitioner is seldom given the time, resources, or expertise to conduct pre and post 
evaluations o f crime hot spots requiring improvements. The solution has been to 
conduct a "quick and dirty" study o f a vulnerable area. Thus, the practitioner 
develops recommendations without the benefit of gathering all o f  the relevant 
information, without the benefit o f  power or authority to implement 
recommendations, without the power to make design or management decisions that 
perpetuate the problems, nor without the ability or resources to evaluate or measure 
the success or failure o f the recommendations. Each new site calls for reinventing the 
process again without a standard code or protocol.
The CPTED practitioner must address divergent facets o f  architecture, 
operational/ management practices, governmental bureaucracy, and vested interests 
together in a collaborative process. Each new situation requires creative problem 
solving. However, there are no minimum standards of what the process should be or
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the criteria for evaluation. With the exception o f several cities with CPTED 
codes/ordinances/resolutions, there are virtually no common guidelines for the 
practitioners to follow other than their own experience or resources. CPTED can 
make a difference in preventing acts of terrorism. CPTED emphasizes problem 
seeking before rushing into problem solving. Security standards are needed for both 
minimum and uniform standards o f evaluation for CPTED, just as fire disasters have 
created a uniform standard for fire protection. Protecting people, information, and 
property must be a high priority for the urban built environment. Government 
buildings, signature infrastructure, bridges, tunnels, stadiums, transportation hubs, 
water facilities and other building types such as schools, public housing, convenience 
stores, residential housing, and retail and commercial buildings must be included in 
CPTED planning. Even family planning clinics are subject to the terrorist activity of 
pro-life groups. The goals for designing to protect against terrorism are different than 
designing to resist crime, but the process is the same: CPTED.
Situational Crime Prevention Provides an Approach to Mitigation
Situational Crime Prevention theory, based on the assumption that if one 
knows the type o f place and the type of vulnerability, one should be able to 
recommend a specific tactic that can prevent crimes o f  this type and this place. Such 
an approach is advocated by both situational crime prevention theory (Clarke, 1992) 
and problem-oriented policing theory (Goldstein, 1990). At minimum, these 
complementary strategies are also a promising approach to mitigating the 
consequences of a terrorist attack. Rather than looking for a generic solution to a
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specific vulnerability at a particular place, one could undertake a thorough 
examination of the situation and then craft a unique set o f interventions to address this 
problem.
Rational Choice Theory
Rational-choice theory in criminology, has developed out of the utilitarian 
concept that one chooses that which will provide the most reward and will result in 
the least pain (Clarke and Cornish, 1986). Ancillary approaches to defending space 
continued to build on earlier theoretical foundations through the convergence of three 
elements. These generally include (1) a motivated offender, (2) a target, and (3) some 
degree of vulnerability. Along this vein, this study expanded upon Rational Offender 
theory, applying it to terrorist attacks, and suggesting studying the ways or “routines” 
of potential terrorists and how they intersect with the “routines” of targets.
Routine Activity Theory
Concentration o f crime at places is predicted by routine activity theory (Cohen 
and Felson 1979; Felson 1994) and offender search theory (Brantingham and 
Brantingham 1981). Some of the original evidence for clustering of crime at places 
was found in Boston (Pierce, Spaar and Briggs 1986) and Minneapolis (Sherman, 
Gartin and Buerger 1989). Additional evidence for crime concentration at places has 
been found for specific types o f crime. Routine Activity Theory can help identify 
areas vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
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More Research is Needed on the Effects o f  Displacement Theory
Crime Displacement Theory contends that an intervention (e.g. a change in 
street lighting) does not deter the criminal or offender but merely displaces the crime 
to the daytime, a nearby area, a different target, or type o f  crime. This theory suggests 
some degree o f rationality on the part o f the terrorist, and so is integrally tied to the 
terrorist’s making o f  a rational choice. Yet theoretical explorations based on the 
rational choice perspective discussed above (Cornish and Clark 1986) find no basis 
for believing offenders always completely displace if they cannot attack their ideal 
targets (Cornish and Clark 1987; Barr and Pease 1990; Eck 1993; Barnes 1995; 
Bouloukos and Farrell 1997). Reviews o f empirical studies examining place-focused 
prevention, police enforcement, and other preventive tactics in the United States, 
Canada, Great Britain, continental Europe, and Australia, find that there is often no 
displacement, but when displacement occurs it does not overwhelm other gains from 
blocking crime opportunities (Cornish and Clark 1987; Barr and Pease 1990; Eck 
1993; Hesseling 1995). In these studies, there is no evidence to suggest that these 
interventions increase opportunities for crime by displacing it. Researchers who have 
looked for empirical evidence o f displacement have found little evidence o f that 
displacement. Concern about displacement appears to be based more on pessimism 
than empirical fact. Therefore, theories on displacement effects seem to hold very 
little promise for mitigating the impact o f terrorist attacks at this time, absent more 
thorough research into its effects.
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The Theory o f  a “Garrison State ” May Provide an Accurate Picture o f  Future Trends
Harold Lasswell’s concept o f  the “garrison state,” which were developed in 
the 1930s, may provide an accurate description o f the future o f urban areas. Lasswell 
initially offered the garrison state construct in 1937 in response to the Sino-Japanese 
War. He reasoned that technological changes within the military would alter the 
relationship between the military institutions and the civilian societies o f  which they 
were a part. This conjecture was consistent with his general perspective that 
technological change is always accompanied by social dislocations and that these 
dislocations were responsible for psychological tensions that threaten the rationality 
o f political processes (Lasswell, 1941).
The crucial technological development that prompted LasswelTs reflections 
and resulted in the garrison state construct was the introduction o f air power to 
military efforts. He perceived that military air power would make civilians vulnerable 
to attack in addition to military installations and personnel. In essence, he argued that 
the development o f military air power generated a democratization o f  risk. The 
garrison state construct became a widely embraced theory of civil-military 
relationships. Many intellectuals subscribed to it, as did representatives o f  the mass 
media.
The evolvement of LasswelTs garrison state remains a possible consequence 
o f the wide use o f terrorism. This is consistent with his general perspective that 
technological change is always accompanied by social dislocations, and that these 
dislocations were responsible for psychological tensions that threaten the political
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process. Lasswell specifically addressed the idea o f increased risk for civilians , 
noting the development and ascent of “specialists on violence” to positions of 
political power. In essence, then, Lasswell conceived o f the garrison state as the 
eventual result o f the increase centrality in society o f  the specialists on violence.
The thesis offered by Lasswell almost seventy years ago provides insight into 
the current state o f terrorist activities. Today, the lethal technology that Lasswell 
identified to frame his argument, namely airpower, has been replaced by tools of 
terrorism as an extension o f politico/military power. As noted earlier, terrorism is 
officially sanctioned by several countries that are recognized by the United States as 
state sponsors of terrorism. Terrorist methods continue to generate the 
democratization o f risk identified by Lasswell. The potential for terrorist attacks 
supports Lasswell’s construct of the garrison state by calling for broadly applied 
exclusionary physical barriers among society or segments o f  society (Lasswell, 1941). 
The myriad surveillance, detection, intelligence and physical strategies currently used 
or planned for implementation show that public spaces in American cities will indeed 
be closer to fortresses than at any previous time. Those strategies that make terrorist 
acts more difficult, more costly and/or less rewarding for terrorists appear to present 
the most likely probability for successfully mitigation.
Based on reviews o f government documents and interviews with 
knowledgable informants, this study builds upon the already existing theories of 
defending against traditional crime to include a very broad approach to mitigate the 
impact o f terrorist attack on the urban built environment. These strategies include not 
only specific target hardening to meet the special demands posed by terrorist
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bombings, but also includes strategies to plan for defending aigainst terrorist acts 
involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.
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APPENDIX A.
INVENTORY OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS MEETING THE 



















A bomb planted outside an abortion clinic in 
Asheville, N.C. exploded causing no injuries 
and little damage because it detonated only 
partially. The clinic received no advance 
warning o f  the bomb. Police initially said two 
bombs had been planted at the Femcare clinic, 
but the FBI determined that a second device 
found in the vicinity was actually a piece o f the 
exploded bomb. The bomb was placed outside 
the Femcare clinic, next to a wall near where 
the waiting room is located. It went off at about 
a half-hour before the clinic wras to open at 8 
a.m. Homes and businesses near the building 
were evacuated and police cordoned off the 
road around the Orange Street clinic in a 
neighborhood several blocks from downtown 
Asheville. FBI and Asheville bomb teams 
disarmed what was left o f the bomb. 
Investigators would not elaborate on the bomb's 
makeup. Femcare was one o f several clinics 
nationwide that received packages said to 
contain the potentially deadly bacterium 
anthrax. Nothing was found inside the packages 
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Two Palestinians and a Pakistani are arrested on 
a tipoff to New York City police and are found 
to have suicide bombs and a note indicating 
they intend a terrorist attack in the city's 
subways. Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a 
Palestinian, entered the United States (in 
Washington state) illegally from Canada three 
times and was apprehended and returned to 
Canada. He entered Canada as a student, but 
requested and received political asylum. After 
his last U.S. entry the Canadians would not take 
him back because he had committed crimes in 
Canada. He applied for asylum, and a  judge 
ordered a hearing for 1998 and released him.
Abu Mezer said that he had been accused by the 
Israeli government o f belonging to Hamas, a 
terrorist organization a claim denied by his 
family in Israel. On June 23, at a hearing on his 
asylum application, he withdrew it, and the 
judge gave him 60 days to depart the country. 
Lafi Khalil, the second terrorism suspect 

















During the Summer Olympic Games, less than 
two weeks after the TWA Flight 800 disaster, a 
pipe bomb exploded at Centennial Olympic 
Park in Atlanta, Georgia, killing two people and 
injuring more than one hundred others. The FBI 
said that the pipe bomb looked "homemade" 
with "nails and screws attached." They 
suspected domestic terrorists, and members o f 
local militia groups were questioned without 
any results. The Olympic flag flew at half-mast 
and Olympic athletes and spectators became 
tense and worried. Lines to attend Olympic 
events became even longer than before; 
spectators were submitted to more thorough 
scrutiny as they passed through metal detectors 
and had their bags inspected. During the 
Games, Atlanta had been under surveillance by 
more than 30,000 law enforcement officials, 
and the Olympic Committee and the city had 
spent over $300 million on security efforts. Yet 
even these measures were not able to prevent 
the bombing in Centennial Olympic Park. The 
Committee had been proud o f the organization 
and location o f  the Games. They had spent 
years planning for the Games and there were no 
major problems up to that point. The attack 
dampened their spirits. But it was a temporary 
setback and the Games continued to a 
successful conclusion. The FBI named a 
suspect: Richard Jewell, a security guard who 
had spotted the bomb. His name was leaked to 
the press as the primary suspect and the story 
appeared in newspapers around the world.
Much to the embarrassment o f the FBI, 
however, they were unable to come up with any 
proof or physical evidence linking Jewell to the 
bombing. The investigations o f  the FBI and 
local authorities have not produced any other 
suspects. Recently, a $500,000 reward was 
offered for information leading to the arrest and 
conviction o f those responsible. While the 
response has been encouraging, there has been 
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A bomb in a 1993 Ford truck exploded at 9:02 
a.m. at the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building at Fifth and Hudson Streets in 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 
169—including 19 children—and injuring over 
500. Among the dead were 15 children who 
were in the America's Kids day which was 
destroyed when the second story o f the building 
collapsed. Two people were found dead in a 
neighboring building that had been damaged. 
People heard the blast from 50 miles away. At 
least 75 buildings were condemned and at least 
312 damaged. Ten buildings collapsed. Damage 
estimates ranged from $750 million to $1 
billion. Approximately 250 children lost one or 
both o f their parents in the blast. The bomb 
likely contained at least 4800 pounds o f 
explosives including fuel oil and ammonium 
nitrate, a fertilizer ingredient. Federal 
employees in the building worked for the Social 
Security Administration; the Departments of 
Health and Human Services, Labor,
Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, Defense,
Housing and Urban Development; the Secret 
Service; the Drug Enforcement Agency; the 
General Services Administration; the United 
States Customs Service; the Bureau o f Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms; and the General 
Accounting Office. Federal facilities around 
the country were evacuated when several hoax 
bomb threats were received. April 21 the United 
States Department o f Justice reported the arrest 
James McVeigh, 27, a member o f the 
right-wing Michigan Militia, which views the 
United States government as the enemy o f the 
common man. McVeigh was angry with the 
federal raid on the Branch Davidian compound 
in as, two years earlier, in which scores died. 
Eight minutes after the bomb went off,
McVeigh was picked up in a 1977 Mercury 
Marquis 20 miles from the bombing site on a 
traffic offense; federal authorities did not know 
until later that he was in custody. Police found 
residues o f ammonium nitrate and high 











Eight militant Muslim fundamentalists are 
arrested in New York for plotting to blow up 
the United Nations headquarters, tunnels under 
the Hudson River and a federal office building. 
The arrestees were from Sudan, Egypt, the 









CD A bomb exploded in the World Trade Center in CD <3
c New York City. The World Trade Center is the s 3o*
w
C/3
second tallest building in the world, where more 5'oa O3 3
— than 100,000 people work and visit every day. 3* CDX
vO
v oOJ The bomb exploded in the parking structure CD3
underneath the building, damaging the E7T
infrastructure and subway tunnels. Smoke C/2
reached the top o f the 110-story building in
minutes. Six people were killed; more than
1,000 were injured. The FBI joined the Joint
Terrorist Task Force in the investigation, which
eventually brought 22 Islamic fundamentalist
conspirators to trial. The trial revealed extensive
plans to use terrorism to wreak havoc in the
United States, including targeting government
facilities.
7 «—1 c An explosion ripped through the Arco chemical n CO









o Liberation Front phoned Agence France-Presse £ L TO*
in Amman and claimed it had exploded a o TO
factory in Texas that supplies chemical weapons 3GO I .
to the American Army. The caller did not CD
£3
VI
specify the date or location o f  the attack, but £7T
threatened that the groups would ‘'strike at any cn
target in the United States,’’saying that his
group was capable of choosing the “venue and
the date.”
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8 June, 1990
A bomb went o ff outside the Cuban Museum of 
Art and Culture in Miami's "Little Havana" 
section at lam , causing $20,000 to two 
paintings and a sculpture included among the 
works o f  15 Marielista artists. The blast also left 
a hole in the sidewalk. No injuries were 
reported. The museum was exhibiting a 
celebration o f the 10th anniversary of the Mariel 
boatlift. The same museum was bombed in May 
1988. The FBI called the bombing an act o f 
terrorism tied to political differences within the 
Cuban exile community. The FBI was 
investigating 16 other homemade bombs which 
had exploded or were discovered in Dade 
County since May 1987. No arrests had been 








Two Berkeley, California, bookstores that had 
sold all o f their copies o f Salman Rushdie’s The 
Satanic Verses were firebombed. Codv’s 
Books and a Waldenbooks were damaged when 
bottles filled with flammable liquid were 









1 2 A pipe-bomb damaged the Cuban Museum of 03 8 P
0 Art and Culture in Miami’s Little Havana r- “T3m 3 cr
— district. The museum has been the focus o f
Om
5* a*o 3 3





to initiate dialogue with the Castro retime.






Hackensack police arrested Yu Kikumura, 35, a 
suspected Japanese Red Army member, at 7 
a.m. at the Vince Lombardi rest station in 
Ridgefield off the New Jersey Turnpike with 3 
powerful homemade bombs. State police officer 
Robert Cieplensky noticed empty gunpowder 
boxes on the back seat o f  Kikumura's 1980 
Mazda when the officer signaled him to pull 
over. Police found three sophisticated and 
powerful 18-inch antipersonnel bombs in fire 
extinguisher canisters, a  complete detonating 
system and additional materials and 
bomb-making tools (including rifle powder, six 
gunpowder containers, a  plastic funnel, wire 
cutters, pliers, tubes of glue, and a hacksaw).
An FBI bomb expert said the bombs could have 
"destroyed the car and a substantial part o f a 
normal dwelling."
Magistrate Ronald J. Hedges had him held 
without bail for possession o f the bombs and 
entering the US at Kennedy International 
Airport on March 8 with a fraudulent 3-month 
visa obtained in Paris on February 23 by using a 
stolen Japanese passport. He faced charges that 
carry penalties of up to 90 years in prison and 
$260,000 in fines. He was remanded to federal 
custody at the Metropolitan Correctional Center 
in Manhattan. Public defender Thomas Higgins 
was assigned to defend him. At the time o f  his 
arrest, Kikumura was carrying a card for a 
Swiss bank account and an account statement 
from a West German bank, written in German. 
He also had $3600 in $100 bills, $49 in lower 
denominations, an Air France airline ticket, 
international airline schedules, and maps o f 
Florida, Massachusetts, Tennessee, New York 
City and the New York subway system. The 
New York City map contained pinholes of 
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The Federal Bureau o f  Investigation arrested 
Victor Vancier (Chiam Ben Yosef), 30, leader 
o f the Jewish Defense League; Jay Cohen, 23; 
and Sharon Katz, 44, all o f  New York City, for 
a  series o f fire bombings, a pipe bombing, and a 
tear gas attack at a Soviet dance troupe’s 
opening in Lincoln Center in which 20 people 





























A fire bomb exploded outside Lincoln Center’s 
Avery Fisher concert hall in New York City 
where the Moscow state Orchestra was to 
perform in its first appearance in New York 
since 1979. The bomb caused minor damage 
but no injuries. Three plastic canisters 
containing a flammable liquid were found at the 
hall entrance. A caller to a news agency said, 
“There will be no Soviet Nazi performance until 
three million Soviet Jews are freed. Never 
again,” which may indicate that the bombing 
was a work of the Jewish Defense League. On 
Aug. 13, 1987, Victor Vancier, 30, Murray 
Young, 59, and Jay Cohen, 24, pleaded guilty to 
charges o f racketeering and bombings aimed at 




























Three bombs exploded at 9 a.m. at the federal 
building, a Jax restaurant, and a luggage store in 
Coeur d’Arlene, Idaho. A fourth bomb was 
diffused atop the Armed Forces recruiting 
center. On October 3 rd Aryan Nations church 
members David Dorr and Edward and Olive 





















In Houston, Texas, two homemade pipe bombs 
exploded at the Daar Us Salaam Mosque 
causing $50,000 damage. Authorities viewed 
the attack as a protest against the holding of 


























In a phone call, the United Freedom Front 
warned a Navy recruitment office in East 
Meadow, New York, o f bombs hidden in 
attache cases. After clearing the building, 
police covered the two attache cases, which had 
been affixed to the east and west staircases, 
with blast-absorbing blankets. Minutes later the 
bombs exploded, causing heavy damage to the 
stairwells. The terrorist group’s communique 








1 c Three explosions at Hotel Rajneesh in CO DO >
7 downtown Portland, Oregon, injured two, £ o3
3
including the suspected terrorist. Stephen P. 5* or h
OO Paster, who was charged with first-degree OQ Cm .3fD
arson, was seriously injured with bums to his CDC/3■ i—
hands, arms, face, and torso. A policeman
■J
or
suffered minor injuries from smoke inhalation. o
The incident was related to growing hostility o ’3
against guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and his
followers who had purchased large
landholdings in Oregon.
1 C—I £3 Officials in Abbeville and Delcambre, n c




£ receiving threats that cyanide had been dumped £ 5. o<
— into the water. More than 13,000 homes were O•t
£OO 3
'O
oo without water. Water had been cut off in the c/a cr*<
southern Louisiana town o f St. Gabriel the *o a*<
previous week for similar reasons. Chlorine *<
£
3^
was added to the water to neutralize any Q-CD
cyanide.
1 o The Fuerzas Armadas Liberation Nacional w 03 3  - n
9 fDoCD (FALN) set off four bombs in Manhattan that
O
3_»




injured three people, including one whose leg 5* crC/2 3 ZS . 1
CD was amputated. One blast at 9:25 pm damaged CTOC/2 S-*
sO the Brooklyn Federal courthouse; the other
cn c  
CD
OOto blasts occurred in lower Manhattan. A fifth o
bomb, made o f four sticks o f  dynamite, a 2?.o '
blasting cap, a nine-volt battery, and a pocket p3
watch, was deactivated in lower Manhattan.






A powerful bomb exploded at 7:40 pm at a 
Westchester County, New York, International 
Business Machines office in Harrison, causing 
no injuries. The bomb went o ff four hours after 
a bomb had exploded at a South African 
transport office on Long Island (see next case). 
International Business Machines has extensive 
operations in South Africa. The IBM office, 
one o f 27 facilities in the country, was a sales 
and service branch where 500 persons usually 
work. Only about 30 — all o f  whom were 
evacuated — were in the building when a 
telephoned warning was received a few minutes 














A bomb exploded at 3:00 pm after one hundred 
people were evacuated from an Elmont, New 
York, building that housed the South African 
Railways Procurement office. No injuries were 
reported. An anonymous phone caller had sent 












2 C/5o The Federal Bureau o f  Investigation reported 03 00 ?3 rq
2 T3 that 12:40 am. an improvised explosive device 3f-)
o
3 S r*t V
3 exploded at Bankers Trust, 280 Park Avenue, 5 ‘ cr 3 2 : 3 1cro New York City. The explosion caused (TO 03 1
extensive damage to Bankers Trust and some 2 c3 a
oo glass damage to the building across the street S3- 0 * 1'tsJ triggered at 300 Park Avenue. No injuries were a>
reported. The FALN claimed responsibility.
2 c—lc At 5:45 p.m. a pipe bomb exploded at a  travel 03 35 n•*>J office in New York. The offices and for nearby 3 “5 ’TO 0£>




OOto Investigation believed the Croatian Freedom crc 3cr rq
Fighters were responsible. The Bureau said the a0
Croatian Freedom Fighters are a generic name a0
used by the Croatian National Resistance, an 3
international anti-Yugoslav organization dcTT
committed to the establishment o f  Croatia. The sr
name is used claim responsibility for terrorist 00
attacks.





At 8:30 a.m. the bomb squad o f the New York 
police department discovered a pipe bomb 
scheduled to detonate at 9:20 a.m. in front o f 
the Yugoslav Airlines office in New York City. 
Police diffused the bomb, believed by the 
Federal Bureau o f  Investigation to have been 









2 2 Puerto Armed Forces o f National Liberation CD CO 3 *n
5 S3—1 (FALN) bombed the New York and American £. o3 2 - >  o ' r*=r Stock Exchanges, the New York headquarters 5 ' crw 3 Z2- i
vO of Merrill Lynch, and Chase Manhattan Bank at (JQC/3 •  152. T3ooto midnight, causing extensive damage but no
C/5 c  
CD
injuries. The blasts came on the 28th o
anniversary o f the Puerto Rican nationalist so'
attack on the House o f Representatives in which S33
five congressmen were wounded by gunfire.
Since 1974, the FALN has claimed credit for
one hundred twenty bombings in New York
City, Washington, D.C., and Chicago.
2 ■n The Federal Bureau o f Investigation reported CD CO
6
vU
CT* that a bomb exploded at the New York Stock £. o3 >
d
p Exchange, 18 Broad Street, New York City. An 5* crC/5 Zi
improvised explosive device was placed next to OQC/3
i
" O
soo a glass door on the north side of the building
ca
to causing extensive damage to a metal security o
door, glass doors and windows, and two sc T
windows in adjacent buildings. Parts o f a to
timing device were recovered. The Associated 3»
Press in New York City received a call from a O *£3
male with a Spanish accent who stated that a EL
communique from the Puerto Rican Armed CO*CO
Forces o f National Liberation (FALN) had been
left in a telephone booth at 91st and Riverside
Drive claiming FALN responsibility for these
incidents. No injuries were reported.





The Federal Bureau o f  Investigation reported 
that a bomb exploded at the Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York 
City. The device was placed between a pillar 
and a window on Nassau Street, causing 
extensive glass damage to the Plaza entrance 
level at the mezzanine level. A witness 
observed gray smoke and the strong order o f 
cordite but did not see the perpetrator. No 
injuries were reported. The Puerto Rican 










2 The Federal Bureau o f Investigation reported ro 03 3 -nCn In*.
8
V.W
cr that a bomb exploded at the Merrill Lynch o3
s. >  
o* r££3 Office, 1 Liberty Plaza, New York City. An u>Z3 ct* 3 Z  — 1
improvised device had been placed at the (JO S ’ -o
VOOO Cortland Street entrance. Extensive damage
cn c CD
NJ was caused to glass in the building. No O
physical evidence was recovered. No injuries 2?.o"
were reported. The Puerto Rican Armed Forces 033
of National Liberation (FALN) was believed
responsible.
2 T1 The Federal Bureau o f Investigation reported a a 03 305 ^
9 cr'-i bomb exploded at the American Stock X
o
3 5 ‘ Ee03 Exchange at 86 Trinity Place, New York City. U2-3* CT* 3 z  =* 1v; An improvised explosive device was placed on (TO S ' -a
VOOO a window sill causing damage to windows on
cn e CD "■tto the street level. No witnesses were reported and o
no evidence was recovered. There were no 5o'
injuries. The FBI believed to the Puerto Rican 033
Armed Forces o f National Liberation (FALN)
was responsible.
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3 T J According to Federal Bureau o f Investigation, at CO CO r s
0
tu




03 bombs exploded at the administration building, Cl5 * crC/3 O
o f the University of Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras, OQ 5.o ‘
OO Puerto Rico. The two devices consisted o f a
03
3
N J propane tank, a 5 by 2 inch pipe bomb, external 33
packages o f  high explosives, a clock timing o ‘3
mechanism, and an electric blasting. The B-
communique claiming credit for this incident C/3*C/3
reportedly urged students to form semi-
clandestine groups to fight against American
imperialism. No injuries were reported. The
FBI believed the Antonia Martinez student
commandos responsible. The FBI indicated
that the group is composed o f anti-United States
university students and is named for Antonia
Martinez, a student at the University o f  Puerto
Rico who was killed during a  you UPR riot on
March 4th, 1970, while standing on the porch of
a boarding house near the campus. Martinez,
19, was struck in the head by a bullet. Among
radical students she is considered to be a
martyr.
(a) —attempt 
(t) — credible threat
Summary:
Targets: 25 buildings, 2 subway, 1 park, 1 chemical plant, 1 water supply 
Method: 26 conventional explosives, 3 fire bombs, 1 poison
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Explain Purpose
'This interview is part of a larger study to identify and prioritize strategies to mitigate 
the impact o f terrorist attacks against urban infrastructure."
Obtain Consent
"As we discussed, the interview will be taped to help me to tabulate the highlights of 
the many conversations in the most accurate way. Is that still agreeable to you?"
Introduction
"There are several broad questions that I'd like to ask o f you. As someone who has 
responsibility for dealing with the possibility of terrorist attacks, there are several 
important questions I’d like to ask you."
Questions (based on literature review and review o f attacks against urban 
infrastructure meeting criteria for this study over the past twenty years)
1. What do you consider the most likely urban target(s) for terrorist attack?
2. Why?
3. Why do you think it/they are they vulnerable?
4. Which terrorist group(s) do you consider the most likely to launch a 
domestic attack? Right/left, foreign/domestic, specific?
5. What do you consider the most likely method(s) o f  terrorist attack against 
an urban target? (conventional/nuclear/biological/chemical)
6. Given the broad range o f weapons, including weapons o f mass destruction, 
that may be employed by terrorists, what ways of protecting urban targets 
do you consider most promising? Least promising?
7. What should we be doing differently to protect urban targets?
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8. Who should be primarily responsible for ensuring our cities are prepared 
for a terrorist attack?
9. How can involved agencies play a more effective role?
10. What do you consider to be the downside or unintended impacts o f 
enhancing the protection of urban areas against terrorist attack?
11. What might be some unintended outcomes that must be considered in 
strengthening the preparation of urban infrastructure for terrorist attacks?
Debrief
'"Thank you so much for both your time and expertise. You have provided valuable 
information that should be o f great assistance in this study. Your efforts in this 
interview are part o f the larger study and, as discussed earlier, a final report will be 
available in the Summer of 2001. I'd be happy to send you a summary."
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